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DEDICATION
WESTMINSTER COLLEGE OF LAW 1912-1957
It is with great pride that the Denver Law Journal dedicates
this Anniversary Issue to the alumni of the Westminster College
of Law and to its distinguished faculty and trustees.
Organized as a night law school in 1912, Westminster gradu-
ated some 700 attorneys during the following 45 years. In 1957,
Westminster was merged into the University of Denver College
of Law. The new school has maintained the night division and
created the Westminster Law Library as a tribute to West-
minster College of Law.
Mention of the College's many distinguished graduates, sev-
eral of whom served in later years as trustees, officers, teach-
ers, and advisors of the institution, would require space not
available here. Among the College's graduates are a Governor,
United States Secretaries of Agriculture and of the Interior, a
member of the Federal Power Commission, numerous judges at
every level of the judicial system, several district attorneys, city
councilmen, bankers, corporation presidents, and other commu-
nity leaders beyond count.
Deans John Murray, Hamlet J. Barry, Clifford W. Mills, and
William Hedges Robinson, Registrars John E. Nelson, William
E. Doyle, and Nellie Ryan, as well as trustees Benjamin Hilliard,
Jr., Barnard B. Carraher, Marshall Reddish, Horace N. Hawkins,
Charles H. Haines, John W. Shireman, Charles A. Baer, and
Sydney E. Shuteran, devoted much time and attention during
many years to the school's management. Most of them, in addi-
tion to Max D. Melville, Allen Moore, Morrison Shafroth, Harry
Riddle, Albert Vogl, Frank A. Wachob, Hubert D. Henry, Rich-
ard D. Ryan, Fred M. Winner, Joseph E. Cook, and others,
served as teachers for years with little or no compensation,
simply for love of their profession and out of deep sympathy
for the students in their evening endeavors to become mem-
bers of that profession. Almost without exception, the students
held daytime jobs, but even during times of financial depres-
sion and war, struggled on to their goal.
It is indeed fitting that this issue of the Journal be dedi-
cated to these men and women - students, teachers, and officials
of an institution which will never be forgotten by its graduates.
Norma L. Comstock*
* Attorney, Denver, Colorado; LL.B., 1932, Westminster College of Law;
formerly a Member of the Board of Trustees and faculty of the West-
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FAMILY PROTECTION UNDER THE
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
By L. WILLIAM SCHMMIT, JR.*
The Colorado Legislature recently adopted a modified form
of the Uniform Probate Code to replace the multitude of
statutes previously constituting the probate system. Mr. Schmidt
analyzes present Colorado law protecting the immediate family
of the decedent and discusses what the Uniform Code changes
mean to the practicing attorney. The treatment, analytical
rather than argumentative, provides a realistic appraisal of the
two systems.
INTRODUCTION
T HE probate laws of all states make some provision for the
protection of the immediate family of a decedent. Such
laws are designed not only to protect the immediate family by
giving them preference over general creditors of the decendent
with respect to certain assets, but they are also intended to
protect the family from intentional or unintentional disinheri-
tance by the decedent. The law, of course, must strike some
balance between the need to protect the immediate family and
the desire to protect the creditors of the decedent. The legisla-
ture usually decides that certain assets and certain amounts
of money represent minimum standards which should be sub-
ject to protection in favor of the family. The protection af-
forded may take different forms depending upon whether the
person protected is the spouse of the decedent or one of the
decedent's children. The Uniform Probate Code (Code) recog-
nizes the necessity for protecting the immediate family. In
some cases, the protection afforded is not significantly differ-
ent from that already provided by Colorado law. However, in
*Partner, Holland & Hart, Denver, Colorado; B.A., 1959, University of
Colorado; J.D., 1962, University of Michigan. The author wishes to
acknowledge the valuable assistance of Marilyn M. Rodriguez, senior
student at the University of Denver College of Law, who contributed
in the research and preparation of this article.
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other cases such as the elective share of the surviving spouse,
the changes are quite drastic.
The Colorado Bar Association Study Committee on the Uni-
form Probate Code was appointed to consider the advisability
of adopting the Code in Colorado. After an extensive effort,
a proposed Colorado Probate Code was approved by the Board
of Governors of the Colorado Bar Association. Senate Joint
Resolution No. 7 of the 1972 Colorado General Assembly1
directed the Legislative Council to study the Code and the
effect that its passage would have on Colorado law. Hearings
were conducted with the result that the Colorado Probate Code
was proposed in the 1973 session in the form of House Bill No.
1039. At the time this article is being written, the Colorado
Probate Code has been approved by the House of Representa-
tives and is awaiting hearings in the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee. Except as otherwise noted, the recommendations of the
Colorado Bar Association Subcommittee on Article II were ap-
proved by the House of Representatives.
I. CURRENT COLORADO FAMILY ALLOWANCE
AND HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION
A. The Family Allowance
The present Colorado statutes provide considerable protec-
tion for the immediate family of a decedent. These protections
primarily take the form of the family allowance2 and the
homestead exemption.3 Under the family allowance statute, the
surviving spouse or minor children of a decedent are allowed
to claim $7,500 worth of cash and assets from the estate. The
family allowance has been described by the Colorado Supreme
Court as a temporary measure "designed to help the widow
during the period of administration of her husband's estate.
' '4
Although early Colorado law limited the benefit to widows, the
language of the present statute makes it clear that a surviving
husband is also entitled to claim the allowance from the estate
of his deceased wife.) The allowance is not received auto-
matically. A written application must be filed on or before the
I S.J. Res. 7, [1972] Colo. Sess. Laws 653.
2 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-12-16(2) (a) (Supp. 1969).
:3Id. § 77-3-4 (1963).
4 Wallace v. First Nat'l Bank, 125 Colo. 584, 598, 246 P.2d 894, 901 (1952).
See also Zackheim v. Zackheim, 75 Colo. 161, 225 P. 268 (1924); Rem-
ington v. Remington, 72 Colo. 132, 209 P. 802 (1922); Grover v. Clover,
69 Colo. 72, 169 P. 578 (1917); Deeble v. Alerton, 58 Colo. 166, 143 P.
1096 (1914).
;CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-12-16(2) (a) (Supp. 1969) provides, in
part, that "he or she shall be allowed to have and retain as his or her
sole and separate property . . . ." (emphasis added).
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date fixed in the notice to creditors as the last date for filing
claims." Colorado case law has held that the claim must be
under oath and filed within 6 months after the issuance of
letters of administration.
7
The present Colorado statute does not seem to require
that the claimant of the family allowance be a Colorado resi-
dent. Although earlier cases in this area held that Colorado
residence was a prerequisite to a surviving spouse's or minor
child's right to claim the family allowance," these cases were
decided under earlier versions of the statute which expressly
limited the allowance to a "widow residing in this State."9
Tn 1953 the statute was amended to avoid any reference to resi-
dence within the state, 10 and no subsequent cases on this ques-
tion have been presented.
The $7,500 allowance may be taken in the form of cash,
specific personal property, or any combination of the two.
If specific items of personal property are chosen, the court
may order an appraisal of the estimated value of the selected
property." The allowance was originally designed to give the
widow a right to certain articles of personal property formerly
belonging to her husband "so that she would not be stripped
of the means with which to carry on.' 2 A common practice
today where the estate is solvent is to take the family auto-
mobile, furniture, and personal effects in partial satisfaction
of the amount.
Under the present statutory scheme, the family allowance
-a fourth class claim- takes priority over the claims of the
decedent's general creditors."13 Where there is insufficient per-
sonal property in the estate to provide the entire $7,500, real
property in the estate may be sold. 4 However, the family al-
lowance is not superior to a valid mortgage and only the
equity may be used to satisfy the allowance.' 5 If the estate's
6COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-12-12(1) (1963).
7 Wigington v. Wigington, 112 Colo. 78, 145 P.2d 980 (1944).
s E.g., Lyons v. Egan, 107 Colo. 32, 108 P.2d 873 (1940).
9 Ch. 109, [1935] Colo. Sess. Laws 398.
III CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-12-16 (Supp. 1969), formerly ch. 252, §
211, [19531 Colo. Sess. Laws 673.
11Id. § 153-12-18 (1963).
12 Wallace v. First Nat'l Bank, 125 Colo. 584, 598, 246 P.2d 894, 901 (1952).
:COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 153-12-2(1) (e)-(f) (1963).
'Id. § 153-12-19. See Pinnacle Gold Mining Co. v. Propst, 54 Colo. 451,
131 P. 413 (1913).
'--See Bennet v. Reef, 16 Colo. 431, 27 P. 252 (1891). The deficit in the
widow's allowance may also be paid out of the rents of the real estate.
Logan v. Logan, 11 Colo. 44, 17 P. 99 (1888).
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insufficiency to pay the allowance was caused by a gratuitous
conveyance by the decedent during his or her lifetime, at least
one Colorado case has held that the surviving spouse may not
complain of the conveyance since he or she has no right to
an allowance during the decedent's lifetime.'" The right to
the family allowance exists regardless of whether the decedent
left a will or whether the will was admitted to probate.'
7
Similarly, the fact that one claiming the allowance is entitled
to a distributive share of the estate has no effect upon the
right to the full family allowance.'8 The statute specifically
provides that the family allowance shall be exempt from at-
tachment, execution, and other process.' 9 The exemption bars
only the general creditors of the estate, however, and the
allowance is not beyond the 'reach of the widow's personal
creditors. 20 The surviving spouse's right to claim the family
allowance may be voluntarily and expressly waived, as in a
valid antenuptial agreement21 or separate maintenance agree-
ment, 22 but the waiver must be clear and specific. 23 Since the
right to the allowance vests upon the decedent's death, sub-
ject to timely application, the surviving spouse's remarriage
does not affect her right to the allowance.
24
B. The Homestead Exemption
If a decedent was possessed of a homestead exemption at
the time of his or her death, the surviving spouse or minor
children are entitled to the exemption. 25 At present, the statu-
tory amount of the homestead exemption is $5,000. This sum
must be paid to the surviving spouse or children from the
proceeds of any sale of homesteaded property. The homestead
exemption is in addition to the family allowance, and the
decedent's beneficiaries other than the spouse have no in-
terest in the homestead of the surviving spouse. The purpose
of the homestead law is to "preserve a right of occupancy
16 Norris v. Bradshaw, 96 Colo. 594, 45 P.2d 638 (1935).
1' Williams v. Pollard, 101 Colo. 262, 72 P.2d 476 (1937).
18 Id.
19 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 153-12-16(2)(a) (Supp. 1969).
2 Wallace v. First Nat'l Bank, 125 Colo. 584, 598, 246 P.2d 894, 901 (1952);
Isbell-Kent-Oakes Dry Goods Co. v. Larimer County Bank & Trust
Co., 75 Colo. 451, 226 P. 293 (1924).
21 See, e.g., Maher v. Knauss, 150 Colo. 108, 370 P.2d 1017 (1962); Griffee v.
Griffee, 108 Colo. 366, 117 P.2d 823 (1941).
22 Brimble v. Sickler, 83 Colo. 494, 266 P. 497 (1928).
23 Bradley v. Bradley, 106 Colo. 500, 106 P.2d 1063 (1940); Deeble v.
Alerton, 58 Colo. 166, 143 P. 1096 (1914).
24 See Hale v. Burford, 73 Colo. 197, 214 P. 543 (1923).
2 5
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 77-3-4 (1963).
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for those who stand in the relation of the head of a family."26
The surviving spouse becomes the head of the family imme-
diately upon his or her spouse's death, and therefore has a
continuing right to occupy the homesteaded property until
the amount of the homestead allowance is paid.
II. THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE ALLOWANCES AND EXEMPTIONS
A. The Family Allowance
The underlying premise upon which the family allowance
portion of the Code2 7 is based is that a surviving spouse should
receive a monetary support allowance "off the top" of the
decedent's estate in the year following death.2 8 Under the Code,
the family of a decedent who was domiciled in the state would
be entitled to a "reasonable" allowance for maintenance dur-
ing the period of administration. 2 The purpose of the Code's
allowance is the same as that already announced for Colo-
rado's present allowance: to provide support for the family
while the estate is undergoing administration. 30 Instead of
authorizing a uniform fixed sum to be allowed in all cases,
the Code calls for a flexible or "reasonable" amount. In each
case a number of factors, including need, would be considered
in determining the amount of the allowance. 31 Nevertheless,
the Code would impose several limitations on the amount.
First, the allowance could not exceed $500 per month or $6,000
per year unless the family member or representative of the
estate petitioned the court for a larger amount.32 In addi-
tion, since the family allowance takes preference over claims
of general creditors, the court could not continue the allowance
for longer than 1 year if the estate were inadequate to dis-
charge allowed claims.
33
Those entitled to claim the family allowance under the
Code would include the surviving spouse, minor children whom
the decedent was obligated to support, and children who were
in fact being supported by the decedent.34 Although the Gen-
21 Wallace v. First Nat'l Bank, 125 Colo. 584, 593, 246 P.2d 894, 898 (1952).
7 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-403 [hereinafter cited as CODE].
: REPORT OF COLORADO SUBCOMMITTEE ON ARTICLE II (Intestate Succession
& Wills) OF UNIFORM PROBATE CODE (1972) [hereinafter cited as the
COLORADO SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT].
"1' Effland, Rights of the Surviving Spouse & Children, UNIFORM PROBATE
CODE PRACTICE MANUAL § 4.9, at 56 (1972).
34 Id.
:' CODE § 2-403.
:;2 Id. § 2-404.
3;3 Id.
;14 Id. § 2-403.
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
eral Comment to Part 4 of the Code expressly provides that
the family allowance should be granted only where the de-
cedent was domiciled in the state, it does not require the
spouse to be a resident.5
If a person entitled to the family allowance dies, his right
to any future payment terminates. The family allowance is
not reduced by any amount passing by intestate succession nor
by the surviving spouse's elective share. Similarly, it would
not be charged against any bequest in the decedent's will
unless the will expressly provided otherwise.3"
B. Exempt Property
Under the Code, the exemption of the surviving spouse
or children for household goods and other personal property
is a separate provision from the family allowance provision.
Code section 2-402 would permit the surviving spouse or chil-
dren to select up to $3,500 worth of household furniture, auto-
mobiles, furnishings, appliances, and personal effects of a de-
cedent domiciliary. This provision was designed to relieve the
personal representative of the duty to sell household chattels
when there are family members who would have them 7 The
personal representative would have the power to execute the
appropriate documents to establish ownership of the property
taken as exempt.
38
If the selected chattels were encumbered so that their
net unencumbered value is less than $3,500, or if the exempt
property in the estate does not amount to $3,500, the surviving
spouse or children would be entitled to other estate property,
including cash, to make up the $3,500 amount." On the other
hand, a claimant may be able to choose more than the $3,500
worth of property in certain circumstances. Professor Effland
of the Arizona State College of Law gives the following
example:
Suppcse that the surviving spouse wishes to select two
items of normally exempt property, houselold furnishings in
the amount of $2,000 and an automobile valued at $2,100, none
of these items having been specifically devised. The spouse
is entitled to exempt property in a value not exceeding $3,500
and the selected items exceed this by $600. However, al-
35 This appears to be in conformity with present Colorado law. At least
one commentator, however, writes that the surviving spouse must be
domiciled in the state. Effland, supra note 29, § 4.9, at 56.
36 CODE § 2-403.
37 Id. Art. II, Part 4, General Comment.
38 Id. § 2-404.
39 Id. Art. II, Part 4, General Comment.
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though the Code has no express provision for this situation,
there appears to be no reason why the spouse could not select
these items by paying to the personal representative the $600
excess. This would in effect be a selection of exempt property
in the amount of $3,500 and a sale as to the $600, the personal
representative having full power to sell under Article III of
the Code.
40
If there is no surviving spouse, all of the decedent's
children (whether or not they are minors or dependents) are
entitled to share jointly the entire exemption.4' Generally, the
right to the exempt property is one given in addition to any
property passing to the surviving spouse or children under the
decedent's will, by intestate succession, or through the elec-
tive share.42 However, by an express provision in the will, a
testator may force the spouse or children to take certain prop-
erty under the will in lieu of any exempt property.
43
C. The Homestead Allowance
Two traditional features of homestead exemptions have
been to provide property for the family prior to claims of
general creditors and at the same time to provide a portion of
the estate which could not be taken away from the family by
the decedent's will. The Code retains both of these features
in a dollar allowance called a "homestead allowance. 4 4 The
Code suggests an amount of $5,000, but the precise amount is
left to the local legislature for determination at the time the
Code is adopted. If there were no surviving spouse, the allow-
ance would be divided equally among the decedent's minor
and dependent children.45 The homestead allowance, like the
family allowance, is given in addition to any intestate share
of a spouse or child, or the elective share of the spouse. It
is also independent of any share passing under the decedent's
will, unless the will specifically provides otherwise.
D. Recommendations of the Colorado Bar Association
Subcommittee on Article II
In summation, the provisions of the Code provide three
basic protections for the immediate family. The first is a
designated homestead allowance of $5,000. The second is a $3,500
exempt property allowance which is related primarily to tan-
41 Effland, supra note 29, § 4.9, at 59.
-41 CODE § 2-402.
42 Id. § 2-403.
43 Id. § 2-206.
41 Id. § 2-401.
45 Id.
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gible personal property. The third is a family allowance of
a reasonable amount with a limit of $500 per month or $6,000
per year.
The Colorado Bar Association Subcommittee on Article II
of the Uniform Probate Code recommended the adoption of
these provisions with certain modifications. The most sub-
stantial modification was the combination of the homestead
allowance and the exempt property allowance into a single
allowance designated as an "Exempt Property Allowance" which
is not tied to any particular type of property. This eliminates
the present distinction between these two types of allowances
relating to real estate and tangible personal property. In ad-
dition, it was recommended that the amount of the Exempt
Property Allowance be increased to $10,000 to conform with
the limits of the present Small Estates Act limit in Colorado.4 "
The combination of these two allowances under the Code is
$8,500. This means that the provisions dealing with homestead
exemptions after death need to be revoked.47 The provisions
dealing with the homestead exemption during lifetime would,
of course, not require any modification. Although there was
some sentiment that a family allowance of no set sum but
merely "a reasonable allowance" was too indefinite, the con-
sensus of the subcommittee was that a flexible standard is
desirable. Unfair advantage of such a standard is limited by
the necessity for court approval if the amount is to exceed
$500 per month or $6,000 per year. The allowance may not
continue for longer than one year if the estate is inadequate
to discharge allowed claims. Payment of the family allowance
is subordinated to the payment of the exempt property allow-
ance. Rights to exempt property and the family allowance
have priority over all claims, including funeral and admin-
istration expenses.
48
III. ELECTIVE SHARE OF SURVIVING SPOUSE
A. Present Colorado Law
Almost all states have some form of protection for a sur-
viving spouse against intentional disinheritance. Although some
arguments might be made against the advisability of such pro-
tection, the concept is very deeply rooted in the historical
foundations of probate law. The common law equivalent of
this probate protection was dower and curtesy.
• 4; COLORADO SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT.
47 The provisions that need to be revoked are found in CoLo. REV. STAT.




Notwithstanding the provisions of a testator's will, the
surviving spouse has the option to take one-half of the tes-
tator's estate. 4" In order to claim this elective share, the sur-
viving spouse must file a written election rejecting the pro-
visions of the will within 6 months from the date the will is
admitted to probate.5 " The failure to exercise the option within
the 6 month period is conclusive evidence of the consent of
the surviving spouse to the provisions of the will. Where an
election against the will is made, the electing spouse receives
any property which the testator specifically devised or be-
queathed to him or her plus enough additional property to
equal one-half of the aggregate value of the estate.5' All
classes of property in the estate are subject to the elective
share provisions, 52 and the interests of the beneficiaries are
abated proportionately insofar as is feasible.53 The right of
a surviving spouse to elect against the will is a personal priv-
ilege which does not pass to the spouse's heirs.54 Furthermore,
a surviving spouse's creditors may not compel him or her to
make the election.5 5 The right to elect may be voluntarily
waived before or during marriage by a valid prenuptial or
postnuptial agreement.
56
B. Problems with Existing Election Provisions
As a rule, the statutory election may be exercised only
against property which was owned by the testator at the time
of his death.5 7 This has resulted in various schemes to inten-
tionally disinherit a spouse, many of which have proved suc-
cessful. 58 For example, the decedent may have utilized various
"will substitutes" such as joint tenancy, lifetime gifts, funded
revocable trusts, and other similar nonprobate arrangements
having the effect of reducing the probate estate. Attempts to
defeat the rights of the surviving spouse can be successful
in Colorado if valid lifetime transfers or other arrangements
49 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-5-4 (1963).
50 Id. § 153-5-4(1).
51 Id. § 153-14-10(1).
5"Logan v. Logan, 11 Colo. 44, 17 P. 99 (1888).
53' Hart v. Hart, 95 Colo. 471, 37 P.2d 754 (1934); Binkley v. Switzer, 69
Colo. 176, 192 P. 500 (1920).
34 Gallup v. Rule, 81 Colo. 335, 255 P. 463 (1927).
55 DEutsch v. Rohlfing, 22 Colo. App. 534, 126 P. 1123 (1912).
See, e.g., Remington v. Remington, 69 Colo. 206. 193 P. 550 (1920)
(pcstnuptial agreement); Whipple v. Wessels, 66 Colo. 120, 180 P. 309
(1919) (prenuptial agreement).
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-5-4 (1963).
:, See, e.g., Comment, Defeating the Inheritance of the Surviving Spouse,
40 Miss. L.J. 286 (1969).
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have been concluded by the decedent during his lifetime.5 9
Although some of the Colorado cases on this subject have
invalidated lifetime transfers on the basis of fraud on the sur-
viving spouse, in those cases there were equally good legal
grounds, e.g., lack of effective delivery, for invalidation of the
transfer.60 One Colorado case affirms the right of the owner
of property to convey the same without the consent or knowl-
edge of his spouse or other heir, and the mere fact that the
conveyance deprives the surviving spouse of the right to in-
herit this property does not make it fraudulent or invalid.'
This case goes quite far in preventing the surviving spouse from
reaching property transferred during the lifetime of the de-
cedent by ruling that a deed must be executed before the
grantor's death but delivery may be after the grantor's death,
even where there is a reservation of a life estate to the grantor,
provided it was the intent of the grantor at the time of execu-
tion of the deed to pass a present interest in the property
with mere postponement of the possession or enjoyment of
the property.
C. Solution of the Uniform Probate Code
Article II, Part 2 of the Code, provides for the elective
share of the surviving spouse. This is possibly the most con-
troversial provision of the entire Code. In Michigan, which
has adopted the Code, the controversy over this provision
reached the point where all statutory protection against dis-
inheritance of a spouse was completely eliminated.
62
The Code provides that, if a married person domiciled in
the state dies, the surviving spouse has a right of election
to take a share equaling one-third of the "augmented estate"
of the decedent.63 The Colorado Subcommittee has recommended
that the elective share be increased to one-half of the aug-
mented estate to conform with existing Colorado law.
6 4 It
is the concept of the augmented estate which presents the
controversy with respect to the elective share provisions. As
has been seen, it is often possible for a decedent to inten-
59 See Rea, Election to Take the Statutory Share, 29 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 506
(1957).
60 Wolfe v. Mueller, 46 Colo. 335, 104 P. 487 (1909).
61 Thuet v. Thuet, 128 Colo. 54, 260 P.2d 604 (1953).
62 This is especially surprising in view of the fact that Professor Richard
V. Wellman, Chief Reporter for the Uniform Probate Code, is a Profes-
sor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School and was one of the
prime movers behind the Michigan probate revision.





tionally disinherit a surviving spouse by various nonprobate
techniques. , Conversely, a surviving spouse can, under some
circumstances, receive more of the decedent's estate than might
seem equitable. For example, a surviving spouse may have been
amply provided for by the decedent through life insurance, a
living trust, outright gifts by the decedent during his life-
time, or acquisition of property in joint tenancy, and still
elect to receive a share of the probate estate. It is the purpose
of the augmented estate concept to prevent both types of in-
equity."'
The augmented estate is defined in section 2-202 of the
Code and is computed on the basis of three elements. The
beginning point is the probate estate reduced by funeral and
administration expenses, the homestead allowance, family al-
lowances and exemptions, and enforceable claims. The second
element consists of property transferred by the decedent
during marriage to persons other than the surviving spouse.
The third element consists of property which has been trans-
ferred by the decedent to the surviving spouse. The first
element is fairly easily computed. The complexities arise with
respect to the second and third elements.
The last two elements described above are added to the
first element. In other words, certain transfers by the decedent
during lifetime must be added to the net probate estate in
computing the augmented estate. Only lifetime transfers for
which the decedent did not receive adequate and full con-
sideration in money or money's worth are to be added back
in computing the augmented estate. 7 The lifetime transfers
which are added back must come within certain defined cate-
gories. First, if the decedent makes a gratuitous transfer and
retains at the time of his death the possession or enjoyment of,
or right to income from, the property, then the property is
added to the augumented estate. Second, there are included all
properties to the extent that the decedent retained at the time
of his death a power, either alone or in conjunction with any
other person, to revoke, to consume, to invade, or to dispose
of the principal for his own benefit. Third, any property,
transferred so as to be held at the time of the decedent's
death by decedent and another with right of survivorship,
is added to the augmented estate. This would include joint
,Denver Nat'l Bank v. Von Brecht. 137 Colo. 88. 322 P.2d 667 (1958).
W; Effland, supra note 29, § 4.4, at 47.
67 CODE § 2-202(1).
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tenancy and tenancy by the entirety, but joint annuities are
specifically excluded. Finally, there is added to the augmented
estate any gratuitous transfer made by the decedent within 2
years of death, excepting gifts of $3,000 or less in each of those
years to any one donee. Contemplation of death is not a factor
with respect to such gifts, so proof of motive is immaterial.
Life insurance, accident insurance, or pensions payable to a
person other than the surviving spouse are not included in the
augmented estate. In computing the augmented estate, there
is added to the net probate estate all property falling within
any of the above categories, whether such transfers were made
to the surviving spouse or to some other person."
In computing the augmented estate against which the
election is made, we have so far discussed two basic steps.
The first of these involves computing the net probate estate
in the hands of the personal representative. The second step
involves adding to the net probate estate certain types of prop-
erty transfers made by the decedent during lifetime regard-
less of the transferee. This means that the surviving spouse
must include in the augmented estate all property which he
or she owns at the decedent's death to the extent that it is
derived from the decedent other than by will or intestate suc-
cession. The spouse must account for all such property even
though he or she may have already transferred it at the de-
cedent's death to someone else. This presents obvious problems
of tracing. Property owned by the surviving spouse at the
decedent's death or transferred by the spouse during the
decedent's lifetime is presumed to have been derived from
the decedent except to that extent that the surviving spouse
establishes that it was derived from another source." The
property owned by the surviving spouse which was derived
from the decedent is included in computing the augmented
estate, but it also reduces the amount of property which must
be contributed by others in satisfaction of the elective share
of the spouse.
As a very simple example of the operation of this com-
plicated concept, assume that we have an augmented estate
of $300,000. Let us further assume that the augmented estate
consists of a net probate estate in the amount of $100,000, plus
property having a value of $100,000 which was owned by the
decedent and the surviving spouse as joint tenants at the time
68 Id.
69 Id. § 2-202(3) (i).
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of the decedent's death, and an additional $100,000 which was
in a revocable living trust created by the decedent during
his lifetime. Suppose the decedent's will bequeaths everything
to his daughter and the living trust terminates with the re-
mainder being payable to decedent's son. Under the Colorado
Subcommittee recommendation, the surviving spouse would be
entitled to an elective share of one-half of the augmented estate
or $150,000. The surviving spouse would be required to account
for the $100,000 which she received as a surviving joint tenant.
The joint property would partially satisfy the elective share.
The next problem is the source of the additional $50,000 to
which the surviving spouse is entitled as a result of the elec-
tion. The balance of the elective share is payable out of the
remaining property of the augmented estate, without distinc-
tion between probate and nonprobate property. The liability
for the balance of the elective share is equitably apportioned
among the recipients of the augmented estate in proportion to
the value of their interests therein.4 ' This means that the son
and daughter would each be required to contribute $25,000
to the surviving spouse. Depending upon the nature of the
assets received under the will and trust, contribution by the
son and daughter should not present a serious problem since
they would have on hand the assets from which payment to
the surviving spouse could be made. Any person who is liable
for contribution may choose to give up the property received
by him or pay its value as of the time it is considered in com-
puting the augmented estate. 71 Property is valued as of the de-
cedent's death except for property given irrevocably to a donee
during the lifetime of the decedent which is valued as of the
date the donee came into possession or enjoyment of the prop-
erty.
72
A more difficult problem arises where property transferred
during the decedent's lifetime is brought back and added to
the augmented estate. The transferee is subject to contribu-
tion for his proportionate amount of the elective share even
though he may no longer own the transferred property. As-
sume a deceased parent has given his son $10,000 with which
to take a trip to Europe within 2 years of the date of death.
The son would be liable to contribute to the elective share.
A real hardship would exist if the amount of contribution
7", Id. § 2-207 (b).
7I Id. § 2-207(c).
72 Id. § 2-202 (2).
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of the son was very large and he did not have means of his
own with which to make the contribution. The tracing problem
in cases involving lifetime transfers is potentially compounded
because a donee of the transferee is liable for contribution to
the elective share to the extent the donee still has the trans-
ferred property or its proceeds at the decedent's death.
73
The right of the surviving spouse to elect may be waived
by a written contract signed after fair disclosure. This con-
templates the utilization of a prenuptial agreement or post-
nuptial agreement. In addition, any property transferred dur-
ing the lifetime of the decedent is excluded from the com-
putation of the augmented estate if it was made with the writ-
ten consent or joinder of the surviving spouse.74 This presents
a valuable estate planning tool in that it allows an individual
to assure against an election by his spouse with respect to any
specific lifetime transfer by having the spouse join in the
transfer.
The election to take the elective share is made by filing
with the court, and mailing or delivering to the personal repre-
sentative of decedent, a petition within 6 months after the
publication of notice to creditors. The Colorado Subcommittee
felt that this language in the Code is somewhat indefinite
and recommended that the petition be filed within 6 months
after the first publication of the notice to creditors.
Under the Code, the surviving spouse is permitted to re-
nounce any items that would otherwise be taken under the
decedent's will or by intestate succession and thus avoid hav-
ing to accept property specifically devised or bequeathed or
taken by operation of law. 75 This is inconsistent with present
Colorado law which provides that the court shall order the
distribution to the surviving spouse of the property specifi-
cally devised or bequeathed to him by the testator together
with such additional property as will equal one-half of the
testator's estate.76 The Colorado Subcommittee saw no com-
pelling reason to change the existing law, and recommended
changing the Code to this extent. The legislature agreed
that existing law is preferable and deleted the provision of
the Code permitting the surviving spouse to renounce any
items that would otherwise be taken under the decedent's will
or by intestate succession.
73 Id. § 2-207 (c).
74 Id.
75 Id. § 2-206 (a).
_'i COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-14-10 (1963).
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IV. OMTrED FAMILY MEMBERS
A. The Omitted Spouse
Present Colorado law provides that the subsequent mar-
riage of a testator revokes his will unless a contrary intention
is expressed in the will.77 The Code provides that a subsequent
marriage does not revoke a will, but a surviving spouse who
was not provided for in such a will is entitled to an intestate
share unless the will shows the omission to be intentional or
the testator provided for the spouse by a transfer outside the
will with the intention that such transfer be in lieu of a
testamentary provision.78 This approach is deemed preferable
to having the will revoked by the subsequent marriage, while
preserving for the surviving spouse a share of the estate. The
effect of this provision is perhaps to reduce the instances where
a spouse will claim an elective share.
B. Pretermitted Children
Under the present Colorado statute, a will is not revoked
by the subsequent birth of a child.79 However, unless it shall
appear by the terms of the will that it was the testator's in-
tention to disinherit a subsequently born child, that child is
entitled to an intestate share.80 The Code follows the same
basic rule and includes adopted children. 81 The reference to
adopted children is an extension of the Colorado law. How-
ever, a subsequently born or adopted child shall not receive
an intestate share if it appears from the will that the omission
was intentional. In addition to express omission, an intestate
share is not given where the testator had one or more children
at the time the will was executed and devised substantially
all his estate to the other parent of the omitted child. 82 Finally,
if the testator has provided for the omitted child by a trans-
fer outside the will, and if the intent that this transfer be in
lieu of a testamentary provision is shown by statements of
the testator or other evidence, then an intestate share is not
awarded.8 1 If the testator fails to provide in his will for a
living child because he believes that child to be dead, the child
receives an intestate share.84 The Code permits oral evidence
77 Id. § 153-5-3.
78 CODE § 2-301.
7
11 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-5-6 (Supp. 1965).
s" Id. § 153-5-6.
.14 CODE § 2-302.
. Id. § 2-302(a) (2).
.:3 Id. § 2-302(a) (3).
'4 Id. § 2-302 (b).
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to establish a testator's intent that lifetime gifts or nonprobate
transfers such as life insurance or joint accounts are in lieu
of a testamentary provision for a child born or adopted after
the will.
CONCLUSION
The provisions of the Uniform Probate Code providing for
the protection of the surviving spouse and children of a de-
cedent are not different in theory from the practice which
has existed in Colorado in the past. The approach is only
slightly different with respect to the exemptions and allow-
ances. The most significant change is with respect to the elec-
tion of the surviving spouse to take against the will. Although
the provisions are very complex and possibly conducive to
much litigation, the method of ascertaining the proper elec-
tive share of the spouse is much more consistent with the
basic theory of preventing intentional disinheritance. It is not
often that elections are made against the will, but the recom-
mendations of the Code would seem to provide a more honest
solution in those cases where the election is made.
POSTSCRIPT
Subsequent to the completion of this article, the Colorado
Legislature enacted a modified form of the Uniform Probate
Code, which will take effect July 1, 1974. Due to two last min-
ute changes in the Code prior to final enactment, certain points
made in this article need to be clarified. First, the Code as
finally passed made the amount of the Exempt Property Allow-
ance $7,500, instead of $10,000 as was recommended by the Colo-
rado Bar Association Subcommittee on Article II of the Uniform
Probate Code. Second, it was provided that a spouse can elect
to take one-half of the augmented estate or, in the alternative,
one-half of the inventoried estate. This preserves the current
Colorado election and grants a new form of election. However,
because of this change, the form of inequity which was sought
to be eliminated by the augmented estate concept, whereby a
spouse who has been adequately provided for during the dece-
dent's lifetime may still elect to take one-half of the inven-
toried estate, still exists under the Code.
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INTRODUCTION
T HE ninth amendment to the Constitution of the United
States reads: "The enumeration in the Constitution of cer-
tain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people." For nearly two centuries this lan-
guage was cited for little more than the general principles of
federalism and limited constitutional government." Indeed, the
ninth amendment was uniformly read in conjunction with the
tenth as a rule of construction limiting the power of the federal
government3 No substantive unenumerated rights under the
ninth were articulated by the Court. Mr. Justice Jackson, in
1955, characterized his understanding of the amendment:
What are those other rights "retained by the people?" . . . [T~he
ninth amendment rights which are not to be disturbed by the
federal government are still a mystery to me.4
Since 1965, however, new attention has been given the ninth
amendment. In that year, the Supreme Court delivered its now
famous decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, marking the first
instance of the ninth amendment's use in finding an unenumer-
ated, substantive right- the right of privacy in the marital
relationship. The issues resolved and those left unanswered by
Griswold's application of the amendment have been the subject
of much judicial and academic argument.
In Griswold the appellants were convicted in state court of
advising married people in the use of contraceptives. The Court
reversed the Connecticut convictions and struck down the stat-
ute in a 7-2 decision, embodying six separate opinions.
The decision is typically cited for the establishment of a
right to privacy in the marital relationship. Of interest to stu-
dents of the ninth amendment, however, Griswold also stands as
a promise, as yet unfulfilled, of substantive meaning for the
" See United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947):
[W]hen objection is made that the exercise of a federal power
infringes upon rights reserved by the Ninth and Tenth Amend-
ments, the inquiry must be directed toward the granted power
under which the action of the Union was taken. if granted
power is found, necessarily the objection of invasicn of those
rights, reserved by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, must
fail.
Id. at 96. See also Beaney, The Griswold Case and the Expanding Right
to Privacy, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 979; Kelley, The Uncertain Renaissance of
the Ninth Amendment, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 814 (1966); Van Loan, Natural
Rights and the Ninth Amendment, 48 B.U.L. REV. 1 (1968).
See Moore, Ninth Amendment: Its Origins and Meaning, 7 NEw ENG-
LAND L. REV. 215 (1972).
4 R. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COUIT AND THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF Gov-
ERNMENT 74-75 (1955).
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
VOL. 50
NINTH AMENDMENT
amendment. The right of marital privacy is arguably the first
unenumerated, substantive right recognized, at least in part,
under the ninth amendment, and it is conceivable that more
such rights could be "discovered." This article explores the
promise of Griswold and the subsequent federal decisions which
address the ninth amendment.' Beginning with three basic
formulations of the amendment set forth in Griswold, and trac-
ing these formulations through subsequent case law, the au-
thors offer a synthesis of ninth amendment doctrine-a syn-
thesis describing not only the current status of such doctrine,
but also one suggesting future uses of the amendment.
I. FROM Griswold: THREE VIEWS OF THE
NINTH AMENDMENT
Of the six opinions in Griswold, there are three distinct
views of the ninth amendment. These include (1) Douglas'
majority opinion, (2) the Goldberg concurrence, and (3) the
two dissents authored by Justices Stewart and Black. Neither
the Harlan nor the White opinions addressed the ninth amend-
ment.
A. The Douglas Position
The majority opinion in Griswold, written by Justice
Douglas, has been widely hailed as the source of the so-called
penumbral theory of marital privacy. Douglas reasons that the
right of marital privacy is the product of "penumbras, formed
by emanations" of those guarantees in the first, third, fourth,
fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments -penumbras that pro-
vide the "life and substance" of the enumerated rights guar-
anteed by each of these amendments." This penumbral theory
suggests to Douglas the existence of a constitutional "zone of
privacy"" which cannot be invaded by the state.
It is unfortunate that Douglas does not explicitly describe
the precise manner in which he uses the ninth amendment. In
listing the amendments whose emanations create this zone of
privacy, Douglas articulates substantive rights for each amend-
ment except the ninth. He simply cites the ninth in full,'0 leav-
ing his intended use of the amendment in doubt. This leads one
to question whether marital privacy is a substantive right,
"The restriction of this article to federal cases is not to suggest that fed-
eral decisions are necessarily representative of all decisions which men-
tion the ninth amendment.






unenumerated by the Bill of Rights, and found in the ninth
amendment, or is it in fact a penumbral product of all the
amendments mentioned. Phrased differently, is the ninth amend-
ment, as used by Douglas, an actual source of a substantive
right, or is it an enabling amendment when used in conj unction
with other constitutional amendments?
Justice Stewart, in his dissent, remarks, "... I can find
no such general right of privacy in the Bill of Rights, in any
other part of the Constitution, or in any case ever before de-
cided by this Court."11 Stewart attacks the majority opinion
for using the ninth amendment as a source of the unenumerated
right of privacy. Even treating the ninth as an "enabler," how-
ever, suggests that the amendment is a necessary vehicle by
which Douglas fashions a substantive right from the enumer-
ated rights found in the other cited amendments.
We are thus left with two possible interpretations of the
Douglas position. Either the ninth amendment is the source
of a substantive right of marital privacy, or else the ninth is
an enabling clause, requiring the Court to construe the Con-
stitution as liberally as a spirited reading of the Bill of Rights
demands. Under either of these interpretations, the ninth is an
essential force in the recognition of rights not enumerated in
the Constitution.
B. The Goldberg Position
Justice Goldberg's concurrence relied heavily on the ninth
amendment. After tracing the historical development of the
amendment, 12 the opinion sets out a series of disclaimers, ex-
pressing the manner in which the ninth was not to be used.
It is not, Goldberg asserts, to be incorporated into the four-
teenth amendment for use against the states; nor is it to be
used as an independent source of rights:
Rather, the Ninth Amendment shows a belief of the Constitu-
tion's authors that fundamental rights exist that are not ex-
pressly enumerated in the first eight amendments and an intent
that the list of rights included there not be deemed exhaustive.1 3
Later, Goldberg hedges his disclaimers that the ninth
should not be read through the fourteenth:
In sum, the Ninth Amendment simply lends strong support to
the view that the "liberty" protected by the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments from infringement by the Federal Govern-
11 Id. at 530.
12 Id. at 487-91. An extensive history of the ninth amendment is developed
in Van Loan, supra note 2.
13 381 U.S. at 492.
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ment or the States is not restricted to rights specifically men-
tioned in the first eight amendments.'
4
I believe that the right of privacy in the marital relation
is fundamental and basic-a personal right "retained by the
people" within the meaning of the Ninth Amendment. Con-
necticut cannot constituticnally abridge his fundamental right,
which is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from in-
fringement by the States.5
n
Goldberg, then, seems to affirm and deny at once a "fun-
damental rights" argument for the ninth amendment. While
there are no rights of substance therein, the amendment some-
how is further evidence of a general concept of "liberty" as
expressed in the fifth and fourteenth amendments.'
"
An outstanding feature of the Goldberg position, and
the one which most clearly distinguishes it from the Douglas
position, is Goldberg's use of the term "liberty." Goldberg
argues that "the concept of liberty protects those personal
rights that are fundamental, and is not confined to the specific
terms of the Bill of Rights.' 7 To rule otherwise "is to ignore
the Ninth Amendment and to give it no effect whatsoever."
1 8
Thus, Goldberg treats the ninth, like the fifth and fourteenth,
as an amendment embodying a concept of liberty basic to the
Constitution. To Goldberg, the ninth precludes the Court from
denying a right implicit to liberty simply because the right
may not be enumerated in the Constitution. A failure to rec-
ognize a right of marital privacy would constitute a denial of
constitutional liberty, and therefore the right must be guar-
anteed.
An eternal concern of constitutional theorists is the means
by which rights, once recognized as constitutional in stature,
may be appropriately circumscribed. For Justice Black, rights
only existed to the extent they were specified in the language
of the Constitution. Consequently, an unenumerated right was
not a constitutional right at all. But for Goldberg, a right might
be unenumerated and still be of a constitutional quality, so long
as it was essential to the concept of liberty. Goldberg was at
least aware of the obvious problem of limiting rights by a prin-
ciple as broad as liberty:
14 Id. at 493.
1-,Id. at 499.
";Though both Justice Goldberg and Chief Justice Warren, who joined
Justice Goldberg in this opinion, have since left the Court, this con-
currence retains its precedential importance, since nearly half the
Griswold majority took part in it, and because Justice Brennan, who
also joined in the opinion, remains on the Court.
17 381 U.S. at 486 (emphasis added).
I., Id. at 491.
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I do not see how [the ninth amendment applied in this manner]
broadens the authority of the Court, rather it serves to support
what this Court has been doing in protecting fundamental
rights.'9
In contrast, Douglas viewed the marital privacy right as
either (1) a product of the various amendments discussed
earlier, with the ninth as an enabling vehicle, or (2) founded
upon the ninth amendment itself with the other amendments
serving as evidence of the framers' intent to protect certain
"penumbral" interests of the individual. Whether either inter-
pretation of Douglas' position offered sounder principles for
limiting recognition of unenumerated rights than did Gold-
berg's "liberty theory" was a question which denied a precise
answer in 1965. But as this article suggests, a much clearer
answer is now possible. A survey of subsequent federal case
law makes one fact certain: it is the belief in the potential or
the fear of lack of potential for circumscribing unenumerated
rights that has substantially controlled the lower courts' ac-
ceptance of the Douglas or Goldberg positions.
C. The Dissents
Justice Stewart's dissent goes to the heart of the Griswold
controversy over ninth amendment use:
[T]o say that the Ninth Amendment has anything to do with
this case is to turn somersaults with history. The Ninth Amend-
ment like its companion, the Tenth ... was . . . simply to
make clear that the adoption of the Bill of Rights did not alter
the plan that the Federal Government was to be a government
of express and limited powers, and that all rights and powers not
delegated to it were retained by the people and the individual
States.
20
Essentially, the Stewart and Black dissents look to the long-
standing principles of limited government and federalism, shun-
ning the potential of both the Douglas and Goldberg positions.
Black's dissent adds still another dimension to the limited gov-
ernment and federalism arguments. He suggests that the ninth
amendment reasoning of Douglas and Goldberg are both really
due process formulations for a concept of "natural justice,"
21
and consequently he argues against the applicability of either:
[T]hey require judges to determine what is or is not constitu-
tional on the basis of their own appraisal of what laws are un-
wise or unnecessary. The power to make such decisions is of
course that of a legislative body.2 2
11' Id. at 492-93.
2 Id. at 529-30 (emphasis added).
21 The concurrences of both Justices Harlan and White relied on due proc-
ess arguments to invalidate the Connecticut statute.
:2 381 U.S. at 511-12.
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The thrust of the Stewart and Black dissents is clear. They
would retain the established rule of applying the ninth (with
the tenth) only to limit federal incursions into state autonomy,
and reject any notion that the ninth amendment is a potential
source of substantive personal rights. To them it is manifest that
the "people" alluded to in the ninth exist only through the
legislatures of the states:
If, as I should surely hope, the law before us does not reflect the
standards of the people of Connecticut, the people of Connecticut
can freely exercise their true Ninth and Tenth Amendment
rights to persuade their elected representatives to repeal it.2 3
It is worthy of note that the dissents' "natural justice"
attack on the Douglas and Goldberg positions as well as their
own restrictive view of the ninth amendment constitute a re-
jection of the "substantive due process" nature of both the
penumbral and liberty approaches outlined earlier. When Jus-
tice Black expresses his unwillingness to rely upon judicial
"appraisal of what laws are unwise or unnecessary," 24 he is
arguably reacting to the potential limitlessness of constitutional
rights produced by the Douglas and Goldberg formulations of
the amendment in Griswold.
II. THE POsT-Griswold RESPONSE
For the legal community today, Griswold remains as the
only "definitive" statement of the ninth amendment. The Su-
preme Court has largely refused to entertain ninth amend-
ment arguments inspired by Griswold; however, there are 15
Supreme Court and 154 lower federal court cases2 which dis-
cuss the amendment. These cases suggest two common themes.
First, certain Supreme Court Justices, most notably Douglas,
have modified and refined their positions with respect to the
ninth amendment.1' Second, the lower federal courts have
generally avoided a direct response to ninth amendment
claims. This is due, in part, to the absence of principles to
delimit recognition of unenumerated constitutional rights and,
in part, to a general confusion surrounding a "proper" inter-
pretation of Griswold. For the most part, those unenumerated
rights asserted have not been acknowledged under the aegis
of the ninth amendment. A few district courts, however, have
boldly reached into the language of the amendment to dis-
2. Id. at 531 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
-4 See text accompanying note 22 supra.
The 154 lower federal court cases include 42 in the circuit courts of
appeals and 112 in district courts, as of June 15, 1973.
See text pp. 170-72 infra.
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cover unprecedented and unenumerated rights.2 - But such a
creative use of the amendment has not spread to the higher
federal courts.
2 1
One district court opinion is illuminative of the problems
the federal courts face in understanding Griswold and the ninth
amendment. Judge Dumbauld, of the western district of Penn-
sylvania, called Griswold an "amusing case,"- explaining his
"understanding" in these terms:
[I]t might be argued that Negrich [an inmate in a Pennsyl-
vania prison] has a Ninth Amendment right to privacy, to be free
from unjustified intrusion by government . ... But it would
be unseemly for a court of first instance, absent further il-
lumination by lightnings from Olympus, to base its decisions
upon so "penumbral" or nebulous a dcctrine.1"'
In only two Supreme Court decisions since Griswold has a ninth
amendment claim been raised and addressed by the majority
opinion.3 1 In neither case did the Court provide the "lightnings
from Olympus" requested by Judge Dumbauld. The following
survey of post-Griswold decisions dramatically underscores the
need for such guidance.
A. Personal Rights
1. The Student Long Hair Cases
The asserted right of public school students to wear long
hair has been a prolific source of ninth amendment arguments.
Such claimed rights, based in whole or in part on the ninth,
have reached the federal courts in 26 cases since Griswold.
In two high court decisions, : 1 certiorari was denied stu-
dents seeking reinstatement in their schools after being sus-
•-7 See, e.g., Davis v. Meek, 344 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ohio 1972), where school
officials were enjoined from enforcing a rule excluding married high
school students from engaging in extracurricular activities on the
ground that the rule constituted an unwarranted invasion of the stu-
dents' penumbral right of privacy.
21 This is true with the pcssible exception of the circuit courts which have
found a right to personal choice in hair styles based, in part, upon the
ninth amendment. See text p. 161 infra.
2!, Negrich v. Hohn, 246 F. Supp. 173, 178 (W.D. Pa. 1965), aff'd, 379 F.2d
213 (3d Cir. 1967).
246 F. Supp. at 179.
: Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972): "[T]he integrity of the fam-
ily unit has found protecticn in . . . the Ninth Amendment." 4majority
opinion citing Justice Goldberg's Griswold concurrence) (dictum); Law
Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154,
160 (1971), where Justice Stewart for a 5-4 Court ruled that a New
York State Bar question asking affiants to applicant's character whether
they had visited the applicant's home was a violation of the first, fourth,
ninth, and fcurteenth amendments: "[lit borders on the frivolous .... "
See discussion in text at Section III infra, where these and other
Supreme Court cases since Griswold are discussed with reference to
individual justices' positions on the ninth amendment.
:;' Freeman v. Flake. 405 U.S. 1032 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissent from denial
of certiorari); Olff v. East Side Union H.S. Dist., 404 U.S. 1042 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissent from denial of certiorari).
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pended for hair code violations. In both cases, Justice Douglas
dissented from the denial of certiorari. In one opinion he rea-
soned that:
The word "liberty" is not defined in the Constitution. But as we
held in Griswold v. Connecticut . . . it includes at least the
fundamental rights "retained by the people" under the Ninth
Amendment .... One's hair style, like one's taste for food, or
one's liking for certain kinds of music, art, reading, recreation,
is certainly fundamental in our constitutional scheme .... .3
At the circuit court level, there have been only two deci-
sions where the ninth amendment was used successfully to
assert a right of free choice in grooming. In the first case,
Bishop v. Colaw,34 the eighth circuit used the ninth, in con-
junction with other amendments, to find such a right:
We hold that Stephen possessed a constitutionally protected
right to govern his personal appearance while attending public
high school . ... The source of this right has been found
within the Ninth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the privacy penumbra of the Bill
of Rights .... The common theme underlying decisions strik-
ing down hairstyle regulations is that the Constitution guaran-
tees rights other than those specifically enumerated, and that
the right to govern one's personal appearance is one of those
guaranteed rights.35
A year before Bishop was decided, the seventh circuit, in
Anderson v. Laird,36 denied first and ninth amendment claims
of a National Guard member seeking to wear his hair as he
wished. The court did observe, however, that "[i]f Anderson
were completely in civilian status, his position would have
legally persuasive stature."37 Finally recognizing the position
foreshadowed in Anderson, the seventh circuit permitted a right
to free choice in personal grooming in Arnold v. Carpenter.38
Here, as in Bishop, the ninth amendment was used with other
amendments to guarantee an unenumerated, substantive right.
The circuits denying ninth amendment claims in the long
hair cases are:
-The Third Circuit. "[I]n the absence of further guid-
ance from the Supreme Court, we ought not to expand the
Ninth Amendment beyond the notions applied to the right
of [marital] privacy as expressed in Griswold.
3 9
1 Olff v. East Side Union H.S. Dist., 404 U.S. 1042, 1044 (1972) (Douglas,
J., dissent from denial of certiorari).
:4 450 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1971).
3.5 Id. at 1075.
3"; 437 F.2d 912 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 865 (1971).
:7 437 F.2d at 914.
:31 459 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1972).
39 Stull v. School Bd., 459 F.2d 339, 347 (3d Cir. 1972).
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-The Fifth Circuit. "[A] regulation restricting the
length of hair restricts privacy not at all. Hair is, of
course, worn for all the world to see. We do not think
Griswold stands for any general 'right to go public as
one pleases.' ,,40
-The Sixth Circuit. "It is further contended that the
constitutional right of privacy of the students and their
parents has been impaired in violation of the First, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. We find
the contention to be without merit. . . . In our opinion
Griswold v. Connecticut has no application here.
'41
-The Tenth Circuit in Freeman v. Flake "4 2 did not an-
swer the student's ninth amendment claim directly but said,
in distinguishing Griswold, that hair style regulations do
not control conduct found in the privacy of the home.
In the ten district court cases where a ninth amendment
claim has been raised in support of a student's right to wear his
hair as he pleases, and in which the decision was not appealed,
the split of authority is even. Three districts have found a ninth
amendment right,4 3 three have denied such a right,44 and four
districts have not reached the ninth amendment arguments.
4 5
In all the district court decisions where the right to freedom
in personal grooming was successfully asserted, the court cited
a number of constitutional provisions. However, two holdings
are rather explicit in their use of the ninth amendment. First,
the district court for Idaho ruled:
Certain personal liberties, however, are established for every
individual by the reservation of rights contained in the Ninth
Amendment and by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This court concludes and holds that personal ap-
pearance, including hair length, is cne of these personal liberties,
subject only to reasonable regulation by the state in matters of
a legitimate state interest.
4
6
Second, the eastern district court for Texas reasoned:
[T]he fundamental right to be let alone, so often referred to in
"' Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 614 (5th Cir. 1972).
H Jackson v. Dcrrier, 424 F.2d 213, 218 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850
(1970).
12 448 F.2d 258, 261 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1032 (1972).
13 See Berryman v. Hein, 329 F. Supp. 616 (D. Idaho 1971); Parker v. Fry,
323 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Reichenberg v. NelsGn, 310 F. Supp.
248 (D. Neb. 1970).
14 See Bouse v. Hipes, 319 F. Supp. 515 (S.D. Ind. 1970); Pritchard v.
Spring Branch Ind. School Dist., 308 F. Supp. 570 (S.D. Tex. 1970);
Miller v. Gillis, 315 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
'5 See Co'sey v. Seamans, 344 F. Supp. 1368 (W.D. Okla. 1972); Farmer
v. Catmull, 339 F. Supp. 70 (D. Utah 1972); Alberda v. Noeli, 322 F.
Supp. 1379 (E.D. Mich. 1971); Martin v. Davison, 322 F. Supp. 318 (W.D.
Pa. 1971).
Berryman v. Hein, 329 F. Supp. 616, 618 (D. Idaho 1971).
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Fourth Amendment settings, lies within the penumbra of that
constitutional guarantee, and should be classified as one of the
basic rights retained by the people through the Ninth Amend-
ment.
4 7
Given the split in the circuit courts and the indecision at
the district court level, one might expect - with Justice
Douglas -that the right of public school students to groom
as they please should be the major test area for ninth amend-
ment doctrine. Since the Supreme Court persists, however, in its
denials of certiorari in these cases, the lower courts are left
to deal with Griswold and the ninth amendment without
meaningful guidance.
2. The Rights of Public School Teachers
Dismissals of public school teachers have produced several
ninth amendment claims. In Fisher v. Snyder,48 the District
Court for Nebraska had an excellent opportunity to employ
the amendment. Here, an unmarried teacher was dismissed by
school authorities because men had reportedly spent the night
in her home. The court ordered her reinstated after ruling that
she possessed a consitutionally protected right of privacy. The
decision was based, in part, on Griswold, but the teacher's
ninth amendment claim was not reached.
In other cases of dismissal, a teacher who taught personal
political Leliefs in an economics course was not reinstated,
the court finding no first, fifth, or ninth amendment "rights of
academic freedom."'" Similarily, a loyality oath for teachers
was found not to violate a dismissed teacher's first, fifth, ninth,
or fourteenth amendment rights.'"' Ninth amendment pleas
went unanswered in a case challenging a dismissal allegedly
based on racial discrimination,- as well as a case of dismissal
for possession of marijuana.,
2
3. Demonstrations and Protests
Most demonstration and protest situations fall more clearly
under the ambit of first amendment freedoms than under ninth
amendment unenumerated rights. Indeed, where the ninth has
been raised to support acts of protest, it has been tied closely
to first amendment arguments. Since Griswold, there have been
eight federal court cases in which the ninth amendment has
•17 Watson v. Thompson, 321 F. Supp. 394, 402 (E.D. Tex. 1971).
4s 346 F. Supp. 396 (D. Neb. 1972).
A9 Ahren v. Board of Educ., 456 F.2d 399 (8th Cir. 1972).
Knight %v. Board of Regents. 269 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 390
U.S. 36 (1968).
Caldwell v. Craighead. 423 F.2d 613 (6th Ci. 1970).
52 Lai v. Board of Trustees. 330 F. Supp. 904 (E.D.N.C. 1971).
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been asserted to protect demonstrators.i : In none of these cases
has the ninth been used successfully. In fact, the only case
which affirmatively applies a Griswold-ninth amendment ration-
ale does so to suppress a demonstration. In People v. Doorley,5 4
the District Court for Rhode Island denied protestors the right
to picket in a residential neighborhood on the ground that
the pickets invaded the residents' rights of privacy.
Even in those cases where the protestors' convictions were
reversed by a federal court, the decisions turned on constitu-
tional provisions other than the ninth amendment, most fre-
quently on the strength of first amendment rationales. ,5
4. Obscenity and Pornography
At the district court level, two ninth amendment challenges
to federal laws prohibiting interstate transportation of obscene
materials have been successful. In the first of these, United
States v. B & H Distributing Corp.,5 ' the court found that ban-
ning interstate transportation of obscene materials where
neither unwilling adults nor children would be exposed to them
is "unconstitutionally overbroad, in violation of the First and
Ninth Amendments." 57 In the second case, United States v.
Orito,5 a claimed ninth amendment right to transport obscene
materials was not reached, but the court cited Griswold, saying:
"[w]ith the right to read obscene matters comes the right to
transport or to receive such material when done in a fashion
that does not pander it or impose it upon unwilling adults or
upon minors."59
Other cases dealing with transportation or possession of
obscene materials have either rejected the ninth amendment
claims of petitioners or have decided the issues on first amend-
ment grounds.'"' Where the ninth amendment has been raised
53 Bright v. Nunn, 448 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1971); Tatum v. Laird, 444 F.2d
947 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Williams v. Eaton, 310 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Wyo.
1970), modified, 443 F.2d 422 (10th Cir. 1971); Benson v. City of Min-
neapolis, 286 F. Supp. 614 (D. Minn. 1968); Brooks v. Briley, 274 F.
Supp. 538 (M.D. Tenn. 1967), aff'd, 391 U.S. 361 (1968); Schumann v.
New York, 270 F. Supp. 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Carmichael v. Ailen, 267
F. Supp. 985 (N.D. Ga. 1967); United States v. Miller, 249 F. Supp. 59
(S.D.N.Y. 1965), rehearing denied, 392 U.S. 917 (1968).
54 338 F. Supp. 574 (D.R.I.), rev'd on other grounds, 468 F.2d 1143 (Ist Cir.
1972).
55 See, e.g., Tatum v. Laird, 444 F.2d 947 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
56 319 F. Supp. 1231 (W.D. Wis. 1970), vacated, 403 U.S. 927 (1971) (appeal
pending).
57 3.19 F. Supp. at 1237.
58 338 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Wis. 1970), prob. juris. noted. 404 U.S. 819 (1971).
.511 338 F. Supp. at 310.
6 See, e.g., United States v. Zacher, 332 F. Supp. 883 (E.D. Wis. 1971);
Simpson v. Spice, 318 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Wis. 1970); United States v.
Luros, 260 F. Supp. 697 (N.D. Iowa 1966).
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in this area it has again been coupled with first amendment
freedom of speech arguments.
5. Landlord-Tenant Disputes
Recently, tenants have sought to use the ninth amendment
in disputes with their landlords. In each instance thus far,
the asserted ninth amendment rights have been raised to no
avail. In Velazquez v. Thompson,"0 tenants employed the
amendment to challenge New York's summary eviction statute
and their landlords' use of the statute in cases of nonpayment
of rent. The unenumerated right claimed by the tenants was a
right to "habitable housing," but the court found their argu-
ments to be without merit. Similarily, courts in two jurisdic-
tions have denied ninth amendment claims where tenants sought
to invalidate state statutes permitting landlords to seize and
sell the tenant's household effects in distraint for rent.
6 2
6. Criminal Procedure Applications
Inroads have been made in the area of substantive ninth
amendment rights of persons accused of crimes. In Hooper v.
Gooding,; evidence inadmissable at trial was admitted during a
preliminary hearing. The preliminary hearing judge was re-
quested by defense counsel to exercise his discretionary power
to close the hearing and thereby protect his client's right of
privacy. The judge denied the motion and the district court
subsequently reversed the ruling:
Failure to exercise such discretion under appropriate circum-
stances might well constitute a violation of a defendant's right
to privacy, a violation of the Ninth Amendment to the Consti-
tution of the United States .... 64
In United States v. Tarlowski, the court cited the ninth
amendment, in dictum, to uphold a general right of "liberty,"
finding that a defendant was entitled to the presence of wit-
,'451 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1971).
Sellers v. Contino, 327 F. Supp. 230 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Kerrigan v.
Boucher, 326 F. Supp. 647 (D. Conn.), aff'd. 450 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1971).
Thcre are a number of other applications of the ninth amendment which
might benefit the poor. In the area of welfare law, see Conner v.
Finch, 314 F. Supp. 364 (N.D, Ill. 1970), aff'd, 400 U.S. 1003 (1971)
(ninth and tenth amendment "right to family life" asserted in challenge
of income exclusion provision of Social Security Act). The welfare
cases and a variety of miscellaneous cases raise ninth amendment
claims, but the courts resolved these controversies on grounds other
than constitutional ones. The authors have not classified these cases
with other examples where the ninth amendment was not reached be-
because the former group of decisions rejected all constitutional argu-
ments. This classification of the cases is supported by several refer-
ences in case law. See. e.g.. Carliner v. Commissioner of the District ef
Columbia. 412 F.2d 1090 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 987 (1969).
63 282 F. Supp. 624 (D. Ariz. 1968).
,'Id. at 627.
305 F. Supp. 112 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
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nesses at an Internal Revenue Service investigation of possible
tax evasion. The adverse ruling was, however, specifically
overturned on fifth amendment due process grounds.
In other cases, courts have rejected or ignored ninth amend-
ment claims to be free from prejudicial pretrial publicity," and
to be free from prosecutions conducted in bad faith. , In un-
equivocal terms, the court for the northern district of Illinois
denied a ninth amendment argument of freedom from giving
compelled testimony before a grand jury: "These conten-
tions are so patently frivolous . . . that they do not merit
discussion."6
7. Prisoner Rights Cases
Prisoner rights claims premised on the ninth amendment
have been raised in two circuit court and four district court
cases since 1965."" The decision most squarely addressing (and
rejecting) a ninth amendment claim, Burns v. Swenson 7 " denied
the prisoner's asserted right to be free from the maximum
security facility in the Missouri state penitentiary. The court
considered the ninth amendment in these terms:
[The prisoner] would have us ascribe Constitutional dimensions
to penal treatment which is substantially less revere than that
barred by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Griswold
does not dictate an adjudication that Burns' confinement in the
Maximum Security Unit deprived him of a constitutionally pro-
tected right. The Ninth Amendment claim has been accorded
due consideration. It is devoid of merit and must be rejected.71
Similarily, courts have denied ninth amendment claims of
prisoners:
-not to be moved to a correctional facility where
communication with his counsel would be more
difficult;
72
-to be free from assaults and homosexual attacks in
jail;
73
66 Martinez v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 343 F. Supp. 897 (D.P.R.
1972).
67 Turco v. Allen, 334 F. Supp. 209 (D. Md. 1971).
"'In re Womack, 333 F. Supp. 479, 481 (N.D. Ill. 1971). aff 'd. 466 F.2d 555
(7th Cir. 1972).
IIIKish v. County of Milwaukee, 441 F.2d 901 (7th Ch. 1971); Burns v.
Swenson, 430 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied. 404 U.S. 1062 (1972):
Wells v. McGinnis, 344 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Daviz v. Lindsay,
321 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Palmigiano v. Travisono. 317 F.
Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970); Negrich v. Hohn, 246 F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Pa.
1965), aff'd, 379 F.2d 213 (3d Cir. 1967).
7"430 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972).
71 430 F.2d at 778.
7 Wells v. McGinnis, 344 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
7:3 Kish v. County of Milwaukee, 441 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1971).
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-to be moved from solitary confinement into the prison
population, as a "fundamental right of privacy and
freedom from gratuitous humiliation at the hands of
the state.
7 4
-to be free from the censorship of mail by prison
authorities.
7 5
In short, no ninth amendment inroads in federal courts have
been made by prisoners.
8. Sterilization Cases
In the area of sterilization there have been two attempts to
fashion unenumerated rights from the ninth amendment. Both
attempts failed. In Hathaway v. Worcester City Hospital,
7 the
plaintiff sought to compel a city hospital to perform a tubal
ligation, on the grounds that the ninth amendment guaranteed
the unenumerated "right to choose whether or not to bear
children." The court dismissed the action without addressing
the ninth amendment. An identical result occurred in the
sterilization case of McCabe v. Nassau County Medical Center.
77
9. Sex Education Cases
As in the area of sterilization, there are two federal cases
in which the ninth amendment has been raised in disputes
concerning sex education. And again, like the sterilization
cases, these sex education decisions have ignored the amend-
ment. In Unitarian Church West v. McConnell T8 parents and
the church asserted first and ninth amendment rights to teach
sex education in Sunday school. Their right to do so was up-
held, but on grounds strictly limited to first amendment
doctrine.
In Manfredonia v. Barry,79 the first, ninth, and fourteenth
amendments were raised in defense of a birth control lecturer
arrested for disseminating information in front of a 14-month-
old child. Here again, the ninth amendment was not addressed
by the court, and the decision, favorable to the lecturer, was
based on other grounds.
B. The Governmental Sphere
1. Claims of Government Employees
In all cases dealing with the involvement of federal em-
74 Davis v. Lindsay, 321 F. Supp. 1134, 1137 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
75 Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970).
76 341 F. Supp. 1385 (D. Mass. 1972).
.7 453 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1971).
78 337 F. Supp. 1252 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
7" 336 F. Supp. 765 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
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ployees (or employees of federally funded agencies) in the
political process, claims that the Hatch Act" violates ninth
amendment rights have not been upheld by the courts.8 ' In these
cases, the courts have recognized the ongoing right of Congress
to regulate the political conduct of federal employees, and con-
stitutional claims (usually a combination of first, fifth, ninth,
and tenth amendments) have met resistance.
In two cases, postal employees who had been fired for non-
political activities asserted ninth amendment violations of pri-
vacy. In White v. Bloomberg,82 the employee was reinstated,
but on first, and not ninth amendment grounds. In Mindel v.
United States Civil Service Commission,83 however, a postal em-
ployee who had been fired because he was living with a woman
to whom he was not married was ordered reinstated because
his dismissal "violates the right to privacy guaranteed by the
Ninth Amendment.
8 4
2. Induction into the Armed Services
All circuit and district courts passing on the question have
ruled against claimants asserting a ninth amendment right to
be free from conscription.8 5 Though most courts have dismissed
such claims without commenting on the ninth amendment, the
first circuit, in United States v. Diaz,8 6 did expand on the issue
somewhat:
Defendant's final contention is that the Selective Service Act
is an unconstitutional interference with his "right to life" guar-
anteed by the Ninth Amendment. Whatever may be said for
the historical and . . . social merit of defendant's contention, we
feel compelled to follow existing Court precedent upholding
the constitutionality of Congressional conscription.
8 7
Indeed, no hint of a ninth amendment inroad appears in this
805 U.S.C. §§ 7321-27 (1970).
81 Fishkin v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 309 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. Cal.
1969), appeal dismyissed, 396 U.S. 278 (1970); Dingers v. Hampton, 305
F. Supp. 169 (D.D.C. 1969); Democratic State Central Comm. v.
Andolesk, 249 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Md. 1966).
82 345 F. Supp. 133 (D. Md. 1972).
83 312 F. Supp. 485 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
84 Id. at 488.
85 United States v. Murray, 452 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Sowul, 447 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Zaugh, 445 F.2d
300 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Farrell, 443 F.2d 355 (9th Cir.
1971); United States v. Uhl, 436 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1970); United States
v. Diaz, 427 F.2d 636 (1st Cir. 1970); United States v. Dcrris, 319 F.
Supp. 1306 (W.D. Pa. 1970); Orlando v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 1013
(E.D.N.Y. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971); United States v. Cook,
311 F. Supp. 618 (W.D. Pa. 1970); Drifka v. Brainard, 294 F. Supp. 425
(W.D. Wash. 1968); Katz v. United States, 287 F. Supp. 29 (S.D.N.Y.
1966).
86427 F.2d 636 (1st Cir. 1970).
87 Id. at 639.
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area. Two other specific claims of ninth amendment freedom
from induction have been raised and rejected-the unenu-
merated right to "life and liberty,""" and a "right to one's own
life.'8,
3. Rights of Military Personnel
Consistent with the lack of success of ninth amendment
claims in the induction cases, attempts by those already in mili-
tary service to assert unenumerated rights have also failed. A
common argument utilizes the amendment to challenge person-
nel reassignments to combat zones, but such arguments have
fallen on deaf ears."" In one case, Gutierrez v. Laird,"' a female
air force officer asserted a ninth amendment "right to bear
children" in contesting a nonpregnancy rule imposed upon
women officers. The court distinguished this case from Gris-
wold, noting that the government was not prohibiting these
women from having children; the rule merely required such
officers to choose between a career as an officer or one as a
mother.""
C. The Environment
One of the most interesting developments in the area of
ninth amendment doctrine has been the recent assertions of an
unenumerated right to a decent environment. However, to date
no court has recognized such a right. In Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers,!" the plaintiffs sought to
enjoin the construction of a dam. They pointed to the fifth,
ninth, and fourteenth amendments as authority for a right to
"enjoy the beauty of God's creation, and to live in an environ-
ment that preserves the unquantified amenities of life. '94 In
rejecting this claim, the district court for Arkansas summarized
its attitude toward the ninth amendment:
The Ninth Amendment may well be as important in the develop-
ment of constitutional law during the remainder of this century
as the Fourteenth Amendment has been since the beginning of
the century. But the Court concludes that the plaintiffs have not
stated facts which would under the present state of the law
constitute a violation of their constitutional rights .... 9.5
. Katz v. United States, 287 F. Supp. 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
'United States v. Dorris, 319 F. Supp. 1306 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
!I0 See. e.g., Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1970).
91 346 F. Supp. 289 (D.D.C. 1972).
Id. at 293.
!:;325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
1,1 Id. at 739.
'.5 Id. (emphasis added).
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A number of other ninth amendment environmental claims
have failed. These include:
-the protection from aircraft noise near Washington Na-
tional Airport. "Plaintiffs concede that this would be the
first court to sustain the contention that the Ninth Amend-
ment . protects persons from noise. This circuit has
declined the invitation to elevate to constitutional level
the concerns for protection of the environment."" '
-the protection of the historic environment. In Ely v.
Velde, '7 the court denied an injunction which would have
kept the state from constructing a penal facility in an area
of historic homes. The ninth was specifically disallowed as
a basis for protection of the historic environment.'8
- a ninth amendment assertion to protect aesthetic, conser-
vational, and recreational interests. The court in Pennsyl-
vania Environmental Council, Inc. v. Bartlett" expressly
denied this claim, as did the court in Tanner v. Armco Steel
Corp.'10 The latter decision held that "The Ninth Amend-
ment, through its 'penumbra' or otherwise, embodies no
legally assertable right to a healthful environment.""' 1
III. FEw LIGHTNINGS FROM OLYMPUS
It should be clear from the foregoing survey of federal
case law that the promise of Griswold has not, as yet, been
realized. Except for a handful of lower court decisions, neither
the Douglas nor the Goldberg positions has gained wide accept-
ance. No doubt, some of this reluctance to breathe life into the
ninth amendment is a product of the traditional conception of
the amendment as a limiter of federal power. The constraints
of this traditionalism are, however, greatly overshadowed by
another factor-a profound absence of clarification of the
meaning and limits of the Griswold holding. The "lightnings
from Olympus" requested by Judge Dumbauld have simply
not been forthcoming.
No Supreme Court decision since Griswold has utilized
the ninth amendment as a basis for a fundamental constitu-
tional right. Griswold stands for the proposition that marital
privacy is a constitutional, though unenumerated, right, but
beyond Griswold, and in cases closely analogous to it factually,
Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe, 344 F. Supp. 573, 579 (E.D. Va. 1972).
321 F. Supp. 1088 (E.D. Va.), modified, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971).
9S 321 F. Supp. at 1094.
99 315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 454 F.2d 613 (3d Cir. 1971).
1411340 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
101 Id. at 535.
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the Court has refused to discuss the ninth amendment. Eugene
Van Loan, in 1968, suggested that "it is perhaps best that
the Griswold case and its use of the ninth amendment be
placed in the 'same class as a restricted railroad ticket, good
for this day and train only.' ""-' At least Mr. Douglas among
the Justices, is unwilling to view the ninth amendment in so
limited a fashion. Although his position in Griswold was not
entirely clear, Douglas has since refined his theory of the ninth
amendment. In Palmer v. Thompson,"" the Court in a 5-4
decision upheld the right of Jackson, Mississippi to close rather
than to integrate its public swimming pools. The battle was
joined largely on fourteenth amendment equal protection
grounds, but Douglas, dissenting separately, chose the ninth
amendment to explain his position:
The "rights" retained by the people within the meaning of the
Ninth Amendment may be related to those "rights" which are
enumerated in the Constitution.
[F]reedcm from discrimination based on race, creed, or color
has become by reason of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fif-
teenth Amendments one of the "enumerated rights" under the
Ninth Amendment that may not be voted up or voted down.104
Like Griswold, Palmer v. Thompson offers both an asserted
fundamental freedom and a group of amendments which are,
together, the source of the fundamental freedom. Douglas is
arguing that "ninth amendment rights" are somehow related to
enumerated rights. The nature of this relation is the key to
understanding the refinement of the Douglas position:
We deal here with analogies to rights secured by the Bill of
Rights or by the Constitution itself .... [The right of races to
swim together] is in the penumbra of the policies of the Thir-
teenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments and as a matter
of constitutional policy should be in the category of those enu-
merated rights protected by the Ninth Amendment. If not in-
cluded, those rights become narrow legalistic concepts which
turn on the formalism of laws, not on their spirit.lo5
Read together then, Douglas' Griswold and Palmer opinions
characterize the ninth amendment as an enabling provision
which operates via analogies between legally unprecedented
and unenumerated rights and those rights already specified in
the Bill of Rights. If the asserted right is penumbral or analo-
gous to a specific right or group of rights already recognized
112Van Loan, supra note 2, at 48, citing Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649,
669 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
1,13 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
1;4 Id. at 233, 237 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
1"15 Id. at 238, 239 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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as constitutional in stature, then Douglas believes the ninth
amendment enables, or perhaps requires, the Court to protect
the unenumerated right. Although this reasoning will often
depend upon an expansive reading of the Bill of Rights to
establish the necessary analogies, it is a far more conservative
notion than the idea that the ninth itself is a source of sub-
stantive rights. With this conservatism rests the true value of
the Douglas position, for if an asserted unenumerated right does
not reasonably relate to an enumerated right, the ninth amend-
ment does not enable the Court to recognize the new right. It
is by this mode of reasoning that the promise of Griswold can
be realized and yet the recognition of new rights may be doc-
trinally limited.
In contrast, the Goldberg position in Griswold is focused
on broad principles of liberty - a conceptualization which today
might permit Goldberg to use the ninth amendment to discover
a "basic freedom" even in the absence of a specific penumbral
relationship. In short, there are no clearly ascertainable limits
to unenumerated rights in the Goldberg scheme.
Mr. Justice Stewart's position has remained unchanged since
his dissent in Goldberg: necessarily, if a ninth amendment right
is asserted, it must be asserted in combination with the tenth
amendment. The "people" of the ninth amendment are -as
they were in Griswold - embodied by the state legislatures,
and thus the ninth may not be used by individuals against the
state; instead, it may be used only by the state in exercising its
legitimate police power. Stewart, reasoning from this posture
in Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wad-
mond,1"'! labeled an individual claim of privacy asserted under
the first, fourth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments as one
which "borders on the frivolous," since the protection of private
personality, like the protection of life itself, is left primarily
to the individual states under the ninth and tenth amend-
ments.",- As was observed earlier,'- some lower federal courts
have followed this traditional view of the ninth amendment,
and whatever else may be said about such a view, it is clearly
one which needs no limitations regarding the recognition of
individual rights.
1,6 401 U.S. 154 (1971).
I17 Id. at 160. In fairness to Justice Stewart, the frivolity he sees may not
rest in the individual claim, but rather that the affiants were chosen by
the applicant himself.
See, e.g., text p. 169 supra.
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Of the three original positions articulated in Griswold,10 9
Stewart's has remained much the same; Goldberg's position,
although followed in some of the lower court opinions surveyed
earlier,1 0 is of questionable vitality because Goldberg is no
longer available to develop and defend his position, and because
his "liberty theory" cannot be adequately circumscribed. Finally
the Douglas position has been gradually refined to a potentially
workable approach to the ninth amendment. In more recent
decisions, however, Douglas has exceeded these refinements,
and in so doing he may have accomplished two results: first,
he may have somewhat muddied the waters of his enabling
theory and its use of penumbral relationships; and second, he
may have partially resurrected the Goldberg position. Analy-
sis of both these developments is critical to future use of the
ninth amendment.
In Osborn v. United States,"' Douglas cites Griswold and
all amendments listed therein except the fourteenth to support
a general right of privacy.1 2 Additionally, in dissenting from
denial of certiorari in Freeman v. Flake,1 3 Douglas suggests
that only one amendment is necessary to bring the ninth
into operation as a penumbral relator:
I can conceive of no more compelling reason to exercise our dis-
cretionary jurisdiction than a conflict of such magnitude, on an
issue of importance bearing on First Amendment and Ninth
Amendment rights.
1 14
Both these opinions are consistent with Douglas' enabling theory
of the amendment, but in another dissent from certiorari in a
student long hair case, Olff v. East Side Union High School
District, 5 Douglas reasons that "liberty . . . includes at least
109) Of the rest cf the Griswold court only Justices Brennan and White re-
main. Brennan, who joined in the Goldberg concurrence, has remained
consistent with his 1965 position. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S.
183, 248 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice White, who con-
curred singly in Griswold without mentioningthe ninth amendment, has
offered one bit of dictum indicating his willingness to entertain the
Douglas or Goldberg-Brennan positions. In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972), where he wrote the majority opinion, White found a viola-
tion of the fourteenth amendment where the state failed to provide an
unwed father with a hearing to determine his fitness as custodial par-
ent of his children. White cites Goldberg's Griswold concurrence favor-
ably: "The integrity of the family unit has found protection in . . .
the Ninth Amendment." Id. at 651. Of the members of the current
court appointed after the Griswold decision - Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Powell, Rehnquist, Blackmun, and Marshall -none are on
record with a post-Griswold opinion embracing the ninth amendment.
'"'See, e.g., text pp. 160-61 supra.
385 U.S. 323 (1966).
Il" Id. at 341.
113 405 U.S. 1032 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissent from denial of certiorari).
114 Id.
11 404 U.S. 1042 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissent from denial of certiorari).
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the fundamental rights 'retained by the people' under the Ninth
Amendment .... "116 The ambiguity here is similar to that in
Griswold: a largely undefined reference to the ninth amend-
ment. But Olff, like Freeman is a long hair case, which given
Douglas' pronouncements in similar cases, suggests that he
would join the first and ninth amendments to protect an unenu-
merated right of the student. If and when certiorari is granted
in such a case, it is to be expected that Douglas will resolve
any doubts in the enabling theory occasioned by his Olff
opinion.
The even more recent Douglas concurrence in the abortion
case of Roe v. Wade,117 demonstrates his belief that the ninth
amendment is not an independent source of substantive rights,
but rather that it is an enabler. The opinion also suggests that
Douglas sees more vitality in Goldberg's "liberty theory" than
one might expect, particularly as it applies to the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment:
The Ninth Amendment obviously does not create federally en-
forceable rights, [he then quotes the ninth in full]. But a cata-
logue of these rights includes customary, traditional, and time-
honored rights, amenities, privileges, and immunities that come
within the sweep of "the Blessings of Liberty" mentioned in the
preamble to the Constitution. Many of them in my view come
within the meaning of the term "liberty" as used in the Four-
teenth Amendment. 118
An alternative interpretation of Douglas' opinion in Roe is that
he was much more concerned with affecting a conclusive resolu-
tion on the subject of abortion, than with furthering any given
doctrinal theory.
CONCLUSION
Had Griswold stood initially for more than a conglomerate
of varied holdings in search of a doctrinal base for the right
of marital privacy, many of the differing responses to ninth
amendment claims in the lower courts might have been
avoided. Patently, Griswold still offers no clear signal of its
meaning, either in retrospect or through any "line" of cases
that follows from it. Though Douglas has since refined and
elaborated on the enabling theory he introduced in Griswold,
further clarification of his position is now needed.
In view of the substantial split among the circuit courts
of appeals on the applicability of Griswold and the ninth
1"Id. at 1044. Douglas' use of "liberty principles" is reminiscent of the
Goldberg concurrence in Griswold.




amendment to the student rights long hair cases, and the
indecision over these cases at the district court level, the Court
might entertain a clarification of Griswold in this sphere. Also,
since the long hair cases seem to assert penumbral rights that
are akin to those protected in Griswold, an extension of
Griswold to these cases would be a cautious and moderate one.
Conversely, any holding limiting Griswold to its facts would
weaken the immediate potential of the ninth amendment.
Ultimately, the Court must decide the nature of those rights
retained by the people, but left unenumerated by the Consti-
tution. Implicit in our constitutional design of government is
the firm belief that the ultimate source of sovereign power is
the people-that they collectively sacrificed many individual
freedoms for the benefits of social order. In return, the power
they granted government was a power limited by the Consti-
tution, but as evidenced by the specific enumerations of the
Bill of Rights, many individual rights were not sacrificed in
this process. What the ninth amendment then reaffirms is
that there are rights older than the Constitution itself, which
were retained by the people-rights which may not be
"denied" or "disparaged" for their mere lack of enumeration in
the Bill of Rights.
Moreover, the ninth amendment may hold a potential
similar to that of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Under the Warren Court's theory of "new equal
protection," the burden rested with the state to establish a
compelling and legitimate state interest served by a challenged
statutory classification of individuals. Analogously, under the
ninth amendment, one who exercises a right he believes was
"retained" by the people and whose assertion is in some manner
suppressed by the state might conceivably employ the ninth to
shift the burden to the state. If the right he exercises is un-
enumerated and if he makes a prima facie case that it is a right
retained by the people, the state may not ignore this claimed
right with any argument that the right he identifies is not
specified in the Constitution. It will then be the state's burden
to establish either (1) that the right could not possibly be
retained by the people or, (2) if retained, that a compelling
state interest militates against the exercise of the right.
It is suggested here that the position of Mr. Justice Doug-
las. as developed in his opinions subsequent to Griswold is the
soundest view of the ninth amendment now available to Court.
The Douglas approach has appeal to those who wish to find
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unenumerated rights of substance in (or through) the ninth
amendment; it also contains -as has been discussed herein -
a safeguard for moderate constructionists, who, under the
Douglas approach, would demand that any novel, unenumerated
right be keyed specifically to enumerated rights by penumbra
or analogy.
The first bud of a constitutional law development similar
to the geometric expansion of equal protection and new equal
protection may have been seeded for the ninth amendment in
Griswold. But until the next needed clarifying step is taken
by the Court, this promise of Griswold cannot be realized.
MAI.CKETI NG THiEORY AND THE
FENCING O1 STOLEN GOODS'
By TED ROSELIUSt, DOUGLAS BE oNtt
The prevention of theft in an increasingly urbanized society
is a continuing challenge to law enforcement personnel. The
authors of this article take an interdisciplinary approach to
the problem, and suggest the use of conventional marketing
theory in detecting and preventing the sale of stolen goods in
order to reduce the incentive of thieves to steal. Although the
authors' approach is novel and somewhat unique, if effective
implementing techniques could be developed, its use could have
dramatic preventive consequences, and therefore merits atten-
tion.
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INTRODUCTION
F OR some time, psychologists have studied the criminal as
an individual, inquiring into his motivation, attitudes, and
personality. These studies have led to advances in the areas
of rehabilitation, deterrence, and, occasionally, investigation.
Sociologists have treated crime as an anomaly of social struc-
ture and have studied, among other topics, the social organiza-
tion of gangs, the impact of crime on social values, and the
social factors leading to a criminal career.
In contrast, the approach of this study is to visualize the
distribution of stolen goods as a business and marketing prob-
lem. An underlying concept of this article is that professional
crime - especially that dealing with property - is organized
on an economic basis rather than entirely on a sociological or
psychological one. Fences and thieves face substantial market-
ing problems which may be solved by the application of the
same marketing management techniques used by legitimate
businessmen.
There is a body of marketing knowledge available for de-
scribing and predicting the behavior of persons involved in
the legitimate distribution of goods. If there is any commonality
of behavior between legitimate and criminal marketing, this
knowledge may be utilized in predicting the behavior of thieves
and fences, and for developing more effective strategies to
block and investigate such behavior.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Marketing Defined
In the conventional view, marketing is defined as "the
performance of business activities that direct the flow of goods
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and services from producer to consumer or user."' This defi-
nition gives some justification for viewing the theft of goods
as "production" and the fencing of goods as "marketing." How-
ever, a broader definition is often used to give more specific
direction to the persons charged with performing the market-
ing functions. Thus, "[mJarketing is a total system of inter-
acting business activities designed to plan, price, promote, and
distribute want-satisfying products and services to present and
potential users."-' This definition assumes that much of the
behavior related to the distribution of stolen goods consists
of rational, economically guided decisions. It also indicates
that such distribution requires conscious effort and decision-
making by the thief and fence.
In the present context, marketing refers to all the activi-
ties performed and the treatment given to stolen property be-
tween the time it is stolen and the time it is eventually con-
sumed. Thus, a study of the marketing of stolen goods would
include transactions between thief and fence, the amount and
kind of demand for stolen property, prices received for stolen
property, promotion techniques, behavior of middlemen, buying
motives and habits of the consumer of stolen goods, and many
other related topics.
B. Structure and Objectives
In this study,' an effort is made to determine the feasibility
of using conventional marketing theory as an operational
scheme for visualizing the traffic in stolen goods. This ap-
proach is by no means definitive, but provides a supplementary
method by which to analyze the traffic in stolen goods.
1 CoMmirIEE ON DEFINITIONS, AMERICAN MARKETING ASSOCIATION, MAR-
KETING DEFINITIONS 15 (1960) [hereinafter cited as MARKETING DEFINI-
TIONS].
2 W. STANTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF MARKETING 5 (1964).
3 The underlying thought in designing a research approach was that this
was to be an exploratory project, investigating only the feasibility of
applying marketing theory to a new problem area. It was necessary
for researchers knowledgeable in marketing to become familiar with
some of the practices of thieves and fences as well as with some of
the problems and practices of law enforcement.
Thus, the general research approach was as follows:
(1) Interview a sampling of thieves and fences to become
workably familiar with the distribution of stolen goods.
(2) Select illustrative marketing theories seemingly most
descriptive of the behavior of thieves and fences, and
adapt them to fit instances uncovered during the inter-
views.
(3) Interview a sampling of law enforcement personnel to
determine the problems they face and whether new ways
of thinking would add to their investigative or deterring
power.
Specific interviews will not be cited in this article.
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Psychological factors may be very influential in decision-
making by criminals with regard to property-related crimes.
For instance, one person interviewed during the study simply
could not accommodate the face-to-face contact required for
some forms of thievery and restricted his activity to burglary
and larceny for personality reasons. However, economic cri-
teria are also relevant in this decisionmaking. For example,
several interviewees preferred to steal jewelry and furs instead
of larger chattels due to the lower risks involved, the ease of
storage, high rates of turnover, and high markup. These rea-
sons are marketing oriented, not psychological.
To visualize the professional, organized distribution of stolen
property in the context of a businesslike operation, one must
divide the criminal activity into two areas which represent two
types of problems faced by many legitimate businesses: one, the
production of stolen property as a result of some type of theft;
and two, the marketing or distribution of stolen property car-
ried out by thieves, fences, and other middlemen. The produc-
tion side has been examined extensively, resulting in new
kinds of alarms, locks, security devices, and theft-detection sys-
tems. However, the distribution aspect has been relatively
untouched by formal research. In order to study the market-
ing side, one must assume that the distribution of stolen prop-
erty is rather businesslike, perhaps far more so than produc-
tion, and that many patterns of behavior in distribution are
economically motivated.
The objective of this article is to discuss the following
questions:
(1) Are professional thieves and fences in any way
similar in their marketing behavior to legitimate
businessmen?
(2) Can legitimate marketing theory serve as a vehicle
for describing and analyzing the behavior of thieves
and fences in their distribution of stolen property?
(3) Can conventional marketing theory provide signi-
ficant assistance in investigating and deterring traf-
fic in stolen property?
Affirmative answers to these questions would yield sub-
stantial and direct benefit in at least two areas:
(1) Creation of blocking strategies -steps taken by
law enforcement departments to make the distri-
bution of stolen goods so expensive, time consum-
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ing, and/or risky that there would be a significant
lessening of the incentive to deal with stolen goods.
(2) Design of investigatory strategies - systematic ways
of analyzing and visualizing the activities related
to the traffic in stolen goods. Not only would such
a framework make case evidence more meaning-
ful to the investigator, but it would also allow him
to predict the existence of activities and institutions
before complete evidence is available. This would
allow an investigator to shortcut a tortuous chain
of obscure clues by predicting activities most likely
to be occurring.
II. THE MARKETING OF STOLEN GooDs
Three special kinds of markets involving nonlegitimate
goods are distinguishable: first, a "black market" operating in
an economy of scarcity; second, a "market for stolen goods";
and third, a market for illegal items operating within an open
economy. In an economy of scarcity a rationing system and
price controls are used to provide some semblance of equi-
librium. In this type of economy demand is greater than the
supply of goods which drives the price of goods up to an
artificially high level, thus creating a "black market" in which
goods move illegally at prices often far above the official price
and in quantities not authorized by the rationing system.4 In
an economy of abundance, there is a similarly clandestine mar-
ket which may be referred to as the "market for stolen goods,"
consisting of stolen items moving through illegal channels. A
major distinction between the black market and the market
for stolen goods is that prices are higher than the official
market price in the former, and lower than the free market
price in the latter. Finally, there is a market for illegal items,
such as narcotics or unlicensed liquor, for which there is an
abnormal but open market, and in which illegal items usually
move at a market price which equates supply and demand.
This study will be concerned with the second of these three
identifiable markets.
The thief and the fence have a good deal of flexibility in
selecting a marketing strategy. Due to such factors as a low
cost of goods sold and freedom from some legal constraints,
in some situations they may actually have more freedom than
legitimate businessmen. But, because of other factors, such as
4 See M. CLINARD, THE BLACK MARKET (1952).
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concern about the threat of detection, they have markedly less
flexibility in their marketing behavior. In this section the traf-
fic in stolen goods will be examined from a marketing perspec-
tive to demonstrate that marketing theory can be used to gain
added insights about such traffic.
A. The Demand and Supply of Stolen Goods
The quantity demanded of an item is a function of its
price, the seller's promotional efforts, and the buyer's ability
to purchase, as limited by his income. Demand is considered
to be either "primary" (desire for coffee) or "selective" (de-
sire to buy a specific brand of coffee). Typically, both types
of demand must be present before a sale occurs. Thus, a fence
selling stolen goods to a person reluctant to buy stolen goods
knowingly must first overcome the hesitancy to purchase any
stolen goods (create primary demand) and then convince the
purchaser to buy the specific items offered for sale.
Primary demand for stolen goods is probably relatively
low in the public at large, but may be relatively high within
certain low-income sectors of the population. Often, the stolen
goods marketer is not faced with a severe problem of having
to stimulate primary demand. However, as the volume of stolen
goods increases, increased efforts must be made to promote se-
lective demand as thieves begin to compete with each other
and with legitimate dealers for the market. In short, increased
supply places thieves and fences under increasing pressure to
become "marketing oriented."
The aggregate supply of an item offered for sale is a func-
tion of all costs involved in producing that item and the price
for which it can be sold. Equilibrium between quantity sold and
quantity demanded is achieved when the buyers and sellers
agree on a market price. The conventional wisdom of economics
indicates that an "automatic" movement toward equilibrium
is brought about by competition, free movement of prices, and
free entry and exit of suppliers from the market. However, a
formalized marketing system is required to equalize local differ-
ences between demand and supply.
The general level of disequilibrium between supply and
demand determines whether there is a "seller's market" or a
"buyer's market." In a seller's market, supply is less than de-
mand; the supplier need not stimulate demand because he has
the balance of negotiating power, encounters little difficulty
making sales, and is able to name the price. In a buyer's market,
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demand is less than supply, and the sellers must compete with
each other in persuading the potential buyers with elaborate
systems of marketing (including the creation of selective de-
mand through advertising, product differentiation, and other
marketing activities).
Over a short period of time (perhaps a year), one would
expect the demand for stolen goods to be reasonably stable
in a market area, although a prolonged strike or massive lay-
off in an urban area could create a temporary decrease in
supply and therefore an accompanying relative increase in de-
mand. However, the supply of stolen goods is very volatile,
being upset by either a large-volume theft of an item or a
large recovery by the police. If the equilibrium were upset by
a high-volume cargo theft, one of three things would occur:
(1) an equilibrium between supply and demand in the basic
market could be re-established simply by a decrease in the
price asked by the seller, or by an increase in promotional
activities to expand demand; (2) equilibrium could be re-es-
tablished by transporting the surplus items to another market
region; or (3) equilibrium could be re-established by tapping
into a new market segment such as selling to the next most
risky market, which may necessitate entry into legitimate
channels.
Analysis of the state of equilibrium between supply and
demand in a local market could provide blocking and inves-
tigatory strategies to law enforcement agencies. If an effective
method could be developed to continuously monitor supply and
demand, operational information about the flow of stolen goods
would be continuously available. Sales of stolen goods at an
increasing price over time would indicate either an increasing
demand or a decreasing supply of that item in the geographical
area. One might expect more of the goods to be either stolen
or imported.
B. Transactions Matching Supply with Demand
Never will a producer of goods produce in exactly the
quantities or assortments needed by potential customers. Nor
can a consumer deal directly with the various producers of all
the items he needs. Clearly there is a need for a distributor/
middleman who must match a supply of goods that is hetero-
geneous in terms of time, location, and quantity with a demand
that is equally heterogeneous.5
5 See W. ALDERSON, DYNAMIC MARKETING BERAVIOR 23-51 (1965).
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The matching of supply with demand in the case of stolen
property would seem to be an especially difficult marketing
task, since supply and demand are so heterogeneous. Supply
assortments range from truckloads of surgical brassieres to
guns, diesel engines, liquor, and a variety of other products.
Consumer types include other thieves, knowing consumers,
businessmen willing to take a small risk in order to cut costs,
and unsuspecting consumers.
This mismatch between aggregate supply and aggregate
demand is simply too great to be equalized by thieves them-
selves. Therefore, the activity of fences is necessary to add
time, place, and possession utility to stolen goods held by the
thief. Without these utilities the goods would be unsalable.
In a legitimate business the mechanical elements of the
transaction are usually minimized and routinized to make the
actual transaction as convenient as possible. However, an ille-
gal transaction is typically surrounded by awkwardness; and
the time, place, and other physical mechanics of the transac-
tion lead to much inconvenience for both buyer and seller.
Both parties will benefit to the extent that the transaction can
be made more convenient. One way to make it more convenient
is to use a specialist middleman, such as a fence, to locate
sources of supply and demand, to determine the types of prod-
ucts to be exchanged, and to facilitate and motivate a willing
exchange between buyer and seller.
This study found a variety of transaction-types involving
stolen goods, ranging from rather routine to rather complex,
and involving various degrees of risk and trust on the part of
the buyer and the seller6 A most important consideration in
the transaction between a thief and his fence is risk. In turn,
this element of risk often requires an inordinate amount of trust
between the parties - a trust maintained in part by the unwrit-
ten "code of silence" which prevails among active participants
in this subculture.
There are two very distinctively different kinds of trans-
6The simplest kinds of exchanges reported were of the "Hey, buddy,
want to buy a watch?" type for the blatantly illegal transfer, and the
simple pawning operation in cases where an attempt was made to
legitimize the transaction.
The most complicated exchange reported was a case in which the
buyer knowingly bought a television set in a bar, without seeing the
set beforehand. He paid the cash price and gave his car keys to the
bartender who had somecne drive the car to another location, load
the set, and return it to the bar. Thus, the buyer gave up cash and
his car, trusting that the car would be returned with the right kind




actions in which stolen goods are exchanged, which may be dis-
tinguished on the basis of whether the seller attempts to con-
ceal the fact that the goods are stolen.
In some cases no effort is made to conceal the fact that the
goods are stolen. It is most likely that this would be a rather
simplified type of transaction which could occur at most any
time or place with simple precautions to preclude detection by
law enforcement officials. Both buyer and seller are taking
risks, since both are subject to prosecution. However, with both
parties trying to camouflage the exchange, there is much dif-
ficulty in detection.
In other cases, some effort is made to legitimize the trans-
action. The seller must convince the buyer that the goods
are legitimate in order to complete the sale. In this case, the
seller is taking the risk. If the buyer knows that the goods
are stolen, he is not willing to buy, and may even report the
attempt to sell. Since the seller must make an effort to disguise
the exchange in order to convince the buyer to buy and not
to report the exchange, there may be a tendency for the selling
job to be done by a selling specialist; i.e., a fence with a legiti-
mate cover or front.
C. Functions of the Middleman
In the process of marketing, the middleman must perform
three distinct functions, each of which has identifiable sub-
functions: 7
(1) The functions of exchange- buying and selling;
(2) The functions of physical supply -transportation and
storage;
(3) The facilitating functions - financing, risk-taking, market
information, and standardization.
Any one of these functions or subfunctions may be more
or less important than the others depending upon the situation,
but they all must be performed. One cannot expect them to be
less problematical for the thief or fence than they are for the
iegitimate businessman.
1. The Functions of Exchange
The functions of exchange include buying and selling.
Selling is "the personal or impersonal process of assisting
and/or persuading a prospective customer to buy a commodity
or a service or to act favorably upon an idea that has corn-
7 R. TouSLEY, E. CLARK & F. CLARK, PRINCIPLES OF MARKETING 14 (1962).
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mercial significance to the seller."8 The aim of the selling func-
tion is to accomplish transfer of ownership of a commodity.
Buying is the marketing function of controlling or concen-
trating goods to facilitate sale, purchase, production, or use.
Purchases, therefore, can be made for one of three objectives:
buying for business use, buying for resale, and buying for ulti-
mate consumption.
Sales to various buyers of stolen goods differ in the de-
gree of involvement of the original seller. The quantity of items
to be sold dictates in part the role of the middleman in selling.
If there is a large quantity to be sold, the middleman or fence
plays a larger part in arranging and facilitating the sale.
Direct selling is by far the dominant form of selling with
respect to stolen property, although there may be a broker of
some type who brings buyer and seller together. In some cases,
the seller has the negotiating power, while at other times he
does not. Where supply is greater than demand, the seller
usually makes the initial advance to begin the transaction.
The buying function for stolen goods is probably the most
important function that the fence provides: getting the goods
off the hands of the thief. In all cases it is important for the
thief to "get off the goods" as soon as possible. He is under
great pressure to transport the goods from the site of the
theft. Unlike a legitimate marketer, the thief usually cannot
store the goods while waiting for better market conditions or
for a better assortment. The minimization of risk by putting
distance between the thief and the evidentiary goods is criti-
cal. It is also usually important for the thief to get cash as
soon as possible after the theft. A recurring point made by
thieves is that they spend money as fast as they get it and
that they are always under a real or imagined pressure to get
more cash. All sources stated that they would not release goods
to an ultimate consumer without cash on the spot, although
they might sell on very short-term credit (a few hours at the
most) to a fence.
2. The Functions of Physical Supply
The functions of physical supply include transportation and
storage. The transportation function provides the physical trans-
fer of goods from producer to user and adds place utility to
the items. The storage function creates time utility in a product,
tends to level out fluctuations and differences in quantities
8 MARKETING DEFINITIONS at 16.
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produced and demanded, and is necessary in matching supply
with demand.
The transportation and storage functions can be most
critical to the successful fencing of goods. The ability to move
the goods from the thief to the next user is one of the prime
responsibilities of the middleman. By token of their importance
and possible complexity, the transportation and storage func-
tions would seem to be among the most vulnerable links in
the fencing operation.
3. The Facilitating Functions
The facilitating functions include financing, risk-taking,
providing market information, and standardization. "Market
financing is that part of the general business function of pro-
viding and managing funds and credit which is directly related
to the transactions involved in the flow of goods and services
from producer to consumer or industrial user."" When goods are
owned, capital is invested in them. The financing function pro-
vides this capital.
In the traffic in stolen goods, the fence provides a major
source of financing for the thief. The fence almost always has
cash available and usually pays the thief directly and imme-
diately in cash- a necessary requirement for addicts and for
criminals in need of cash. As a middleman, the fence is
in a position to turn over the goods for cash and consequently
is a major financer. This is true of secondhand dealers and
pawnbrokers as well as the full-time fence.
Risk is typically defined as a hazard of loss in which the
probability of loss is known. Any time a middleman performs
an activity relative to property, it costs him money, and he
takes a risk that he can recover the money by selling the
goods at a higher price than he paid for them. If the probability
of risk is known, the middleman can insure himself against
loss.
The thief faces one major type of risk: the risk of detec-
tion during and after the theft. The fence faces two major
types of risks: the risk of detection while performing any one
of the middleman functions and a significant economic risk.
The latter risk arises because he has committed resources for
goods which he may not be able to sell at a profit. Although
the fence is often better able than the thief to protect himself




fronts, he is generally less able to protect himself against
economic risk. The fence faces risks in all of the middleman
functions; for example deterioration or obsolescence during
storage or transportation, decrease in retail price of the goods
in legitimate channels, and poor intelligence . or market
information.
To the extent that marketing decisions are based on con-
crete facts, the marketing function will be performed more
efficiently. Market research includes the gathering, recording,
and analyzing of all facts about problems relating to the trans-
fer and sale of goods and services.
The dominant form of market information about stolen
goods is word-of-mouth communications between consumers,
fences, information brokers such as bartenders, and thieves.
This study found no evidence of sophisticated data gathering
and analysis similar to the very effective techniques used by
legitimate businessmen. However, it is likely that syndicated
crime does use such techniques on large volume transactions.
If more thieves and fences were to begin using market research
and intelligence-gathering techniques similar to business and
law enforcement agencies, increased traffic in stolen goods
could result since these techniques are signs of a sophisticated
market orientation.
The standardization function determines the basic limits
or grades in the form of product specifications to which manu-
factured goods must conform, and the classes into which prod-
ucts may be sorted." It also includes determining the appro-
priate quantities for package units.
Because thieves and fences deal mostly in goods already
manufactured and packaged, the standardization function is
not as important as others. However, in the case of cargo
thefts of industrial or semiprocessed goods, the standardiza-
tion function takes on added importance because the fence must
perform some grading and packaging.
D. The Consumer of Stolen Goods
Characteristics of consumer motives and behavior are a
very critical element in marketing. As in legitimate market-
ing theory, it is impractical to consider the market for stolen
goods without also considering the preferences and character-
istics of the consumer. Buying motives refer to the reason a
person decides to buy a certain brand or to buy at a certain
1,1 Id. at 16.
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outlet. Motives may be either -rational, a decision made strictly
on the basis of price or functionality of the product, or emo-
tional, satisfying prestige, status, maturity, or other psycho-
logical or social needs. A consumer's belief that he is getting
a "bargain" is a strong buying motive which provides part of
the, explanation for a market in stolen goods.
On the other hand, buying habits refer to the pattern of
behavior exhibited in the market prior to and during the trans-
action. The state of the buyer at the time of the proposed
purchase influences the search behavior of the buyer. Thus,
a buyer may be in one of the following categories relative
to the purchase of stolen goods: unaware that stolen goods are
available; aware that stolen goods are available; interested in
buying stolen goods; intending to buy stolen goods; or actually
buying stolen goods.
In much the same way, buyers of stolen goods can be
arranged in several usage classes varying from nonuser to
heavy user. Investigation as well as prosecution varies with
two important characteristics of the consumer: (1) if the buyer
knows the goods are stolen, and (2) the frequency with which
he buys stolen property.
An unaware consumer is one who buys stolen goods with-
out knowing they are stolen. This could occur because he is
buying in a supposedly legitimate outlet and has no reason to
be suspicious, or because the thief or fence makes elaborate
efforts to legitimize the exchange. An aware consumer is one
who knows that the goods are stolen, and buys them anyway.
The frequency with which a person buys stolen property
is an important characteristic as well, regardless of his state
of awareness. A light user is one who rarely or perhaps only
once buys stolen goods. A heavy user is a person who regularly
buys stolen goods, and it may be such a regular part of his
behavior that he "checks around" about the availablity of
stolen goods prior to buying in the legitimate channels and
expects to fill a substantial portion of his needs with stolen
property.
Even with this simple classification, we arrive at four
kinds of consumers: (1) an unaware light user, who unknow-
ingly buys stolen goods; (2) an unaware heavy user, of which
there are most probably an insignificant number; (3) an aware
light user, who may be buying for emotional motives; and
(4) an aware heavy user, who is probably in an income or
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other grouping in which this mode of behavior is necessary
or accepted.
In the case of aware users, the consumer is likely to have
buying habits that could be easily identified. For example, the
consumer must be able to come into contact with a fence or
a thief -a characteristic that is not common throughout the
citizenry. The consumer must have the full price in cash
readily available since there is little or no use of credit. The
consumer must be willing to assume the various kinds of risks
involved -especially the risk that the product is unsatis-
factory, and the risk of detection. The consumer must be some-
one who is not adverse to avoiding conventional channels and
who is willing to tolerate the inconvenience of doing so.
Further, aware consumers would likely be distinctive in
their motives for buying stolen goods. Motives could range
from money savings to the psychological thrill derived from
"beating the system." However, the most powerful motive
apparently is derived from the substantial savings involved
(savings of 25 to 90 percent off regular retail price are re-
ported). To gain this savings the consumer must give up many
conveniences that he could normally expect from the con-
ventional channel of distribution; e.g., time, quantity, place,
selection, service, and warranty.
Surely a group of consumers with such unique buying
habits and motives have demographic and socioeconomic char-
acteristics that can be identified through research processes.
Precise definitions of these characteristics would provide much
usable information about market segments allowing one to
define a hierarchy of markets according to the risk involved
in selling to each. Much can be learned about a fence by
studying the classes or groups which constitute his customers.
Most consumers are probably not contacted as potential
buyers by thieves or fences. If this is so, it can be expected
that a market segment composed of regular users consume
the major portion of stolen goods, that they are a market
segment having a definable composition, and that they are
readily distinguishable from the remainder of the public. These
factors create the possibility of making a consumer profile
analysis-a definition of socioeconomic boundaries of various
kinds of users of stolen property. This would provide a great
deal of information about the traffic in stolen goods.
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E. Channels of Distribution for Stolen Goods
The channel of distribution is traditionally defined as
"the route taken by the title to the goods as they move from
the producer to the ultimate consumer."'" This definition is
obviously not satisfactory here since the title to the goods
is separated from the possession of the goods by the thief.
Thus, the definition can be altered to refer to the path taken
by possession of the goods between the producer (the thief
who produces stolen goods) and the consumer (the person
ultimately consuming the goods), since possession supplants
ownership in the case of stolen property.
Specific channels of distribution for stolen goods may be
distinguished on the basis of two factors: consumer knowl-
edge and, in the case of industrial goods, the type of product.
1. The Aware Consumer
When the consumer is aware that the goods are stolen,
the parties are not concerned with trying to disguise the
illegality of the transaction. The only difference between chan-
nels in this case is the number of middlemen involved, and
there need be no attempt to legitimize the transactions. The
thief may make a direct sale to a consumer, performing the
functions of a middleman himself, or he may involve an inter-
mediary who merely functions as a type of broker. When the
intermediary takes possession of the goods, he must perform
the marketing functions of a middleman.
2. The Unaware Consumer
When the consumer does not know the goods are stolen,
an effort must be made within the channel of distribution to
legitimize the transaction by disguising the fact that the
property is stolen. Differences in channels will entail differences
in the number and type of middlemen involved.
The thief may sell directly to the consumer but must take
steps to give the transaction an aura of legality. If he cannot
legitimize the transaction or perform some middleman mar-
keting function, he must utilize one or more intermediaries in
the channel of distribution, generally a fence. Legitimation
is best accomplished if the fence operates a cover or front
institution of some kind.
3. Channels of Distribution for Stolen Industrial Goods
Industrial goods are products which must be substantially
''Id. at 10.
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converted before they can be marketed to the consuming pub-
lic. Stolen industrial goods are converted into consumer prod-
ucts or are items used or consumed in the conversion process.
In almost every case, there is a legitimizing transaction some-
where within the channel before goods reach the consumer.
The thief may either sell the goods directly by legitimizing
them to a consumer, by legitimizing them to a'supplier, or by
selling them to a fence who will in turn legitimize the goods
either to a supplier or to a consumer. The thief will be best
able to legitimize a direct sale in instances where a supplier
or industrial consumer normally buys from a large number of
individuals. Particularly with industrial goods, large quantities
of stolen goods may necessitate the participation of a fence
with an institutional cover or front.
The wide variety of middlemen operating within legitimate
channels -including rack jobbers, drop shippers, manufac-
turers' agents, brokers, commission men, and truck jobbers-
make it easy for a fence to assume a cover or a front for
legitimizing sales. However, as the channel of distribution is
lengthened with additional transactions between the thief and
the ultimate consumer, each channel member must receive
a lower margin since the price to the consumer cannot in-
crease substantially without eroding the differential advantage
of the thief or fence. As channel members see a reduced po-
tential margin, there is a lessening of incentive for them to
deal with stolen property. Lengthening of the channel also
increases the probability of detecting the traffic since there
are more channel members vulnerable to detection.
F. Pricing of Stolen Goods
The price asked by a seller depends primarily upon three
related factors:
(1) Market demand -generally, the price of any given
item will increase as the demand for the item in-
creases and will decrease as the demand decreases.
(2) Cost - profitable sales dictate that the selling price
must be greater than the cost of producing the item.
However, it is generally held that cost determines
profit rather than price.
(3) Competition - as more persons try to sell similar
items, the price will generally drop due to the in-
creased supply.
Although he may not have complete information about each
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of these factors, the seller must balance them in arriving at a
price which will be satisfactory to his market segment and
to his profitability.
If one seller's price is higher than that of a competitor, the
seller must offer some type of additional inducement to over-
come the disadvantage. Common kinds of nonprice competi-
tion are premiums such as trading stamps, services such as
delivery or credit, and imputed quality differences created by
promotion. If one seller's costs are lower, he can lower his
price and increase demand for his output. This is a major
factor in the continued traffic in stolen goods both because
thieves and fences are somewhat limited in the kinds of non-
price competition they can mount against legitimate sellers
and because they generally have a low dollar cost for goods.
The total monetary cost of stolen goods to a middleman
is extremely low -so low, in fact, that it is not really a price
determinant. A major nonmonetary cost of producing stolen
goods is the amount of time spent in confinement if the thief
is caught. However, only one source, a thief who had spent
many years in jail and who now has apparently reformed,
mentioned this as a "cost of doing business" (and decided that
it was too high). Other sources stated that the probability of
having to pay this cost was so low that it really was not worth
considering (or at least they chose not to consider it).
Thieves and fences confront the same problem in predicting
demand that a legitimate seller confronts; but because of their
circumstances they can only estimate the relationship between
price and quantity demanded, or use a trial and error method
for determining demand. Additionally, price competition among
thieves is probably not too strong with respect to a given
product. Their major competitors are the legitimate dealers
in the product.
Thus, the thief and fence are not able effectively to use
cost, demand, and competition in setting price. However, they
do have a very effective base upon which'to arrive at the
price for an item. Their pricing base is simply the regular
retail price in legitimate outlets. The price received by the
thief varies with respect to retail price because of two factors:
(1) the efforts made to legitimize the transaction; and (2) the
involvement of a fence in the channel of distribution.
Where there is no effort made to legitimize the sale to the
final consumer, whether there is a direct sale or a fence in-
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volved, there are few pricing problems for any seller in the
channel of distribution. For the thief, a price set too high may
result in lost sales, while too low a price will cost the seller
additional profits. With the addition of one or more fences and
middlemen to the channel of distribution, prices must be set
low enough by the thief to allow the fence to cover the cost
of middleman services that he provides and to make a profit
on the final transaction. While the thief gets a lower price when
he deals with a fence, he gets additional benefits and services
rendered by the fence which he would otherwise have had to
provide.
Where an effort is made somewhere within the channel
to legitimize the transaction, the pricing problem is more dif-
ficult. When the thief makes a direct sale to a consumer or
a legitimate middleman, he must not set his price so low that
it would be an indication that the transaction is not legitimate.
On the other hand, the higher he raises his price (and in-
creases his profit), the more he increases his direct compe-
tition with legitimate dealers handling the same product-
dealers who can offer considerably more than the thief in
the way of services and convenience. If the thief sells to a
fence who in turn legitimizes the transaction, the thief has
no pricing problem. In such a transaction the bargaining power
relative to price will depend upon which individual takes
the initiative in the transaction. If a fence asks a thief to
bring in a particular good, the thief has bargaining power.
Otherwise, the fence has the bargaining power.
In summary, the thief often faces a dilemma in that his
price may be too high or too low. However, the thief and
fence both have a ready reference in the regular retail price.
The pricing objective of the thief is simply to arrive at a price
that will move the goods to an aware or unaware consumer
and provide cash. The fence has a more complex pricing ob-
jective in that he must arrive at a price that will move the
goods and allow him to recover his investment in the goods
plus a profit.
G. Promotion
The objective of a promotional program is to stimulate
demand for an item. The sequential problem faced by the
seller is to create attention, interest, desire, and conviction
on the part of the potential buyer to make an exchange with
the seller. To achieve this objective, a promotional mix is cre-
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ated which may include advertising, personal selling, sales pro-
motion, and other promotional tools.
The promotional program offered is thought by many to
be closely related to the channel of distribution used. For in-
stance, a long channel of distribution (one including many
middlemen) typically also provides distribution over a wide
geographical area and requires a "broadcast" type of promo-
tion provided by newspapers, magazines, radio, and TV. 12 A
short channel (the shortest is direct selling between pro-
ducer and consumer) would best be served by the "closed
circuit" promotion found in face-to-face contact between buyer
and seller. The most effective and expensive promotion is that
of a salesman in face-to-face contact with the potential buyer.
Promotion strategies may be differentiated on the basis of
the potential buyer's willingness to buy stolen property know-
ingly and the thief's attempt to legitimize the transaction. Con-
sider first the situation where the buyer is willing to buy goods
he knows are stolen. The most difficult part of the promo-
tional problem faced by the thief or fence is attracting the
attention of potential buyers. There is not a universally effec-
tive way of making contact or getting leads on potential buyers
of stolen goods. Some sellers of stolen goods may make an
overt attempt to contact potential buyers. Perhaps the most
effective way of making contact is by word-of-mouth com-
munications through friends and relatives. For instance, a
person may bring a quantity of goods (for example, a vanload
of clothes) to a point in the community and encourage friends
to spread the word through the neighborhood that a sale is
being held. The goods might be exhausted in a few hours of
one evening. Other sellers may wait for the consumer himself
to make contact with the supplier of stolen goods by "asking
around in bars."
Once the contact is made, interest in buying stolen goods
is created by the low price of the item and the thief's assurance
of safety in making the transaction. If the buyer is receptive,
arrangements for the exchange will follow.
When the thief tries to legitimize the transaction because
the buyer is not willing to buy goods that he knows are stolen,
the thief is limited in the promotional techniques available
because the method of promotion itself may be an indicator
12 See Aspirn-wall, The Parallel Systems Theory, in MANAGERIAL MAlKET-
ING: PERSPECTIVES AND VIEWPOINTS 644-52 (1962).
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that the deal is illegal. Two possibilities for broadcast types
of promotion are the use of classified ads in the newspaper
and the popular garage sale, although these methods require
a "front" phone number and address. However, if the thief
uses a fence who has a supposedly legitimate front, the fence
has a normal businessman's flexibility in selecting promo-
tional programs.
Of all the parts of the marketing mix involving stolen
goods, the promotional programs are the most difficult to
describe because they are least evident. At the same time, the
promotional aspects provide one of the greatest opportunities
for thieves and fences to enhance the sale of stolen goods, and
for law enforcement officials to detect and block that traffic.
H. Product Line
A legitimate producer of goods has ample opportunity
to design the product in such a way that it will be more
easily salable. A variety of classification schemes is available
to describe the differences between products which require a
different type of marketing mix.
The most widely recognized classification scheme is to
divide products into convenience, specialty, and shopping cate-
gories. A convenience good is a type of item that the consumer
buys regularly, and one to which he is not willing to devote
a great deal of time nor suffer inconvenience in making its
purchase. He will not "shop around" for such a product and
will be willing to buy it at any time or at any outlet as his
needs develop. Examples of convenience goods would be cigar-
ettes and bread. A shopping good is one for which the buyer
is willing to compare prices and product features of several
brands and in several outlets before he chooses a brand and
outlet, as in the case of clothing. A specialty good is one in
which the buyer knows exactly what he wants, and will go
directly to the outlet that carries it, as in the case of a brand-
loyal car buyer.
A skilled thief or fence makes critical decisions about
product lines in which to deal. This is accomplished when the
thief is selective about what he steals and when the fence is
selective about what he buys from the thief. In general, con-
sumer goods most likely to be stolen for resale or fencing
seem to have the following characteristics:
(1) High value-this generates more cash per risky
transaction for the thief or fence.
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(2) Low bulk and low perishability - these features
make it easier to transport the item from the point
of theft and provide flexibility in the storage and
handling of the item.
(3) Branded - items that are branded and those with
a heavy promotion of the brand by legitimate sellers
are much easier for the thief to sell.
(4) Nonsized - items that are sized, such as shoes,
complicate the problem of matching supply and de-
mand.
(5) Established and well-known price -to show that
the stolen goods are a genuine bargain and to give
the thief his only differential advantage, the regu-
lar retail price must be well known to potential
buyers. The retail price is also used as a base price
for negotiations between the thief and fence.
(6) Three other features are of considerable importance,
but perhaps not so critical as the ones above:
since the thief cannot offer a guarantee or war-
ranty, the product should not be subject to high
levels of post-purchase dissatisfaction; the amount
of risk increases with an increase in the traceability
of the item; and marketing opportunities increase
substantially with an increase in the range of con-
sumer types who are potential consumers.
Consumer goods such as guns, gems, autos, television sets,
and liquor all seem to have these characteristics in varying
degrees. Typewriters and adding machines are the best ex-
amples of industrial and commercial products having these
features.
There are many exceptions to these characteristics. For
example, brassieres, cut logs, shoes, pool cues, and meat have
been stolen in volume and do not have all of the important
features. The exceptions suggest that perhaps one important
characteristic to be added to the list is availability for theft.
Even a heavy consumer of stolen goods cannot rely on a
fence to supply convenience items regularly, and he may prefer
to buy some items from a legitimate outlet. Thus, the general
class of convenience goods is usually fenced only when large
quantities can be moved through legitimate channels. An ex-
ception, of course, is cigarettes, which are widely marketable.
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The fact that large quantities of convenience goods are oc-
casionally fenced may give some clues to the channels of
distribution for other types of stolen goods if the convenience
good's channel can be traced.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Marketing theory provides a fresh and effective founda-
tion for studying the traffic in stolen property. It allows law
enforcement agencies to visualize theft and fencing activities
from much the same perspective as that used by thieves and
fences.
Professional and organized thieves and fences face a for-
midable marketing task, especially in the case of large-scale
cargo thefts. When faced with a marketing problem, particu-
larly a complex one, the thief or fence may make an overt
attempt to solve it. Once he does- that is, once he becomes
marketing oriented- his behavior pattern becomes more pre-
dictable through the use of marketing theory and concepts.
Thus, by studying the problem from the perspective of a
marketing-oriented thief or fence, police agencies can investi-
gate and attack crimes by studying the logical marketing prac-
tices and actual marketing activities of thieves and fences.
Law enforcement agencies, for example, must increase
their efforts to monitor the equilibrium between demand and
supply of important types of stolen goods. Continuous efforts
should be made to find methods of answering three questions
for each type of good. First, for a given time, product, and
area, does the thief or the fence typically initiate the trans-
action? Second, is the price for the item increasing or decreas-
ing? Third, are thieves or fences shifting from a more risky
or less risky market segment? Answers to these questions
could allow the investigator to determine the degree of equi-
librium between supply and demand for each important item.
If supply is greater than demand, the investigator can expect
that perhaps the goods have been transported into the market
area, and can endeavor to determine the supply area from
which they have been shipped. If supply is substantially greater
than demand, he could expect shipments out of the market
area. If the answers indicate that supply is less than demand,
the investigator can expect either increased thefts of the item,
or shipments into the market area from other points.
Several specific operations currently used by police forces
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could be more effectively employed for continuous monitoring
of supply and demand. These include the use of pawnshop
details, informants, undercover agents and a more complete
questioning of suspects and victims.
If a thief or fence concentrates on trading with a specific
market segment-perhaps an ethnic minority, a certain income
or age group, persons working or living in a specific location,
or persons unique in their drinking patterns-his marketing
activities must be tailored to fit that segment. Therefore, if
one can separate from the group of potential consumers the
particular market segment served by a thief or fence, a sur-
prising amount of information about his marketing activities
can be learned.
A. Problems in Studying Fencing and Gathering Data
There is a need for additional research into transactions
involving stolen goods conducted from a marketing perspective.
For example, one might inquire as to how the channel of dis-
tribution varies with the characteristics of the stolen item, or
into the critical buying habits and socioeconomic demographics
of the aware, heavy consumer of stolen goods. In any attempt
to delve into stolen goods marketing, problems in data gather-
ing and anlaysis will have to be met in the design of a research
or investigatory model.
The most problematical area is undoubtedly that of the
lack of readily available data relating to the traffic in stolen
property. This problem is caused mainly by lack of financial
resources, traditional use of statistics primarily for budgetary
purposes, and other characteristics of law enforcement agencies.
There seems to be a tendency for departments to record data
more for the purposes of budget support and for public report-
ing than for any very sophisticated kind of operational or
investigative purpose. Furthermore, there is a surprising lack
of transfer of information between and even within many
departments. Additionally, police reporting forms are often
poorly structured and are frequently replete with errors and
omissions.13
13 For example, in one department, when an auto is stolen a loss value
equal to the value of the car is reported. However, when the car is
recovered stripped of parts, the recovery value given is the original
value of the car, inflating the recovery statistic and obscuring the parts
stolen.
In a study by the authors of bicycle thefts, 41% of the reports did
not indicate the time of the theft, 26% of the reports did not include
the day of the theft, and 12% did not indicate whAher it was a man's
or a woman's bike that was stolen.
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Not all of the lack of information is due to inadequate
police reporting and data analysis. The code of silence among
thieves is especially powerful relative to fences and fencing ac-
tivities, and most professional fences keep the thief unaware
of their activities. There is also a lack of continuity in opera-
tions by thieves and fences. Most institutionalization or rou-
tinization of their activities is necessarily done in ways that
reduce visibility of the operation. Another problem is that
thieves are not totally rational or sophisticated in business prac-
tices, even though they generally attempt to maximize profits
rather than to satisfy psychological needs.
B. Recommendations for Action
Listed below are selected strategies based on marketing
and management concepts which appear to be useful in re-
stricting the traffic in stolen property or for investigating spe-
cific cases dealing with stolen property. While some of the
strategies could be implemented with the current state of knowl-
edge, others will require additional research prior to their im-
plementation. Some strategies suggested are now in use by
some law enforcement agencies and are reported here because
they illustrate the marketing dimension. Some are directed
at the thief, others at the fence, and still others at the con-
sumer of stolen goods.
Two kinds of recommendations are made. First, blocking
strategies should be utilized. These are actions taken by law
enforcement agencies to make the traffic in stolen goods so
expensive, time-consuming, or risky that there would be a
significant lessening of incentive to deal with stolen goods.
Second, investigatory strategies, which are systematic ways
of visualizing the diverse activities related to traffic in stolen
goods, should be employed. An investigator is often faced with
sparse and seemingly disconnected observations, but through the
use of various investigatory strategies, an investigatory model
can be designed whereby these observations can be connected
and case evidence then becomes more meaningful. The use of
a model will enable the investigator to predict the existence
of activities and institutions before all the requisite facts
become available.
1. Blocking Strategies
The best blocking strategy is obviously the prosecution
and conviction of fences. Giving some thieves immunity for
turning states' evidence may well be worth the public wrath
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incurred to identify, study, and prosecute fences. If the de-
mand for stolen goods is reduced by disrupting or blocking
the fences, the production or theft of stolen goods will neces-
sarily also be reduced.
The traffic in stolen goods can be deterred to the extent
that the channel of distribution is lengthened. As the channel
is lengthened, the price of stolen goods must be higher. As the
price approaches the legitimate retail price, the fence loses his
primary competitive advantage. Thus, any action that would
cause more middlemen to be involved in distributing an item
lowers the profitability of the traffic and thereby lowers the
incentive to trade in stolen goods. Lengthening of the channel
may also increase the probability of detecting the traffic.
Anything that can be done to increase the price of stolen
goods would provide effective blocking of the traffic. Tech-
niques for increasing the price-if such methods could be
perfected - include jamming channels of communications,
lengthening the channels of distribution, and restricting the
traffic to low-margin items.
Traffic in stolen goods is deterred to the extent that the
actual transaction can be made more inconvenient. The com-
petitive advantage of a fence is his low price to the consumer,
who must accept inconvenience during the transaction. Thus,
the fence's competitive advantage decreases as the transaction
is made more inconvenient.
The ability to block the traffic in stolen goods increases
as the supply of stolen goods becomes greater than demand,
such as would result if the purchase of stolen goods were made
more risky. In such a market, the fence must take more risks
and become more marketing oriented; any change in his mar-
keting program makes him more vulnerable to efforts made
toward blocking his marketing operation.
A classification of transactions into types would indicate
transactions to which high priorities should be assigned for
further investigation. A study of transactions would also yield
certain definable patterns of exchange. This would allow iso-
lation of the types of transactions most susceptible to detec-
tion; e.g., the ones most risky due to prolonged or repeated
contact, or the ones most costly to the fence in terms of time
or money. One could also determine the transaction type most
vulnerable to deterrence, such as the type which requires the
most sophisticated efforts to legitimize.
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
The point at which a conviction for receiving is most like-
ly to result is the transaction just prior to the legitimizing
effort, since both parties know the goods are stolen. The most
difficult kind of transaction during the flow of goods occurs
at that point where the thief or the fence makes an effort to
legitimize the transaction, since he has two things to do at
once: make the sale, and make it appear legal. For these rea-
sons, these particular types of transaction should receive special
enforcement attention.
Public service advertising programs directed at consumers
can be effective in blocking some traffic in stolen goods by
reducing primary demand. Because an aware but light user of
stolen goods is expected to be somewhat nervous about under-
taking the transaction, an advertising theme playing on this
anxiety by stressing the danger of muggings and fraud could
be effective. Persons who are unaware that they are buying
stolen goods might be influenced by an advertising program
stressing the inconvenience and dangers in making purchases
outside regular channels. The objective of these kinds of ad-
vertising programs is to limit the potential market of fences
thus slowing the traffic and thereby making it less profitable.
Such a program would probably not be effective in influencing
the aware, heavy user, although additional research might re-
veal some motive that could be played on in reaching this
group.
A careful monitoring by law enforcement agencies of the
assortment of goods maintained by suspected thieves and fences
in a market area would provide useful information about the
market they serve, about the demand for stolen goods in the
market, and about the buying habits of their customers. Fences
can be classified as being either specialized or generalized,
allowing law enforcement agencies to tailor blocking strategies
accordingly.
Law enforcement departments can destroy the integrity
of the channels of communication that are so necessary to the
traffic in stolen goods. Communications and promotion chan-
nels are very informal and subject to considerable noise and
interference. Since promotion is so vital to distribution, the
distribution can be partially blocked by making communica-
tions unreliable and inconvenient -perhaps by "jamming" the
channels with false information about the availability of stolen
goods.
Improved communications between departments, including
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comparison of theft and recovery reports, would allow for a
more complete determination of areas which are suppliers and
those which are markets for specific types of stolen goods at
a given time. The investigation program would be substan-
tially different if the investigator were looking for thieves than
if he were looking for a fence in a market area. Cooperation
and exchange of information about suspected stolen items
traveling out of a geographical market area into another juris-
diction would force the fence to take additional risky steps.
Additional middlemen, storage, or increasing costs would be
required to overcome these increased risks.
Identification of goods with numbers and secret marks is
most desirable. Businesses themselves would benefit from serial-
ization or other identification because of increased efficiency in
inventory and stock control. Insurance companies, too, would
be in a better position to assess and pay claims. In fact, in-
surance companies might require better identification or serial-
ization as a condition of insurability. But the most important
aspect of better identification is the deterrent effect on the
potential thief and his fence. This deterrent effect emanates
from the increased power of law enforcement officials to iden-
tify more clearly and locate stolen property.
Means of identifying sources of materials available for sale
in salvage yards and secondhand stores must be found. These
outlets are existent and effective opportunities for fencing. A
required waiting period prior to resale of goods would permit
spot checks and close surveillance by police to determine true
ownership. Auction houses, bazaars, flea markets, garage sales,
and pawn shops would also be subject to spot checks, since
they are also effective outlets for stolen goods.
2. Investigatory Strategies
An investigator may classify stolen goods on the basis of
their marketing characteristics thereby allowing him to devote
different amounts and kinds of energy to the different types
of products and market segments. For example, a thief distribut-
ing a large quantity of convenience goods will almost surely
have to use a fence who has contact with dealers that have high
sales volume through multiple outlets. On the other hand, he
could use personal contact selling with shopping or specialty
goods.
Better incident and statistical reporting on the part of
police and other law enforcement agencies would make the
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tracing of stolen property much easier. Reporting officers are
frequently neither descriptive nor specific in describing the
kind of property stolen. The ability to investigate specific cases
increases with both the precision of identification of the goods
and the precision with which field reports are completed.
Sophisticated statistical analyses of a department's theft
and recovery reports, including a comparison with data from
other departments, would provide invaluable information about
demand and supply equilibrium and other marketing indica-
tors. Data compiled by time periods and geographical regions
would permit departments to accomplish planning and inves-
tigation merely by looking at trends and making comparisons
at a fairly uncomplicated level. Many ratios and computer
plots of theft and recovery data can be calculated continuously
by the computers available for use by departments of all sizes.
The most effective investigatory strategy available to law
enforcement agencies is that of incorporating the study of
marketing concepts and practices into the training of inves-
tigators. Investigators must be more aware of marketing theory
than are the thieves and fences in order to combat the traffic
in stolen goods.
C. Summary
Marketing theory has promise as an instrument of law
enforcement allowing an attack on organized crime by at-
tacking their marketing practice. Many concepts from market-
ing theory can be utilized for blocking and investigating stolen-
goods traffic and can provide substantial enrichment to other
investigative approaches.
Thieves and fences make significant marketing oriented
decisions as they conduct the distribution of stolen goods. They
can be expected to use many of the same strategies and pro-
cedures in solving those problems utilized by legitimate busi-
nessmen.
The process of serving as a middleman in the distribution
of stolen goods is a very complex one requiring rational deci-
sionmaking by thieves and fences. Each function- buying,
selling, transporting, storing, financing, risk-taking, informa-
tion gathering, and standardization-- is subject to study by
law enforcement agencies. A recent staff report of the U.S.
Senate Select Committee on Small Business notes that:
In summary, by obstructing the flow of stolen goods (1) the
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selling price is raised and the incentive for buying is lessened,
and (2) the thief's risk/profit margin is unfavorably shifted.1 4
The general economic awareness of thieves and fences pro-
vides a reference point for many law enforcement officials.
These criminals' working knowledge of the laws of supply and
demand and the market structure permit them to engage in a
significant amount of profitable crime.
The reasons for specialization in the theft or fencing of
a particular type of stolen goods are varied. As noted earlier,
there are frequently psychological and social reasons for such
preferences. More germane to this study, however, are the
varied economic motives and reasons for specialty and struc-
ture in a particular product and market segment. There is a
certain amount of naivet6 on the part of some administrative
and law enforcement officials regarding these economic con-
siderations.
One of the major difficulties in conducting this research
arose from the nonavailability of individuals knowledgeable
about fencing operations. Penitentiary inmates and law en-
forcement officials alike are familiar with the operations of
thieves; however, very few really understand the methods
and marketing practices of the fence. Consequently, the most
cogent fact to come from this study is that both research
and action emphasis should be put on fencing operations in
order to thwart thievery.
The willingness of the thief to bear risk during trans-
actions in stolen goods suggest an entrepreneurship advocated
in our society. The challenge now is to make law enforcement
officials as aware of the dynamics of the market situation as
are the thieves.
14 SENATE SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, 92D CONG., 2D SESS., AN
ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL REDISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS AND THEIR ECONOMIC
IMPACT ON SMALL BUSINESS 18 (Comm. Print 1972).

NOTE
STANDARDS OF DISCIPLINE FOR ATTORNEYS IN
COLORADO AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
INTRODUCTION
T HIS note will discuss the standards of discipline applicable
to attorneys in Colorado, setting forth the general stand-
ards governing attorneys' conduct and articulating the manner
in which these standards are given meaning. In particular,
it will focus upon the newly adopted Code of Professional
Responsibility, discussing its significance in Colorado.
Rule 241 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, which
sets forth the current standards governing the discipline of
attorneys, provides:
Any act committed by an attorney contrary to the high-
est standards of honesty, justice or morality, whether com-
mitted in his capacity as an attorney or otherwise, even
though not amounting to a felony or misdemeanor, may con-
stitute cause for discipline, and where such act constitutes a
felony or misdemeanor, conviction thereof in a criminal pro-
ceeding shall not be a condition precedent to suspension or
to the institution of disciplinary proceedings, nor shall acquit-
tal necessarily constitute a bar thereto. That an act com-
plained of is malum prohibitum rather than malum in se shall
not, of itself, constitute a defense to a charge of misconduct.
Any violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
. . . and acts of gross carelessness or gross negligence com-
mitted by an attorney in his capacity as an attorney may also
constitute cause for discipline. 1
The three general grounds of discipline for Colorado attorneys
set forth in this rule may be summarized as follows: (1) acts
committed contrary to the highest standards of honesty, jus-
tice, or morality; (2) acts of gross carelessness or gross neg-
ligence; and (3) acts in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Before proceeding with a discussion of these general
standards, the procedures followed in disciplinary actions
against attorneys and the disciplinary measures which may
be invoked for violation of these standards will be examined.
I COLO. R. Civ. P. 241.
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
A. Procedures in Disciplinary Cases
According to the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, the
supreme court has "original and exclusive jurisdiction" in all
matters involving disciplinary proceedings against attorneys.-
Although the power of the supreme court to discipline has
long been recognized as an inherent power, :' the court's ex-
clusive jurisdiction of such proceedings was not given explicit
recognition within the rules until May 1959.
4
The rules provide for a permanent grievance committee
which is to be an adjunct of the supreme court, and whose
nine members are to be appointed by the court." The grievance
committee has the primary responsibility for handling disci-
plinary matters, and makes recommendations on such matters
to the supreme court.
Informal complaints relating to the conduct of an attorney
are handled by this committee. The committee may dismiss
an informal complaint as providing a wholly inadequate basis
for disciplinary action if it finds that the complaint is of a
trivial or frivolous nature." Should the committee conclude
that a complaint warrants further investigation, it may in-
vestigate the matter itself, or the committee "may refer the
same to an attorney or a bar association for investigation." 7
(This limited investigative function is currently the only role
the Colorado Bar Association or local bar associations play in
disciplinary matters.) s On completion of an investigation, the
2 Id.
3 Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 398, 312
P.2d 998 (1957); Pecple v. Weeber, 26 Colo. 229, 57 P. 1079 (1899).
4 Colo. R. Civ. P. 241 (Supp. 1960).
; COLO. R. Civ. P. 242.
"Id. at 246.
7Id.
8 Id. Under this rule a bar association may also conduct hearings, make
findings and a report as well as conduct investigations. In practice,
however, the only function bar associations now play in disciplinary
matters, and have played since June 25, 1970, is that of limited investi-
gation. Interviews with L. James Arthur, Assistant Attcrney General
of Colorado, in Denver, Colo., June 30, 1972; Harold Auger, Assistant
Clerk of the Supreme Court and Secretary of the Grievance Com-
mittee, in Denver, Colo., June 26, 1972; Norman Berman, former Mem-
ber of the Supreme Court Grievance Committee, in D2nver, Colo., Aug.
29, 1972; Joseph Cook, former Member of the Supreme Court Grievance
Committee, in Denver, Colo., June 27, 1972; William McClearn, Mem-
ber of the Supreme Court Grievance Committee, in Denver, Colo.,
June 29, 1972; William Miller, Executive Secretary of the Colorado Bar
Association, in Denver, Colo., June 29, 1972; Aan Sternberg, Member
cf the Supreme Court Grievance Committee, in Denver, Colo., June 28,
1972; [hereinafter cited as Intrviewsl. Opinicns of those interviewed
are expressed as those of the entire group because individuals did not
wish to have their opinions separately identified.
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informal complaint may be dismissed, or further proceedings
may be conducted by way of a formal complaint.!' If minor
ethical violations are disclosed by the investigation, and the
committee concludes that, although formal disciplinary action
by the supreme court is not warranted, the complaint should
not be dismissed as being without merit, it may direct that a
letter of admonition be sent to the attorney against whom the
complaint was filed.'
If a formal complaint is filed, either upon authorization
of the supreme court or through a private individual, the
grievance committee gives notice and serves process upon the
attorney named in the complaint." The attorney thus served
is given an opportunity to answer the complaint, 12 and a
formal hearing is held before a "hearings committee" or a
"hearings officer" appointed in accordance with rule 251. At
the conclusion of the formal hearing, a report setting forth
the findings and recommendations of the hearings committee
is submitted to the entire grievance committee. 3
The full grievance committee may, if it finds that the
charges are unfounded and unproven, act upon the findings
and recommendations by entering an order dismissing the
complaint. 4 Alternatively, the committee may, upon a finding
that the charges have been "established by substantial, clear,
convincing and satisfactory evidence,"' 5 recommend discipline
in the form of private censure, public censure, suspension (for
a definite or an indefinite period), or disbarment."' If disci-
pline is recommended by the committee, the matter is then
docketed in the supreme court,T and a citation is issued.18 The
respondent is given an opportunity to file exceptions to the
committee report,"' and briefs may be filed by the parties in
accordance with rule 256(e). The case is determined by the
supreme court on the committee record.2-' The court may dis-
miss the matter, impose discipline in accordance with the
11 CoLo. R. Civ. P. 246.
1 "Id.
I IId. at 247, 248.
12 Id. at 249.
1 : Id. at 254. If the entire grievance committee sits as the hearings commit-
tee, it will make findings and recommendations.
14 Id. at 254(a).
'5,Id. at 254.
'"Id. at 254(b).





recommendations of the grievance committee, or impose "such




B. Statistics and Analysis
The statistical information in Table 1 indicates the number
of complaints and disciplinary proceedings initiated against
members of the bar in Colorado in the past 13 years .2 It is
difficult to make many generalizations concerning the signi-
ficance of this data as it is limited in scope and accurate
records of disciplinary matters are a recent development. How-
ever, certain questions may be raised and certain conclusions
may be attempted based upon this limited information. Before
examining the data, however, it may be helpful to review
the procedural developments in attorney discipline in order
that the data may be discussed in its proper historical per-
spective.
TABLE 1 DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS IN COLORADO: 1959-72
1959 to
Type of Proceeding 196923 1969 1970 1971 1972
Informal complaints filed with
Grievance Committee of Colorado
Supreme Court 2 4  937 161 219 280 345
Informal complaints dismissed
at informal level 787 97 129 148 242
Formal complaints filed 112 39 16 34 21
Formal hearings held2.5  102 16 16 21 26
211d. at 256(c), (d).
22 As could best be determined, this data has never before been released
by the Colorado Supreme Court. This information was made available
by the supreme court in accordance with COLO. R. Crv. P. 259. The
statistical data presented is only part of that requested; however, it
represents the sum total of all data currently compiled and available
concerning disciplinary cases. Since the supreme court, in accord with
rule 259, refused access to case files, other information could not be
obtained.
23 These statistics are only estimates as the Colorado Bar Association and
local bar associations, which played a major role in the discipline of
attorneys during this period, kept no accurate record. (See text p. 211
infra.) Interviews.
24 These statistics concerning informal complaints are misleading. For a
discussion of this matter, see text p. 213 infra. It should also be noted
from Table I that the number of informal complaints dismissed at the
informal level and the number of formal complaints filed do not equal
the number of informal complaints filed with the grievance committee
initially in any one year. This discrepancy can be explained by the
fact that often several informal complaints filed with the committee
against the same attorney are combined within one formal complaint
against the attorney. Also, informal complaints filed with the com-
mittee during one year may not be considered until the subsequent
year.
25The number of dismissals after a formal hearing and the number of
instances of formal discipline by the supreme court being imposed
after a formal hearing (private censures, public censures, suspensions,
and disbarments), do not equal the number of formal hearings held in
any one year. This discrepancy can be explained by the fact that a
formal hearing on a case may be held in one year, but dismissal or




Dispositions after a formal hearing 1969 1969 1970 1971 1972
Dismissals unknown 2 0 4 5
Private censures 39 5 5 5 8
Public censures 14 1 0 1 4
Suspensions (definite and indefinite) 14 1 4 5 3
Disbarments 20 0 1 3 2
Formal discipline total 87 7 10 14 17
Dispositions without a formal hearing
not in not in
Letters of admonition effect effect 7 18 52
Total discipline 87 7 17 32 69
The supreme court seemed to take a casual attitude toward
the discipline of attorneys until the late 1950's. Prior to May
1959, the Colorado Bar Association played its most extensive
role in the discipline of attorneys, with the Bar Association
Grievance Committee acting in a manner similar to that of
the current grievance committee. 26 But neither a record of the
complaint, the investigation, if any, nor the ultimate disposi-
tion was required to be kept. The bar association committee
was responsible for an initial determination of the merit of a
complaint, the supreme court exercising its disciplinary power
only after committee consideration and recommendation. 27 No
authority existed independently of the bar association to handle
first impression disciplinary matters; thus, the bar association
was primarily responsible for the disciplining of its own mem-
bers.
After May of 1959, the Colorado Bar Association and local
bar associations continued their dominant role in the disci-
pline of attorneys. Until June 1970, they handled minor dis-
ciplinary matters through investigations and hearings conducted
by their grievance committees, and through in-house discipline
for minor infractions. 2 Such practices prevailed during these
years despite the supreme court's assumption, in 1959, of
"exclusive jurisdicition 29 over disciplinary affairs and the
vesting of initial jurisdiction over such matters in the griev-
ance committee of the supreme court3 0
Although these facts might indicate a lack of serious
intent by the supreme court to assume a forceful role in the
disciplinary field, they might be equally indicative of the re-
luctance of the Colorado Bar Association and local bar asso-
ciations to part with their disciplinary functions.
26 E.g., Colo. R. Civ. P. 241 (1953). Interviews.
27 E.g., Colo. R. Civ. P. 241 (1953).
28 Interviews.
29I CoLo. R. Civ. P. 241, formerly Colo. R. Civ. P. 241 (Supp. 1960).
3,, COLO. R. Civ. P. 246, formerly Colo. R. Civ. P. 246 (Supp. 1960).
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On June 25, 1970, in order to provide a uniform policy
governing all disciplinary cases, the Colorado Supreme Court
exercised its exclusive jurisdiction over the discipline of at-
torneys.3 1 The Colorado Bar Association and local bar asso-
ciations were expressly forbidden from continuing to disci-
pline attorneys within the field pre-empted by the supreme
court.32 Additionally, the secretary of the grievance committee
was ordered to keep a permanent record of all disciplinary
matters.33 (These records are reproduced in Table 1 supra.)
The supreme court's assumption of the exclusive role in
the discipline of attorneys and the marked change in the
handling of record keeping demonstrates the changing attitude
of the supreme court in recent years.34 The data presented in
Table 1 tends to support the view that the present court is
more concerned with the supervision of the legal profession.
There appears to be a trend toward more formal disciplinary
action by the supreme court (seven instances of formal dis-
cipline being invoked by the court in 1969, 10 in 1970, 14 in
1971, and 17 in 1972) and more letters of admonition being
issued by the grievance committee (seven letters in 1970, 18
in 1971, and 52 in 1972). Approximately .4 percent of all at-
torneys in Colorado were disciplined in 1970, while 1.5 percent
of Colorado attorneys were disciplined in 1972.
35
Even though it may appear from the small minority of at-
torneys disciplined in Colorado that the supreme court is not
adequately supervising the legal profession, comparison of Colo-
rado's figures with those of the nation as a whole indicates
that Colorado attorneys are supervised much more strictly than
the attorneys in most states.
36
31 Colo. Sup. Ct. Order, Statement of Policy Concerning the Jurisdiction
of the Grievance Comm. of the Sup. Ct. (Exhibit A) (June 25, 1970)




'34 These changes coincided with publication of the so-called Clark Report
and were undoubtedly influenced by recommendations made in that
report. The Clark Report strongly recommended increased state su-
preme court supervision over the legal profession in disciplinary mat-
ters. It was further recommended that accurate records of disciplinary
matters be kept in each state. ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF
DISCIPLINE ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS & RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINE
ENFORCEMENT (Final Draft 1970).
35 There were approximately 3,900 attorneys in Colorado in 1970, and 17
instances of formal and informal discipline were recorded; thus .4%
of Colorado attorneys were disciplined in that year. There were approxi-
mately 4,600 Colorado attorneys in 1972 and 69 instances of formal
and informal discipline were recorded; thus 1.5% of Colorado attorneys
were disciplined in that year. Interviews.
Of the approximately 360,000 attorneys in this country in 1972 only 309
were publicly disciplined; i.e., disbarred, suspended, or publicly cen-
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In 1972, 345 of the 4,600 attorneys presently in the state had
informal complaints filed against them with the grievance com-
mittee. Although it would appear from this that only a small
fraction of clients are dissatisfied with services rendered by
their attorneys, many disgruntled clients may feel that little
will be accomplished if they do file a complaint. Also, a lack
of public awareness of disciplinary procedures may discourage
dissatisfied clients from filing complaints. Some will naturally
argue that the 345 informal complaints filed against attorneys
in one year represents a large number of complaints, for, on
the surface, this figure means that approximately 7.5 percent
of the attorneys in Colorado had informal complaints filed
against them in that year. This figure of 7.5 percent is some-
what misleading, however, for multiple informal complaints
are occasionally filed against the same attorneys.3
7
The arguably small number of informal complaints filed
with the grievance committee might also be due to the fact
that complaints made to the Colorado Bar Association or to
the local bar associations may never reach the committee.
This would happen if a complainant is informed by a bar
association that his complaint is without merit and the com-
plainant chooses not to bring his claim to the attention of the
grievance committee.38 A bar association might also handle the
complainant's problem informally; e.g., telephone the attorney
and try to work out a settlement of whatever problem exists.
If a complaint filed with a bar association is handled in either
of these ways, it does not become part of the supreme court's
data on informal complaints.39 If, on the other hand, a com-
plaint is originally filed with the secretary of the grievance
committee, it does become part of the court's statistical data
regardless of merit or informal solution.40 The figure of 345
sured. This indicates a national ratio of less than one out of 1,000. As
Table 1 indicates, in 1972 nine out of the 4,600 attorneys in Colorado
were publicly disiplined. This indicates a ratio of approximately two
out of 1,000, or about twice the national average. Telephone conversation
with Russel Twist, Acting Director, Department of Prcfessional Stand-
ards, American Bar Association, Chicago, Ill., June 14, 1973.
37 Grievance committee records indicate that one out of every five in-
formal complaints filed is against an attorney who has been named in
a previous complaint. For a more detailed analysis of disciplinary
actions taken in Colorado during 1971-1972 see Plaut, A Survey of
Grievance Complaints Filed Against Colorado Attorneys: 1971-1972,
COLO. LAW., Aug. 1973, at 7.
'8 Also, fee disputes are primarily handled through the Legal Fee Review
Committees of either the Colorado or Denver Bar Associations.
Interviews.
3.3 Colo. Sup. Ct. Order Concerning Jurisdiction of Grievance Comm.
40 Id.
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informal complaints filed in 1972 is, therefore, misleading.
Under current disciplinary procedures, meritorious com-
plaints are required to be referred to the grievance committee
regardless of the person with whom the complaint is first filed,
since the committee and the court have exclusive jurisdiction in
the disciplinary field.4' However, the number of meritorious
complaints considered by the committee seems small com-
pared to the number of frivolous complaints filed. Most informal
complaints handled by the committee are dismissed (129 out
of 219 in 1970, or 59 percent, and 148 out of 280 in 1971, or 53
percent). The number and percentage of dismissals increased
substantially in 1972 (242 out of 345, or 70 percent).
The large number of informal complaints dismissed by
the grievance commitee seems to indicate that the majority of
complaints filed with the committee are nonmeritorious. How-
ever, this high dismissal rate could be due to the inadequate
personnel available to properly investigate the merits of each
complaint. Most investigations at the informal level are con-
ducted by one of the nine members of the grievance com-
mittee, with few investigations being conducted by other mem-
bers of the bar.42 An additional problem is encountered in the
fact that no remuneration is given for the time spent investi-
gating.43 Although the rules provide for a delegation of inves-
tigatory power,44 funding of these investigations would remain
a problem.
Once a formal complaint is filed and a hearing is held,
there are very few dismissals (0 in 1970, 4 in 1971, and 5 in 1972).
This demonstrates the need for adequate investigatory ma-
chinery at the informal level, for it appears to be at this level
that very critical decisionmaking takes place. Once sufficient
grounds are found not to dismiss an informal complaint, either
a letter of admonition or formal discipline by the supreme
court seems virtually certain to follow.
When an attorney is disciplined, there appears to be a
greater possibility that it will be by the grievance committee
through a letter of admonition, than by the supreme court
through formal discipline. Since letters of admonition first
began to be issued in 1970 by the grievance committee, their
usage has increased substantially (see Table 1). If this trend
41Id.; COLO. R. Civ. P. 241.
42 Interviews.
43 See COLO. R. Cirv. P. 242. (Members are, however, reimbursed for rea-
sonable expenses incurred in the performance of official activities).
44 COLO. R. Civ. P. 246.
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continues, it will be the grievance committee and not the
supreme court that is the primary disciplinary agency. The
desirability of this procedure is questionable due, inter alia,
to the lack of due process safeguards that ostensibly exist in
formal disciplinary proceedings.
An attorney does have the right "to request in writing
that formal disciplinary proceedings be initiated against him
to adjudicate the propriety of the conduct upon which the
admonition is based. '45 If such a request is made, the letter
of admonition is vacated and the matter processed as a formal
complaint with eventual consideration of the case by the su-
preme court.41 To date, however, only one attorney has appealed
the issuance of a letter of admonition (out of 77 letters is-
sued) .47 Perhaps so few attorneys have appealed letters of
admonition because of the nature of this informal mode of
discipline, the time required to perfect an appeal, and required
to attend a hearing.
48
Currently under consideration by the supreme court are
changes in the disciplinary rules and procedures. 4 1 The extent
of these changes is as yet unknown. That the court is even
considering what will undoubtedly be fairly extensive changes
in disciplinary procedures, indicates a concern on the part of
the supreme court with the adequacy of the present process.
II. How MEANING Is GIVEN To THE STANDARD OF
HONESTY, JUSTICE, AND MORALITY
In discussing the standards or grounds of discipline ap-
plicable to Colorado attorneys, the major question raised is
how content or meaning is given to the important, yet vague,
requirement that all members of the bar adhere to the "highest
standards of honesty, justice, and morality.
50
4. Colo. Sup. Ct. Order, Rule Authorizing Letters of Admonition (Exhibit
B) (June 25, 1970).
46 Id.
47 Interview with Harold Auger, Assistant Clerk of the Supreme Court
and Secretary of the Grievance Committee, in Denver, Colo., June 26,
1972.
48 In addition, it has never been definitely determined whether or not
the grievance committee could re-issue a letter of admonition after the
consideration of an appeal, or if the only alternatives are to recommend
formal discipline or to dismiss the complaint. Interviews. With the
existence of such uncertainty, it is understandable that an attorney
might be reluctant to appeal the issuance of a letter of admonition by
the grievance committee.
411 Interview with Mr. Edward Day, Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court,
in Denver, Colo., June 28, 1972.
:,l COLO. R. Civ. P. 241. This standard was incorporated into the Colorado
Rules of Civil Procedure on May 14, 1959. Colo. R. Civ. P. 241 (Supp.
1960). However, it was not a new disciplinary standard even then, for
it was implicitly referred to in several early Colorado cases: "To be
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A. Case Law
In examining this standard, one may look to the case law
of Colorado to see how certain types of conduct have been,
and are considered to be, contrary to the highest standards
of honesty, justice, or morality. The case law provides evi-
dence of the kind of conduct warranting discipline, and thereby
actionable in disciplinary proceedings the conduct complained of must
amount to a violation of law or it must involve 'moral turpitude or
dishonorable conduct.'" Petition of the Colo. Bar Ass'n, 137 Colo. 357,
361, 325 P.2d 932, 934 (1958); "[T]he moral character of the act is the
all-important consideration in a disbarment proceeding." People v.
Hillyer, 88 Colo. 428, 435, 297 P. 1004, 1006 (1931); "[I]t is the duty of
a lawyer practicing at the bar of the state, to transact whatever busi-
ness he may attend to in a reputable and honorable manner, and he is
held to the rule of honorable conduct as a citizen, whether that conduct
relates to the practice of the profession or not." People v. Patterson, 56
Colo. 296, 299, 138 P. 30, 31 (1914); "In no other calling should so strict
an adherence to ethical and moral obligations be exacted, or so high
a degree of accountability be enforced." People v. Keegan, 18 Colo. 237,
239, 32 P. 424, 425 (1893). See also People v. Laska, 105 Colo. 426, 101
P.2d 33 (1940); People v. Kaufman, 90 Colo. 8, 5 P.2d 1114 (1931);
People v. Taylor, 32 Colo. 250, 75 P. 914 (1904); People v. Mead, 29
Colo. 344, 68 P. 241 (1902); People v. Sindlinger, 28 Colo. 258, 64 P. 191
(1901); People v. Waldron, 28 Colo. 249, 64 P. 186 (1901); People v.
Weeber, 26 Colo. 229, 57 P. 1079 (1899); People v. MacCabe, 18 Colo. 186,
32 P. 280 (1893); People v. Brown, 17 Colo. 431, 30 P. 338 (1892); People
v. Green, 9 Colo. 506, 13 P. 514 (1887).
An example of one explicit reference to this standard was made in
In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics,
a leading case handed down just a few years before this standard was
incorporated into the rules. In that case, the court recognized the dis-
tinction between "that which is inherently wrong and inherently right,
or that which is basically immoral and basically moral, or that which
is fundamentally dishonest and fundamentally honest .... ." In re
Hearings Concerning Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, 132
Colo. 591, 604, 296 P.2d 465, 472-73 (1956).
This necessity for lawyers to be honest persons of high moral
character, also finds expression in rules enunciating qualifications for
admission to the bar and the oath of admission. Proof of moral and
ethical qualifications has long been required before attorneys have
been admitted to the practice of law in this state. E.g., COLO. R. Civ. P.
209, formerly Colo. Sup. Ct. R. 83 (1935). Attorneys have been disci-
plined for forfeiting their good moral character. E.g., People v. Essing-
ton, 32 Colo. 168, 75 P. 394 (1904); People v. Sindlinger, 28 Colo. 258,
64 P. 191 (1901); People v. .Keegan, 18 Colo. 237, 32 P. 424 (1893). In
the oath of admission, lawyers have for years pledged to employ only
such means "for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to
me . . . as are consistent with truth and honor .... ." E.g., COLO. R.
Civ. P. 220, formerly Colo. Sup. Ct. R. 83 (1935).
How did the standard of honesty, justice, and morality develop?
What is the source of this standard? It appears that the standard itself
developed from case law and the rules enunciated above. However,
the precise language incorporated into rule 241 of the Colorado Rules
of Civil Procedure referring to the standard of honesty, justice, and
morality was patterned after very similar language being considered
by New Mexico as part of its disciplinary rules and finally adopted by
that state in 1960. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-2-1(3) (2.04) (1953). Interview
with Norman Berman, Former Member of the Supreme Court Grievance
Committee, in Denver, Colo., Aug. 29, 1972. (The author of rule 241,
Frank Hall, formerly Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court is no longer
living. Thus, the origin of the language of this rule was determined from
the interview, as indicated.)
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gives meaning to this standard.51 In addition to understand-
ing this standard, the value of precedent in disciplinary pro-
ceedings can be to provide consistency and uniformity in de-
cisionmaking. As the Colorado Supreme Court has quite re-
cently said:
In a proceeding of this nature, it is perhaps trite, but never-
theless true, to observe that disciplinary action to be taken in
a given case must in the final analysis depend upon the facts
and circumstances of that particular case, and where a prior
comparable case exists it should be resorted to for guidance
in order that some degree of uniformity may be approxi-
mated.
52
Most of the cases, both past and present, involving the
discipline of attorneys may be grouped into several general
categories. A very common cause for disciplinary action has
been the misappropriation or conversion of a client's funds
to an attorney's own use.53 Many attorneys have been disci-
plined because of dilatory action 5 4 and others have been disci-
51 Generally speaking, in the reported cases similar kinds of conduct
have always given rise to some kind of disciplnary action. It is im-
possible, however, to corrolate a particular offense with a particular
kind of discipline. The court considers each case upon its own facts
and circumstances and thus takes into account many different miti-
gating circumstances. E.g., People v. Gibbons, 157 Colo. 357, 403 P.2d
434 (1965); People v. Irwin, 60 Colo. 177, 152 P. 908 (1915); People v.
Taylor, 32 Colo. 250, 75 P. 914 (1904).
3- People v. Bell, 150 Colo. 245, 247, 372 P.2d 436, 438 (1962) (footnotes
omitted). Accord, People v. Trunk, 162 Colo. 245, 425 P.2d 278 (1967);
People v. Weinstein, 135 Colo. 541, 312 P.2d 1018 (1957). Even though
the Grievance Committee of the Supreme Court looks to prior cases
for guidance to assure uniformity in decisionmaking, the committee
usually only looks at recent cases (those within the past 3 years or so)
for guidance. Furthermore, where a prior comparable Colorado case
cannot be found, the committee will naturally look to cases from other
jurisdictions to help in the determination of what is appropriate disci-
pline. Interviews.
53 E.g., People v. Roads, 503 P.2d 1024 (Colo. 1972); People v. Stewart,
497 P.2d 1003 (Colo. 1972); People v. Murphy, 174 Colo. 182, 483 P.2d
224 (1971); People v. Welch, 174 Colo. 177, 483 P.2d 218 (1971); People
v. Keating, 172 Colo. 394, 476 P.2d 265 (1970); People v. Kiley, 170
Colo. 110, 463 P.2d 880 (1969); People v. Tognoni, 167 Colo. 480, 448
P.2d 612 (1968); People v. Mcllhenny, 165 Colo. 156, 437 P.2d 544
(1968); People v. Selby, 165 Colo. 404, 439 P.2d 341 (1968); People v.
Burns, 164 Colo. 490, 435 P.2d 897 (1968); People v. McMichael, 164
Colo. 115, 434 P.2d 417 (1967); People v. Benac, 162 Colo. 479, 426 P.2d
960 (1967); People v. Bell, 150 Colo. 245, 372 P.2d 436 (1962); People
v. Hillyer, 88 Colo. 428, 297 P. 1004 (1931); People v. Marshall, 88
Colo. 394, 297 P. 998 (1931); People v. Winograd, 87 Colo. 384, 287
P. 864 (1930); People v. Essington, 32 Colo. 168, 75 P. 394 (1904);
People v. Sindlinger, 28 Colo. 258, 64 P. 191 (1901); People v. Waldron,
28 Colo. 249, 64 P. 186 (1901); People v. Betts, 26 Colo. 521, 58 P. 1091
(1899).
54 E.g., People v. Bailey, 503 P.2d 1023 (Colo. 1972); People v. James, 502
P.2d 1105 (Colo. 1972); People v. Stewart, 497 P.2d 1003 (Colo. 1972);
People v. Atencio, 494 P.2d 837 (Colo. 1972); People v. Kane, 494 P.2d
96 (Colo. 1972); People v. Heyer, 489 P.2d 1042 (Colo. 1971); People
v. Welch, 174 Colo. 177, 483 P.2d 218 (1971); People v. Lawther, 174
Colo. 174, 483 P.2d 216 (1971); People v. Keating, 172 Colo. 394, 476
P.2d 265 (1970); People v. Selby, 165 Colo. 404, 439 P.2d 341 (1968);
People v. Fenton, 165 Colo. 131, 437 P.2d 350 (1968); People v. Burns,
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plined for making false representations to a client.15
Disqualification to practice law follows automatically upon
conviction of a felony in Colorado.,5  This has been true for
many years,5 7 with the court placing emphasis on the "moral
turpitude" involved in the commission of a felony. 58 Convic-
tion of a felony involving "moral turpitude" committed in
another jurisdiction has been held to be an adequate basis
for disbarment,' although in such cases disbarment is not
mandatory.
60
However, as is stated in the rules:
[W]here such action constitutes a felony or misdemeanor, con-
viction thereof in a criminal proceeding shall not be a condition
precedent to suspension or to the institution of disciplinary pro-
ceedings, nor shall acquittal necessarily constitute a bar thereto.61
As a rationalization for disciplinary action following conviction
of a crime, the Colorado Supreme Court, in 1899, said:
Pardon, or the payment of a fine, or service of sentence,
may restore one to his civil rights - may blot out the offense
committed - but it cannot wipe out the act of which he was
adjudged guilty, and it is the act that the court considers in
these disbarment proceedings.
62
Concerning disciplinary action following acquittal, the court
has said:
The mere fact that defendant was acquitted does not, how-
ever, affect the question as to whether he has been guilty of
professional misconduct for which he should be disbarred.
63
Thus, in the criminal realm, disciplinary action may be taken
by the supreme court before or after conviction for either a
164 Colo. 490, 435 P.2d 897 (1968); People v. Morgan, 163 Colo. 527,
431 P.2d 781 (1967); People v. Mead, 29 Colo. 344, 68 P. 241 (1902).
55 E.g., People v. Kane, 494 P.2d 96 (Colo. 1972); People v. Welch, 174
Colo. 177, 483 P.2d 218 (1971); People v. Lawther, 174 Colo. 174, 483
P.2d 216 (1971); People v. Keating, 172 Colo. 394, 476 P.2d 265 (1970);
People v. Sindlinger, 28 Colo. 258, 64 P. 191 (1901); People v. Betts,
26 Colo. 521, 58 P. 1091 (1899).
56 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39-10-17 (1963). However, automatic dis-
qualification is only effective for 7 years after final satisfaction of the
sentence. Ch. 44, § 4, [1972] Colo. Sess. Laws 267.
57 E.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39-10-17 (1953), amending COLO. STAT.
ANN. ch. 48, § 533 (1935).
58 E.g., People v. Wilson, 490 P.2d 954 (Colo. 1971); People v. Kaufman, 90
Colo. 8, 5 P.2d 1114 (1931); People v. Cowen, 88 Colo. 571, 298 P. 957
(1931); People v. Monrce, 26 Colo. 232, 57 P. 696 (1899); People v.
Weeber, 26 Colo. 229, 57 P. 1079 (1899).
59E.g., People v. Gibbons, 157 Colo. 357, 403 P.2d 434 (1965); People v.
Laska, 105 Colo. 426, 101 P.2d 33 (1940).
60People v. Laska, 105 Colo. 426, 101 P.2d 33 (1940).
61 COLO. R. Civ. P. 241 (emphasis added).
62 People v. Weeber, 26 Colo. 229, 231, 57 P. 1079, 1080 (1899).




felony or a misdemeanor, or even in the absence of a con-
viction, if the act committed by an attorney is contrary to
the highest standards of honesty, justice, or morality.
64
Attorneys have also been disciplined for advertising their
services2 ' In the early case of People v. MacCabe,1 where such
a breach of ethics resulted in disbarment, the court stated:
The ethics of the legal profession forbid that an attorney
should advertise his talents or his skill, as a shopkeeper ad-
vertises his wares. . . . [F]or anyone to invite or encourage
... litigation is most reprehensible.
0 7
Today, unethical advertising, unless it is of the grossest kind,
would probably not result in formal disciplinary action by the
supreme court.68 However, letters of admonition are frequently
issued by the grievance committee for minor instances of un-
ethical advertising.
69
The examples cited above do not cover all the offenses
for which attorneys have been disciplined in Colorado. Cases
within the categories discussed do involve the most flagrant
and the most predominant violations of this primary disci-
plinary standard. As cases involving letters of admonition or
private censures receive confidential treatment under the
rules, 70 the offenses or charges involved in such cases are
not known. These unreported cases certainly involve different
kinds of offenses, and, almost as certainly, less serious ones.
B. Other Sources
Case law cannot provide a complete understanding of the
standard of honesty, justice, and morality, however, and one
must look beyond it to fully understand its meaning and oper-
ation. Further illumination of this standard may be found
in the common law of ethics, which includes not only case
law, but also encompasses many written codifications. These
codifications include textual materials, opinions of the ethics
committees of the American Bar Association, the Colorado
Bar Association, and other state and local bar associations, the
Canons of Professional Ethics, and the Code of Professional
64 COLO. R. Civ. P. 241.
65 People v. Taylor, 32 Colo. 250, 75 P. 914 (1904); People v. MacCabe, 18
Colo. 186, 32 P. 280 (1893). See People v. Ginsberg, 87 Colo. 1.15, 285
P. 758 (1930).
61 18 Colo. 186, 32 P. 280 (1893).
67 Id. at 188, 32 P. at 280.
". Interviews.
Id.
7U COLO. R. Civ. P. 259.
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
Responsibility.' Additionally, the common law of ethics en-
compasses implicit, yet unwritten, notions of what the "high-
est standards of honesty, justice, and morality" means to the
grievance committee members and to the Colorado Supreme
Court.72 A very subjective element is, therefore, the interpre-
tation and application of this standard. In applying these
unwritten ideas to the meaning of honesty, justice, and moral-
ity, the grievance committee members (and probably the su-
preme court) take the group norm into consideration.7 3 This
norm is determined not only by what the committee members
"feel" the legal community considers contrary to honesty, jus-
tice, or morality, but also by reference to many of the written
codifications of the common law of ethics.
7 4
III. GROSS CARELESSNESS AND GROSS NEGLIGENCE- A SEPARATE BUT
RELATED STANDARD
A separate ground for the discipline of attorneys in Colo-
rado, as is indicated in rule 241, is the commission of acts of
gross carelessness or gross negligence.
7 5
In all cases examined in which an attorney was disciplined
for a violation of this standard, the attorney had been dilatory
in the handling of his client's affairs .7  Furthermore, in the
majority of these cases, the supreme court either directly stated7
or strongly suggested 8 that the attorney being disciplined had,
in each instance, acted contrary to the highest standards of
honesty, justice, and morality. In fact, as is discussed earlier,
cases involving dilatory action comprise one of the major cate-
gories of actions considered contrary to the primary standard
of discipline. These two disciplinary grounds (acts of gross
carelessness or gross negligence, and acts contrary to honesty,
justice, or morality) should not, therefore, be viewed as mu-
tually exclusive. A violation of one would most likely involve
a violation of the other.
71 Interviews.
72 Id. For a detailed analysis of the actual grounds fcr attorney discipline
see Plaut, supra note 37.
73 Id.
74 Id.
7" COLO. R. Civ. P. 241.
71; E.g., People v. Bailey, 503 P.2d 1023 (Colo. 1972); PeGple v. James, 502
P.2d 1105 (Colo. 1972); People v. Stewart, 497 P.2d 1003 (Colo. 1972);
People v. Van Nocker, 490 P.2d 697 (Colo. 1971); People v. James, 490
P.2d 291 (Cole. 1971); People v. Tobin, 169 Colo. 218, 454 P.2d 807
(1969); People v. Hillyer, 88 Colo. 428, 297 P. 1004 (1931); People v.
Irwin, 60 Cole. 177, 152 P. 905 (1915).
77 People v. Stewart, 497 P.2d 1003 (Colo. 1972); People v. Van N3ikcr,
490 P.2d 697 (Colo. 1971); People v. Tobin, 169 Colo. 218, 454 P.2d 807
(1969).




IV. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
m COLORADO
Since the Code of Professional Responsibility is part of
the common law of ethics, and since under the rules, "[a]ny
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility . . . may
also constitute cause for discipline," 79 it is necessary to examine
the development and significance of the Code of Professional
Responsibility in Colorado [hereinafter referred to as the Code].
A. Legal Status of The Code
The Code, which became effective in Colorado on August
20, 1970,80 replaced the Canons of Professional Ethics, which
were originally adopted in the early 1900's.81 The Canons of
Professional Ethics [hereinafter referred to as the Canons]
were "adopted" by the Colorado Supreme Court as a "stand-
ard of Professional conduct. 's 2 However:
By the "adoption" or "approval" of the canons of ethics the court
did not intend to give them the force or effect of law. "Adoption"
of the canons of ethics by the court was not intended to enlarge,
or narrow, the field of conduct within which disciplinary actions
would be warranted. . . . It was the intention of the court to
recommend the canons of ethics as a wholesome standard of con-
duct, as a statement of general principles best calculated to re-
flect credit upon. the profession . . . . Although the canons' em-
ploying language of wide coverage cannot be given the effect of
law, they nevertheless are recognized generally as a system of
principles of exemplary conduct and good character.
8 3
The supreme court has "adopted" the Code, like the Canons
before it, as a "standard of professional conduct. '8 4 It would
seem to follow then that "by 'adoption' or 'approval' of the
Code of Professional Responsibility the court did not intend
to give [the Code] the force or effect of law."8 5 On January
16, 1964, the following addition was made to rule 241: "Any
violation of the Canons of Professional Ethics . . . may also
constitute cause for discipline."s' This language was amended
to read "Any violation of the Code of Professional Responsi-
7,; Coo. R. Civ. P. 241.
81) Id. app. C.
81 E.g., Cede Civ. P. app. C (1935). The original Canons were later revised
and re-adopted by the supreme court July 30, 1953. Colo. R. Civ. P.
app. B (1953).
82 E.g., COLO. R. Civ. P. 223, formerly Colo. Sup. Ct. R. 83 E (1935).
S3 In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics,
132 Colo. 591, 604, 296 P.2d 465, 472-73 (1956). Accord, Petition of the
Colo. Bar Ass'n, 137 Colo. 357, 325 P.2d 932 (1958).
84 COLO. R. Civ. P. 223.
, In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics,
132 Colo. 591, 604, 296 P.2d 465, 472-73 (1956).
b"Colo. R. Civ. P. 241 (Supp. 1967).
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bility . . .,,87 when the code was adopted. This addition to
the rules apparently did not give the Canons and subsequently
the Code the force of law since the Colorado Supreme Court
reiterated, in the 1965 case of Bryant v. Hand,8 its earlier posi-
tion that the Canons were not binding on the courts and were
not law.
However, the case of Bryant v. Hand arose before the
addition to rule 241 was made in 1964 and the trial court
decision was also rendered before the rule change." ' Even
though the supreme court's decision in the case followed the
rule change, there is no evidence from either the case or the
briefs that the court even considered the question of whether
or not this addition to rule 241 could be interpreted so as to
give the Canons (and now the Code) the force of law.
Before the case of Bryant v. Hand was decided by the
Colorado Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court,
earlier in the same year, ruled that the Canons by themselves
were not law, and thus were not binding on the courts.""
However, like the Colorado Supreme Court, the United States
Supreme Court did not consider the question of whether a
rule such as Colorado's rule 241 could make the Canons (or
the Code) law. Thus, it remains unresolved whether the non-
mandatory provision of rule 241, which provides that "[a]ny
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility . . . may
also constitute cause for discipline,"9 1 gives the Code the force
and effect of law.92 However, the case of Bryant v. Hand still
stands for the principle that the Canons (and the Code) are
not law, and it has not been overruled.
It also remains unresolved why the addition was made
to rule 241. It seems likely that the supreme court adopted this
change so as to give this "standard of professional conduct '" '
(the Canons and the Code) explicit recognition within the
disciplinary rules. 4
One may ask why the standard of honesty, justice, and
morality has the force and effect of law if the Code of Pro-
87 COLO. R. Crv. P. 241.
88 158 Colo. 56, 404 P.2d 521 (1965).
89, Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 6, Bryant v. Hand, 158 Colo. 56, 404 P.2d
521 (1965).
90 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 535 (1965).
1 COLO. R. Civ. P. 241 (emphasis added).
92 See discussion at p. 223 infra indicating that in practice the Code has
the effect of law.




fessional Responsibility may not. Both are a part of the same
rule. Quite simply, the standard of honesty, justice, and mor-
ality was recognized as a standard of professional conduct be-
fore incorporation into the rules, and through case law, had
been given the force and effect of law."'
B. Importance of the Code
On June 25, 1970, the Colorado Supreme Court authorized
the issuance of letters of admonition:
Where investigation by the grievance committee of an in-
formal complaint discloses minor ethical violations or in-
stances of relatively trivial misconduct and the committee is
of the opinion that disciplinary action by the supreme court
is not warranted but also is of the opinion that the complaint
should not be dismissed as being without merit, the committee
may direct that a letter of admonition . . . be sent . . . to
the attorney of whom complaint was made.961
With this rule change, the supreme court delegated the au-
thority to issue letters for minor ethical violations to the
grievance committee, retaining the power of formal discipline
for conduct inherently wrong, immoral, or dishonest.
Since any violation of the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility may in fact constitute cause for discipline by the supreme
court or by the grievance committee,97 the question of whether
the Code has the full force and effect of law is only of
academic interest. Despite the use of permissive language
rather than mandatory language under rule 241 ("Any viola-
tion of the Code . . . may also constitute cause for discipline.")
discipline almost always follows by the court or grievance
committee for a violation of the Code.98 Even if the Code is
not law, one could realistically argue that its effect is the
same as if it were law.
Under rule 241, "that the act complained of is malum
prohibitum rather than malum in se shall not of itself con-
stitute a defense to a charge of misconduct." If disciplinary
action is brought against an attorney, he cannot raise as an
adequate defense, in and of itself, the fact that the act com-
plained of was not inherently wrong. However, it would seem
from the language, "shall not of itself," that this defense could
be raised with other defenses, and on this basis might be suc-
See discussion in note 51 supra.
Colo. Sup. Ct. Order, Rule authorizing Letters of Admonition (Exhibit
B) (June 25, 1970). Accord, COLO. R. Civ. P. 246.




The Code thus can be seen as having major importance in
Colorado as it serves as the primary basis for issuing letter of
admonition.10 As previously discussed, the Code also provides a
helpful codification of the definition of conduct contrary to
honesty, justice, or morality. For example, two types of con-
duct, conversion or misappropriation of a client's funds and
dilatory action, which the Colorado Supreme Court has con-
sidered contrary to the highest standards of honesty, justice,
or morality"" are covered within the Code under Disciplinary
Rules (DR) 9-102 (Preserving Identity of Funds and Prop-
erty of a Client) and DR 6-101 (Failing to Act Competently). 102
However, the Code does not give complete expression to
all kinds of conduct which could be considered contrary to
this standard. Indeed, it would seem impossible to list in any
code every transgression which an attorney might commit con-
trary to this overall standard.)0 3 To cover this inadequacy, the
standard of honesty, justice, and morality has been retained
within the disciplinary rules of the Colorado Rules of Civil
Procedure.1
0 4
Examination of the case law of Colorado indicates that
the Code has been of only minor significance as no mention
of the Code is made in any disciplinary case. However, few
cases have arisen since the recent adoption of the Code, and
the reported cases involve only the more flagrant examples
of professional misconduct. Thus, the supreme court probably
feels it unnecessary to make references to the Code in these
cases.10 5 Even though the Code is not mentioned in reported
decisions, references to Code violations are made in letters
of admonition,'0 6 which are, of course, confidential in nature.
CONCLUSION
As the foregoing discussion and analysis indicates, at-
torneys in Colorado are expected to act in accordance with
the highest standards of honesty, justice, and morality. Fail-
99 No cases employing this defense have been reported.
100 Interviews. Letters of Admonition have only been authorized under
the rules since June 25, 1970, approximately the same time that the
Code was adopted.
101 Cases cited notes 55-56 supra.







ure to act in this manner constitutes the primary basis for
disciplinary action being taken against attorneys in the state.
As has also been discussed, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
define all of the kinds of conduct which could be considered
by the supreme court and the grievance committee to be
contrary to this overall standard.
Help in ascertaining the meaning of this standard, how-
ever, can be found in case law, written codifications in this
area (such as the Code), and the unwritten notions of what
the standard means to the legal community.
Most members of the bar probably have an understand-
ing or "feeling" about this standard. Certainly if a question
arises as to what conduct may or may not be permissible in a
given situation, an attorney can turn to the above-mentioned
sources to help find an answer to his question. Nonetheless,
the practicality of such a course of action remains question-
able. The practitioner may not have the time, or may not be
willing to take the time, to research and seek out an answer
to a nagging ethical question. And should he take the time,
certain answers will be elusive or unavailable.
Furthermore, what the Colorado Supreme Court and the
grievance committee considers contrary to honesty, justice, or
morality may well change over time as personalities on the
court and on the committee change. Additionally, it is doubt-
ful if there is adequate representation on the court and on the
committee of the varying viewpoints that exist within the
legal community as to the meaning of honesty, justice, and
morality in different situations. Thus, an attorney may be dis-
ciplined in accordance with dominant bar, committee, or court
"standards," and yet be acting in accordance with a different,
and yet acceptable, value structure of his more immediate
peers.
The Colorado Supreme Court is currently in the process
of amending the disciplinary rules. The forthcoming changes
will be both procedural and substantive in nature.107 Many
of the procedural changes may remedy some of the problems
suggested in section I.B. of this note. Any substantive changes
probably will not significantly affect the general standards or
grounds of discipline currently applicable to attorneys in
Colorado.
Under the new amendments, there will probably be five
1117 Interview with Mr. Edward Day, Justice of the Colorado Supreme
Court, in Denver, Colo., June 28, 1972.
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disciplinary grounds spelled out: (1) acts committed contrary
to the highest standards of honesty, justice, or morality; (2)
acts in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
(3) acts of gross carelessness or negligence; (4) acts in viola-
tion of the criminal laws of Colorado; (5) acts in violation of
acceptable rules of legal ethics. 1 8 This last disciplinary ground
would be the only basis for attorney discipline not presently
recognized under the rules of civil procedure or statutes.
If in the new rules the court should use language of
mandatory implementation in setting forth the disciplinary
standards, the Code would be recognized as having the full
force and effect of law. But as discussed, it can be argued
that the Code presently has the same status as if it were
recognized as law. The primary effect of such a change would






FEDERAL ESTATE TAXATION - RETAINED POWERS UNDER
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954, § 2036 (a) -
United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972)
INTRODUCTION
A decedent's "gross estate" is determined by computing
the value of all of his property, both real and personal,
tangible and intangible, wherever situated at the time of his
death.' The value of the gross estate includes the value of
all of decedent's property "to the extent of [his] interest there-
in at his death."2 If the decedent has retained an interest in
any property which had been ostensibly transferred, his estate
is thereafter required to pay taxes on that property to the
extent of the decedent's retained interest.3 Conversely, prop-
erty over which the decedent had completely severed all
dominion and control at least three years prior to his death
cannot be included in his gross estate for tax purposes.
Because effective estate planning requires an understand-
ing of the subtle distinctions between retention and divest-
ment of control over transferred property, the Internal Reve-
nue Code specifically defines those inter vivos transfers con-
summated by the decedent which could create a semblance
of complete severance of control, but which would not, in
fact, divest the decedent of sufficient powers over the trans-
ferred property to escape estate tax consequences.
4
This comment deals with one such retained power -the
reservation of a life interest, defined in section 2036 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 5 Under this statutory provision,
I INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2031 [hereinafter cited as CODE].
2 Id. § 2033.
3 Included in the decedent's gross estate is property that had been the
subject of a gratuitous, incomplete transfer during the decedent's life-
time.
4 CODE §§ 2035-40.
5 Id. § 2036 provides for transfers with retained life estates as follows:
(a) GENERAL RULE - The value of the gross estate shall include
the value of all property to the extent of any interest therein
of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer (except
in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full considera-
tion in money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise under
which he has retained for his life or for any period not ascer-
tainable without reference to his death or for any period which
does not in fact end before his death
(1) the possession or enjoyment of or the right to the
income from, the property, or
227
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the decedent's gross estate includes the value of all property,
transferred by trust or otherwise," under which the decedent
has retained for life7 either: (1) the possession or enjoyment
of, or the right to the income from, the property or (2) the
right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to desig-
nate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property
or its income.8
I. THIE SCOPE OF 26 U.S.C. § 2036 (a)
A 1931 United States Supreme Court decision precipitated
the passage of the predecessor to section 2036.f0 Since the en-
actment of section 811 of the 1932 Code, the courts have re-
peatedly attempted to define and delineate its scope. These
judicial interpretations of section 811, and its successor, sec-
tion 2036(a), have brought the statute into somewhat sharper
focus. Nevertheless, the court decisions remain contradictory.' 0
The modern estate planner is still faced with the task of fer-
reting out those interpretations of section 2036(a) which can
be safely utilized as drafting guidelines.
Section 2036 (a) is divided into two main subsections. The
first attaches estate tax consequences to the donor's retention
(2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any
person, to designate the persons who shall possess
or enjoy the property or the income therefrom.
(b) LIMITATION ON APPLICATION OF GENERAL RULE- This section
shall not apply to a transfer made before March 4, 1931; nor
to a transfer made after March 3, 1931, and before June 7, 1932,
unless the property transferred would have been includible in
the decedent's gross estate by reason cf the amendatory lan-
guage of the joint resolution of March 3, 1931 (46 Stat. 1516).
6 Where section 2036 is applicable, the amount included in the decedent's
gross estate is the value of the entire property transferred, less only
the value of any portion of the property which is not subject to the
decedent's interest and which is actually being enjoyed by another per-
son at the time of the decedent's death. Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1 (a) (1960).
7 The interest is taxable if retained for life or for any period not ascer-
tainable without reference to decedent's death or for any period which
does not in fact end before his death. For examples of the latter two
situations, see Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(b) (i)-(ii) (1960).
8 This comment deals exclusively with subsections (1) and (2) of sec-
tion 2036 (a).
9 In May v. Heiner, 281 U.S. 238 (1930), the Supreme Court held that
property is fully transferred for estate tax purposes even though the
settlor retains the right to income for life. The Supreme Court affirmed
May v. Heiner on March 2, 1931, indicating that the decision would not
be confined to its facts. On the very next day, March 3, 1931, Congress
responded to the Supreme Court decision by passing a Joint Resolution
which taxed all transferred property that was subject to a life interest
retained by the settlor. The President signed the Congressional Resolu-
tion into law that same day. Approximately one year later, on June 6,
1932, Congress reenacted the 1931 Resolution, although in somewhat
broader form. INT. REV. CODE OF' 1932, § 803 (a), 47 Stat. 279. The
language in that provision is identical to the language contained in §
2036 (a) of the 1954 Code.
" See pp. 229-30 infra.
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of possession or enjoyment or the right to the income from
the transferred property. A clear example of what would
constitute a taxable interest under this section is a reserva-
tion of a life estate.1 Similarly, a grantor who transferred
property in trust, retaining a right to the income therefrom
would subject his estate to taxation under section 2036 (a) (1).12
It makes no difference for estate tax purposes whether the
income retained consists of rental payments, 13 stock divi-
dends,' 4 or some other type of income.15 On the other hand,
if the use of transferred property for the benefit of the grantor
depends solely on the discretion of an independent trustee,
the transferred property will not be subjected to estate taxa-
tion.' Nor would such estate tax be imposed if the grantor
retained administrative powers only."'
The second part of section 2036(a) prohibits retention of
the right to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy
the transferred property or its income.' 8 The grantor who re-
tains the power to determine whether income is to be paid
to the life beneficiary or accumulated for the benefit of the
remainderman clearly holds a taxable interest under this sec-
tion.") A grantor reserving the power to terminate the trust,
thereby allowing premature distribution of the principal, simi-
larly subjects his estate to taxation under section 2036(a) (2).°2o
On the other hand, if the grantor's retained power to designate
is limited by an "ascertainable standard," no resulting estate
tax arises. 2' Similarly, if a grantor designates himself as one
of the trustees, his retained interest may escape future tax-
ation if the court determines that the grantor's "fiduciary
obligation" (as a trustee) to treat all beneficiaries with im-
It Commissioner v. Church's Estate, 335 U.S. 632 (1949).
32 Estate of Pamelia D. Holland, 47 B.T.A. 807 (1942), modified, 1 T.C. 564
(1943).
13 McNichols' Estate v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1959).
14 Varian v. Commissioner, 396 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1968).
1. United States v Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316 ('1969).
16 Estate of Jack F. Chrysler, 44 T.C. 55 (1965), rev'd on other grounds,
361 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966).
17 Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States, 432 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1970).
18 It makes no difference, for estate tax purposes, whether the grantor
exercises this control alone or in conjunction with another person. Nor
dces it matter in what capacity the power is exercisable. Treas. Reg. §
20.2036-1(b) (3) (1960).
"' United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627 (1966); Biscoe v. United States,
148 F. Supp. 224 (D. Mass. 1957).
21 Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953); Commissioner v. Holmes,
326 U.S. 480 (1946).
• Jennings v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1947); Estate of Milton J. Bud-
long, 7 T.C. 756 (1946).
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partiality provides a sufficient limitation on his reserved
powers.
22
These conflicting interpretative strains reach a discordant
crescendo in the following hypothetical. S, a settlor, trans-
fers property into an irrevocable trust. S retains powers which
are ostensibly administrative in nature. S is not a trustee nor
are his powers limited by an ascertainable standard, although
they substantially affect the beneficial enjoyment of the trans-
ferred property. In a case where all of these factors exist,
how should sections 2036(a) (1) and (2) be interpreted and
applied? Such is the question that faced the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Byrum.
23
II. United States v. Byrum
A. The Facts
In 1958, decedent Milliken C. Byrum created an irrevocable
trust in which he placed shares of stock in three closely held
corporations. The trust instrument vested the corporate trustee
with broad managerial powers over the trust property, subject
to certain specified controls retained by the settlor. Byrum,
the settlor, reserved for himself the rights to (1) vote the
shares of unlisted stock held in the trust estate; (2) veto the
trustee's sale or transfer of any trust assets; (3) approve all
investments; and (4) remove the trustee, appointing another
corporate trustee to serve as successor.
24
Prior to the creation of the trust, Byrum had owned at
least 71 percent of the outstanding stock of each of the close
corporations. After the transfer, Byrum owned 59 percent of
the stock in one of the corporations and less than 50 percent
in each of the other two.25 Nevertheless, Byrum's reserved
right to vote all of the unlisted stock held in trust, when
combined with the voting rights he possessed over his own
shareholdings, gave him continued voting control of at least
2 Estate of Willard V. King, 37 T.C. 973 (1962).
23 408 U.S. 125, petition for rehearing denied, 409 U.S. 898 (1972).
24 Pertinent provisions of the trust instrument are quoted in a footnote
to the majority's decision. 408 U.S. at 127 n.1.




owned owned by Decedent
by Decedent by Trust and Trust
Byrum Lithographing
Co., Inc. 59 12 71
Graphic Reality, Inc. 35 48 83
Bychrome Co. 42 46 88
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71 percent of the common stock in each of the three cor-
porations.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that
the transferred stock should have been included in Byrum's
gross estate under section 2036(a). The Commissioner asserted
that Byrum's retained powers entitled him to "enjoyment of
. . .the property" 26 and, in addition, enabled him to deter-
mine the flow of dividends so as to "designate the persons
who shall . . . enjoy . . . the income. '27 The district court ruled
for Byrum's executrix on the cross motions for summary
judgment,28 and the Court of Appeals affirmed its decision.
2
1
Certiorari was granted to review the important tax questions.
B. The Majority Opinion
In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court held that Byrum's
retained powers over the trust assets did not render the trust
property includible in his gross estate. The majority opinion,
written by Mr. Justice Powell, is divided into two parts. The
first deals with the Government's arguments under section
2036 (a) (2) and the second deals with the Government's argu-
ments under section 2036(a) (1).
1. Section 2036(a) (2)
Initially the majority argues under section 2036(a) (2)
that a settlor's retention of managerial powers over the trust
assets does not subject his inter vivos trust to federal estate
tax.30 The Supreme Court cites several lower court opinions
which have upheld this theory,31 and Justice Powell contends
that these decisions may have been relied on in the drafting
of Byrum's and of hundreds of other inter vivos trusts.3 2 As
a derivative of this argument, the Court adds that interpre-
tations of the tax code with potentially far-reaching conse-
26CODE § 2036(a) (1).
27 Id. § 2036 (a) (2).
28 United States v. Byrum, 311 F. Supp. 892 (S.D. Ohio 1970).
2 9 United States v. Byrum, 440 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1971).
30 The Court cites McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 784 (1931), to support
its proposition. 408 U.S. at 133. However, McCormick was decided be-
fore Congress had enacted the statutory predecessor to section 2036.
McCormick's validity under section 2036 is, therefore, not conclusive.
It should be noted at the outset that Byrum's retention of managerial
and administrative controls over the trust estate required him to pay
income tax on income from the property he had transferred into the
trust. See CODE §§ 675(4) (A), (B).
• 1 408 U.S. at 133 n.6.
:12 Justice Powell admonishes: 'The modification of this principle now
sought by the Government could have a seriously adverse impact, espe-
cially upon settlors (and their estates) who happen to have been 'con-
trolling' stockholders of a closely held corporation." Id. at 134-35.
1973
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quences should be left to the legislature, not to the courts.33
As a second basis for defeating the Government's argu-
ments under section 2036(a) (2), the majority enters into a
type of Hohfeldian analysis concerning the distinctions between
the legal terms "power" and "right." The word "right," accord-
ing to the majority, connotes an "ascertainable and legally
enforceable power. '34 Byrum's power to utilize his majority
position to vote the stock and thereby control the payment of
dividends35 was neither "ascertainable" nor "legally enforce-
able. ' 36 According to the court's analysis, it was a power but
not a right.
Third, whatever power Byrum may have exercised over
the directors and thereby over the flow of income to the bene-
ficiaries was restricted by Byrum's fiduciary duty as a majority
shareholder. Justice Powell argues that, as a majority share-
holder, Byrum had the obligation to promote the interests
of the corporation and would be subjected to a derivative ac-
tion should he fail to abide by that fiduciary standard.
3 7
The majority continues its argument by asserting that
even though Byrum did possess voting control, it does not
necessarily follow that he actually possessed the power to con-
trol dividends. Justice Powell suggests, in his fourth argu-
ment under section 2036(a) (2), that business and economic
variables provide the most potent influence over the declara-
tion of corporate dividends, not the person or persons possessed
of voting control.
38
33 In Justice Powell's opinion, "Congress is better equipped than a court to
define precisely the type of conduct which results in tax consequences."
Id. at 135.
34 Id. at 136.
35 Presumably control over the directors would be tantamount to control
over the payment of dividends. Under corporate law, it is the directors
who alone exercise authority over the declaration of dividends. See 1.1
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 5320 (1971). The majority has
neglected to mention in support of its argument that the controlling
stockholder may, in fact, lack control over dividends in the case where
a dissident director refuses to follow his directions. In that event, the
controlling stockholder's only recourse is to remove the recalcitrant
director at the next election.
36 The majority considers the concept of "control" too vague and indefin-
able to constitute an "ascertainable" power. Generally, "control" con-
notes the right to vote more than 50 percent of the voting shares of a
corporation. However, "control" may exist in some instances where
there is a right to vote far less than 50 percent of the shares, depending
on factors such as the size of the corporation and the number of share-
holders. Therefore, the Court concludes, the idea of "control" is too
nebulous a concept to influence the ultimate determination of the case.
408 U.S. at 137-39 nn.10 & 13.
37 Id. at 137-38 n.ll.
:3 The Court argues that, in deciding whether or not to declare dividends,
the directors must balance the expectations of the shareholders against
corporate needs for retention of earnings. Justice Powell points out that
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2. Section 2036 (a) (1)
In the second part of its analysis, the Court opines that
the trust is not subject to taxation under the other statutory
provision - section 2036 (a) (1). The Court bases this decision
on two essential grounds. First, Justice Powell argues that the
word "enjoyment" in section 2036 (a) (1) refers to a present
economic benefit,3 9 such as an income interest or the lifetime
use of transferred property. The benefits which Byrum en-
joyed (his salary as an officer of the corporations and the
probability of continued employment in such capacity) were
neither "present economic benefits" nor assets independent
of other factors and constraints.
40
Second, the majority argues that the benefits which Byrum
derived from his position as controlling stockholder were not
the result of any "retained" powers.41 Section 2036(a) (1) re-
quires the decedent to have "made a transfer" under which
he has "retained" for life the "possession or enjoyment" of
"the property" transferred. Justice Powell contends that By-
rum's "enjoyment" was the result of his "control." However,
Byrum never transferred his "control," since the trust never
owned as much as 50 percent of the stock of any of the three
corporations. Therefore, according to the majority opinion,
Byrum did not divest himself of the property ("control!'),
subject to his retention of an attribute of that property. Rather,
he never lost possession of control. In the strained technical
interpretation of the majority opinion, Byrum may have main-
tained control, but he did not divest himself of it and sub-
excessive retained earnings may result in the imposition of a penalty tax.
CODE §§ 531-37. Moreover, accumulated earnings which are unreasonable
may subject the directors to a derivative action. 408 U.S. at 141.
Justice White's dissenting opinion explains that both of these
alleged deterrents to the accumulation of income are spurious. No
penalty tax is imposed until accumulated income exceeds $100,000.
CODE § 535(c). In practical terms, derivative suits for nonpayment of
dividends are rarely brought and almost never won, since the court may
label the decision to declare dividends one of "business judgment," not
subject to review. 408 U.S. at 158-59.
30408 U.S. at 145, citing Commissioner v. Holmes, 326 U.S. 480 (1946).
The Holmes decision defined "enjoyment" in the sense of the "present
right to immediate enjoyment" of the beneficiaries, not in reference to
the retained "enjoyment" of the settlor. Although Justice Powell cites
Holmes as authority for his position, it is important to note that the
Holmes case was decided in favor of the Commissioner.
40Justice Powell contends that, because of his position as majority share-
holder, Byrum's actions were restricted by (1) a fiduciary duty to the
minority shareholders, and (2) the potential threat of derivative actions
against him.
41 With all due respect to the majority opinion, this argument is referred
to in the decision rather obliquely and presented by Justice Powell in a
somewhat cryptic manner. 408 U.S. at 148-49.
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sequently retain it. 42
C. A Critique of the Court's Analysis
Although the majority's opinion articulates several com-
pelling arguments against the Government's position,43 it fails to
grapple with the reality and the substance of Byrum's estate
planning scheme. Byrum did not "absolutely, unequivocally,
and irrevocably '44 divest himself of all interest in the trust.
Not only did he retain the right to vote the stock in trust, but
he also retained the right to veto any sale or transfer of the
trust assets. These two powers, when combined, gave Byrum
control over his own salary, stock dividends, corporate deci-
sions, and other matters vitally affecting the value of the
stock in the hands of the beneficiaries. By constricting the sale
or transfer of the stock out of trust, Byrum was free to chart
the course of each corporation's development and to control
42 Transfers are not taxed under section 2036 unless the decedent acquired
his life interest by retaining it in connection with his inter vivos transfer
of the the property. For example, suppose.S transferred property to T in
trust, instructing T either to pay the income to B or to accumulate it dur-
ing S's life. If T resigned as trustee and S were appointed in, his place,
the trust property would not be taxable to S's estate under section 2036
(a) (2) because, although S possessed the power to designate income
from the trust property, he did not retain this power in connection with
the transfer to the trust. Rather, he acquired it later by virtue of his
subsequent appointment as trustee.
43 In explaining his decision, Justice Powell warned that a holding in
favor of the Government would cause imminent problems in drawing
the line between Byrum and other cases. For example, if the dissenters
were victorious in this case, how would they rule in a case where the
settlor transferred stock into a trust and did not retain control via the
right to vote, but, by virtue of his own position as a majority share-
holder in the company, he, in fact, controlled the payment of dividends
to the shares in trust?
To Justice Powell, this hypothetical trust should not be taxable. To
the dissenters, however, such a trust might be subject to estate taxation.
Justice Powell is appalled by the inevitable result of the latter view.
Under that theory, a majority shareholder in a close corporation could
never transfer any of his shares into a trust (regardless of whether or
not he reserved fatal powers) without subjecting the trust to estate tax
consequences. As long as the settlor remained the majority shareholder,
the trust would be subject to estate taxation.
For a similar result, see Rev. Rul. 67-54, 1967-1 CUM. BULL. 269,
cited by the dissent. 408 U.S. at 157 n.8.
Where a decedent transfers nonvoting stock in trust and holds
for the remainder of his life voting stock giving him control over
the dividend policy of the corporation, he has retained for a
period which did not in fact end before his death, the right to
determine the income from the nonvoting stock .... Since under
§ 20.2036-1 (b) (3) of the Estate Tax Regulations it is immaterial
in what capacity a power was exercisable by the decedent, it is
sufficient that the power was exercisable in the capacity of con-
trolling stockholder. Under the facts of this case, therefore, the
decedent has made a transfer with a reserved power within
the meaning of § 2036(a) of the Code.
44 United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 151 (1972) (dissenting opinion),




The facts of the case establish that Byrum refused to re-
linquish any of his retained powers prior to his death. Had
he done so, the trust would clearly have escaped estate tax
consequences. 41 Nevertheless, Byrum remained obdurate in his
retention of potentially fatal controls over the trust property.
1. Byrum's "enjoyment" of the property
A statutory analysis of section 2036(a) (1) uncovers sev-
eral flaws in the majority opinion. The Estate Tax Regula-
tions clearly state that "enjoyment" includes any "pecuniary
benefit" derived from the retained rights of the settlor.47 In
the instant case, Byrum's ability to vote his own salary was
a pecuniary advantage inuring to his benefit. Despite the trans-
fer of the stock into the trust estate, Byrum did retain a
present economic benefit (e.g., his salary), and, as a conse-
quence, his interest should have been subjected to estate tax-
ation under section 2036(a) (1).
4 8
In understanding why Byrum retained the "enjoyment"
of the transferred stock, it is helpful to examine his powers
in combination, rather than in isolation.49 Section 2036(a) ap-
plies to all powers retained by a decedent, whether expressly
reserved in the trust instrument or retained incident to the
transfer.5 0 The aggregation of Byrum's powers, both those ex-
pressly retained and those flowing from the shares not placed
in trust, assured him control of the close corporations for his
lifetime.
In several critical respects, Byrum was in essentially the
same position after the transfer as he had been before it oc-
curred. 51 He retained the right to an executive position with-
out fear of discharge. He retained the right to fix his com-
45 Byrum's retained powers thus gave him the right to prevent any public
sale of the corporate stock.
4, See CODE § 2033 and Estate of I.H. Burney, 4 T.C. 449 (1944). See also
Judge Aldrich's statement in Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States,
423 F.2d 601, 605 (1st Cir. 1970): "With the present settlor-trustee free
to determine the standard himself, a finding of ownership control was
warranted. To put it another way, the cost of holding onto the strings
[until death] may prove to be a rope burn."
47 Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1 (b) (2) (1960).
48 Under CODE section 2033, the decedent's gross estate includes the value
of all his property to the extent of his interest in it.
411 As long as thirty years ago, the Board of Tax Appeals and the Tax Court
determined that a similar trust should be subject to estate taxation "on
an inclusive view of the whole arrangement." Estate of Pamelia D.
Holland, 47 B.T.A. 807, 814 (1942), modified, 1 T.C. 564, 565 (1943).
McNichols' Estate v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1959).
51 The Government makes this argument in its brief to the Supreme Court.
Brief for Appellant at 23.
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pensation and receive liberal retirement and fringe benefits.
He retained the power to determine if and when the corpora-
tion would be merged. And he retained the power to enjoy
these benefits as long as he so desired. These powers, which
are among the most important benefits associated with con-
trol of a closely held corporation,5 2 certainly constituted "pres-
ent economic benefits" and hence "enjoyment" of the trust
property.
5 3
2. Byrum's power to "designate"
Byrum's estate may have been taxable as well under sec-
tion 2036(a) (2) .4 Byrum did not make himself a trustee. As a
result, he was not bound by the fiduciary duties of a trustee
to treat the life tenants and remaindermen with impartiality.
5
The fiduciary duty which Justice Powell would have imposed
upon Byrum as a majority stockholder is a duty directed only
to minority stockholders. The facts of the Byrum case reveal
that, aside from the trust itself, the other minority stockhold-
ers in the three close corporations were persons unrelated to
Byrum. Arguably, Byrum could have fulfilled his fiduciary
obligations to these minority shareholders by withholding all
dividend payments, although nonpayment of dividends clearly
would have penalized the life tenants of the trust. Neverthe-
less, Byrum's fulfillment of his fiduciary duty to the minority
5 2 See 1 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 107 (1971), describing the bene-
fits of a controlling stock interest in a close corporation as follows:
Unlike the typical shareholder in a publicly held corpora-
tion, who may be simply an investor or a speculator and cares
nothing for the responsibilities of management, the shareholder
in a close corporation is a co-owner of the business and wants
the privileges and powers that go with ownership .... In his
capacity as an officer or employee of the corporation, he looks
to his salary for the principal return on his capital investment,
because earnings of a close corporation, as is well known, are
distributed in major part in salaries, bonuses and retirement
benefits.
Since a shareholder's principal income may depend on re-
tention of a position in the company and since his business and
social prestige may depend in part on the retention of a major
officership, naturally he is anxious to assure himself permanent
employment by the corporation (preferably as one of the major
officers), free from the possibility of discharge by the directors
or other shareholders.
53 In order for section 2036 (a) (1) to apply, it is not necessary for decedent
to retain all rights to enjoyment of the property. A partial retention of
enjoyment is sufficient to bring the trust within the statutory provision.
See Brief for Appellant at 25.
54 A trust is taxed under section 2036 (a) if it falls within the objectives
of either section 2036(a) (1) or section 2036 (a) (2). It does not need to
be taxable under both statutory provisions in order to be subject to
estate taxation.
55 Estate of Willard V. King, 37 T.C. 973 (1962). For the general rule of
fiduciary duty imposed upon a trustee, see 3 A. SCOTT, LAW OF TRUSTS
§ 236.11 (3d ed. 1967).
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shareholders would not have necessitated an awareness of the
particular needs of the life tenants of the trust.586 Therefore,
the fiduciary duty to which the court found Byrum bound was
not adequate to meet the requisite standard of impartiality. Be-
cause court enforcement of Byrum's alleged fiduciary duty to
minority shareholders did not have a bearing on his relationship
to the beneficiaries of the trust, Byrum's powers were not
within sufficient court control to escape taxation under section
2036 (a) (2) .5
Byrum's broad retention of powers left him with "some-
thing more than a memory. '58 In fact, the trustee's basic deter-
mination of whether or not to distribute dividend income was
completely dependent upon Byrum's prior decision -whether
or not to award the payment of dividends. Even though the
declaration of dividends is theoretically the function of all the
directors,' in practice, Byrum had the power to control the
directors' decision.60
Once the directorate had determined if, when, and how
many dividend payments to make, its determination was in-
sulated from judicial review by the court's allowance of discre-
tionary "business judgments."' ' With regard to dividend policy,
a director's fiduciary obligation requires only that he act hon-
estly and reasonably.62 Therefore, the directors in the three
closely held corporations controlled by Byrum were free to
exercise their powers in favor of nonpayment of dividends.
This course of action would have been fully consistent with the
fiduciary obligation imposed upon them as directors. Yet, its
inevitable consequence would have been to postpone beneficial
enjoyment of the trust shares until after Byrum's death.63 To
56 Indeed, in the proper exercise of his discretion .... decedent
may well have determined not to declare dividends even if the
current beneficiaries were in need of additional income. And,
with his absolute power to veto sales of trust assets, he could
have prevented the trustee from selling the stock and reinvest-
ing the proceeds in securities that would produce a greater
return.
Brief for Appellant at 20.
5T United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627 (1966).
"' Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 608 (1948).
' 11 FLETCHER, supra note 35, § 5320.
If a majority of the directors were not amenable to Byrum's wishes, he
had the power to remove them at the very next annual election. A
controlling shareholder in a close corporation can thus change the com-
position of his corporation's board virtually at will. In so doing, he is
essentially assured that the directors will vote in accordance with his
wishes. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 608 (1948).
W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1587 (4th ed. 1969).
62 G. BocEsr, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 841 (2d ed. 1962).
'3 Commissioner v. Holmes, 326 U.S. 480 (1946).
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that extent, Byrum's control over the directors' decision pro-
vided him with the power to "designate" within the meaning of
section 2036 (a) (2) 64
Byrum's aggregation of retained rights clearly gave him
the power to substantially affect the pecuniary enjoyment of the
beneficiaries. Still, the trust instrument specified no ascertain-
able standard to guide Byrum in the exercise of his power.65
The broad discretion vested in Byrum, both as a director and
as a majority shareholder, would have inhibited a court of
equity from intervening against him, except upon a showing of
unreasonableness or bad faith. 6 As a result, any fiduciary obli-
gation which might have been imposed upon Byrum would,
in fact, have provided neither an ascertainable standard nor a
meaningful limitation upon his reserved rights and powers. 7
Absent an external standard, the trust should have been
subject to estate taxation under section 2036(a) (2) in order to
comply with the mandate of the Supreme Court's earlier de-
cision in United States v. O'Malley.6 s O'Malley had held that
the grantor's power to accumulate trust income could be deemed
the power to "designate" under section 2036 (a) (2), so that all
of the trust principal (including portions representing accumu-
lated income) was includible in the grantor's gross estate. Re-
gardless of whether the O'Malley holding should control the
outcome in Byrum,69 the Court is still bound to favor substance
over form by looking to the practical effects of Byrum's aggre-
gation of powers. Because of Byrum's actual control over
almost every important facet of the trust estate, his "irrevoc-
able" transfer was, in reality, no transfer at all.
It is no solace to those who advocate the triumph of sub-
64 It is no defense to the application of section 2036 (a) (2) that Byrum's
control over dividend policy was exercisable through the boards of
directors of the three corporations, rather than by him individually.
The statutory provision applies regardless of whether the power is
exercisable "alone or in conjunction with any person." See Brief for
Appellant at 14.
63 The estate tax requirement of an "ascertainable standard" to limit a
fidiciary's discretionary powers was clearly articulated in Jennings v.
Smith, 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1947).
66 See notes 61-63 supra.
6T Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929); Old Colony Trust
Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 601, 604 (1st Cir. 1970).
68 383 U.S. 627 (1966).
69 The Government argued in its brief to the Supreme Court that Byrum's
retained power to vote and thereby to increase or decrease corporate
dividends enabled him to shift or defer beneficial enjoyment in a man-
ner much like the power to "accumulate" income. The power to ac-
cumulate was held clearly taxable under section 2036 in United States
v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627, 631 (1966). Therefore, the Government




stance over form' that Justice Powell would prefer decisions
with "far-reaching" tax consequences to be handled by the
legislature rather than the courts.' This separation of powers
concept, although valid in theory, should not permit the Su-
preme Court to escape its duty to interpret the existing statute
in harmony with its express provisions and implied purposes.
7 2
A restrictive reading of section 2036(a), grounded on the fear
of expanding its tax consequences, may indeed precipitate a
further and more "far-reaching" effect by creating an unin-
tended tax loophole.'
3
C. The Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting opinion presents a persuasive argument in
rebuttal to the majority's "reliance" theory.' 4 Mr. Justice White
examines the state of the case law at the time that Byrum's
trust was created and concludes that Byrum could not have
rationally relied on legal precedent when he created his trust,
nor could he have reasonably assumed that his retained powers
over the trust property would have enabled it to escape future
estate taxation.'
5
The dissent's flaw is the overextension of its logic. It need
not have gone as far as it did in deeming O'Malley controlling.'
6
The case before the Byrum Court presented a situation in
which the settlor maintained actual control over property
ostensibly divested. It was the aggregation of powers over stock
in a closely held corporation which should have subjected
Byrum's trust to estate taxation. 7' If Byrum had retained only
one of the enumerated powers,'8 the case might have been cor-
rectly decided in his favor. Similarly, in a case where the set-
tlor remained a majority shareholder in a closely held corpora-
tion, even after he had transferred some of his shares into an
74 United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316, 321 (1969); Commissioner
v. Church, 335 U.S. 632, 643-46 (1949); Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S.
106, 114, 116-18 (1940).
71 408 U.S. at 135.
72 The legislative history of section 2036 reveals that the clear intent of
Congress was to tax those trusts which had formerly avoided estate
taxation despite the settlor's retention of a life interest. See 74 CONG.
REc. 7198 (1931) (remarks of Congressman Hawley).
73 408 U.S. at 153 (dissenting opinion).
.4 408 U.S. at 162-68.
75 The dissenters might have added that the Court was confronted only
with the facts of Byrum's trust. In deciding the Byrum case, it was
not incumbent upon the Court to speculate upon the possible reliance of
other settlors.
7, 408 U.S. at 156.
77Compare State Street Trust Co. v. United States, 263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir.
1959). Had the State Street case concerned retention of powers over
stock in a closely held corporation, perhaps it would still be good law.
7S See p. 230 supra for a list of Byrum's retained powers.
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irrevocable trust without retaining the right to vote the trans-
ferred shares, the settlor's control over dividends should not
subject the trust to estate tax consequences, as long as he
retained no other vital controls over the trust property.79 As
distinguished from the above hypothetical situations, Byrum's
trust should have been subject to estate taxation because
of his broad retention of powers, which were tantamount to
virtual control of the trust.
III. FORECAST FOR THE FUTURE
Despite the valid arguments which can be made in opposi-
tion to the majority opinion, the decision in United States v.
Byrum has set some definable standards for drafting future
trust instruments. What the holding in Byrum has settled is
that a settlor may possess the following retained powers with
estate tax impunity: (1) The right to vote transferred shares;
(2) the right to veto sale or transfer of trust assets by the
trustee; and, (3) the right to remove the trustee as successor.
Byrum seems to extend the decision in Old Colony Trust,
which had held that purely administrative powers are immune
from estate taxation. As a consequence of Byrum, even the
retention of administrative powers which have a substantial
effect on beneficial enjoyment will not render a trust taxable
under section 2036(a).
There are, however, important tax questions remaining
after the Byrum decision. To begin with, one may query
whether powers similar, but not identical, to those held in
Milliken Byrum's trust are still subject to taxation. For exam-
ple, what result if the settlor transferred stock in a closely held
corporation and retained the power to control all investment
decisions? A recent Tax Court Memorandum Decision8 1 has
held that this type of retained power, although different from
the powers retained in Byrum, would still not subject the trust
to estate taxation. The Tax Court based its decision on the
Supreme Court's holding in Byrum.s8 2 One can infer from this
extension of Byrum that the courts may be moving toward a
narrower reading of section 2036 (a) and the restrictions which
it imposes upon the settlor. Notably, the retained power to
control trust investments is not taxable even when the settlor
can direct the trustee to invest in all wasting assets, to the
79 The question of how this type of case should be treated is raised in
note 44 supra.
80 423 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. .1970). Old Colony overruled State Street Trust
Co. v. United States, 263 F.2d 635 (lst Cir. 1959).
81 Estate of Arthur Chalmers, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 158 (1972).
82 The Tax Court held that, "While the facts in the Byrum case may be
dissimilar to the facts before this court, it is controlling here." Id.
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distinct pecuniary detriment of the, remaindermen.8 3
It is still questionable whether the Supreme Court would
have decided Byrum differently had the settlor transferred
all of his controlling stock into the trust estate, reserving the
right to vote the shares in trust. Does this situation fall within
the statutory language of section 2306 (a) as interpreted by Jus-
tice Powell? Clearly the settlor would have retained the control
subsequent to its transfer. He would have parted with the
property (the controlling stock), and then retained a portion
of it (voting control). Reading the statutory language nar-
rowly, the situation posed here is distinguishable from that in
Byrum, where the settlor possessed the control, in part, by
virtue of his own shareholdings which were never transferred
into the trust estate.
8 4
It is not entirely clear from Justice Powell's opinion
whether the majority of the Supreme Court in Byrum would
have ruled against the Government in the hypothetical situa-
tion presented above. One may indeed query whether future
estate tax decisions will focus on the technicalities of the statu-
tory language, ignoring both the substantive effect of the trust
instrument and the equities of the particular situation.
The salient question left unanswered is whether Byrum
will be limited to its facts. The Court may have focused on
the existence of unrelated minority shareholders in the Byrum
case. If that particular fact were crucial to the majority's
decision, then perhaps Byrum would, indeed, be limited to its
particular fact pattern. In most closely held corporations, there
are no unrelated minority shareholders. Therefore, in these
situations, the fiduciary duties imposed upon Byrum as a
majority shareholder would have no real significance since the
possibility of a derivative action would constitute even less of
a threat where all the minority shareholders were related to
the settlor.
If the Byrum decision is confined to its unique fact pattern,
the effect of the decision on future estate planning will be
marginal. If, to the contrary, Byrum is not so limited, the
net effect of the decision may invite future settlors to "divest"
themselves of property without divesting themselves of con-
comitant power.
United States v. Byrum would appear to condone the set-
8 Id.; Estate of Willard V. King, 37 T.C. 973 (1962). It is important to
note, however, that in the King case, the securities in question "were at
no time significant from the point of view of control of the particular
companies involved." Id. at 974.
8 408 U.S. at 148-49.
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tlor's retention of broad administrative powers, regardless of
their ultimate effect upon the beneficial enjoyment of the trust
property. If taken literally, Byrum seems to encourage the
estate planning lawyer to advise his client how to part with
property for estate tax purposes and still retain the vital powers
over it for practical purposes. The negative fiscal consequences
to the federal government resulting from a large number of
such estate planning schemes could precipitate the Congres-
sional enactment of more stringent tax legislation.
8 5
CONCLUSION
Section 2036(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 was
designed to tax those inter vivos transfers of property under
which the transferor retained substantial powers and controls
until his death. Examples of such retained controls under
section 2036 are: (1) a life estate; (2) a right to income; and
(3) a right to designate who shall possess or enjoy the trans-
ferred property or its income.
In United States v. Byrum the Supreme Court decided that
a settlor's reservation of the rights to vote shares of stock in a
closely held corporation and to veto the transference of such
shares out of the trust estate failed to constitute a retained
"interest" in property under section 2036(a). The majority
decision allowed the trust to escape estate taxation, despite
Byrum's broad retention of control. The Court's opinion focused
on the nature of the powers retained, rather than on their sub-
stantive effect.
Under a more critical approach to the case, highlighting
the substance rather than the form, Byrum's aggregation of
powers should have rendered his estate liable for taxation of
the trust. Nevertheless, given the holding in Byrum, it is now
incumbent upon future estate planners to contemplate and upon
future courts to articulate the extent to which controlling inter-
ests of settlors will be taxed under section 2036. If a further
judicial clarification of the applicability of Byrum is not soon
forthcoming, estate planners may be wisest to view Byrum as
limited to its facts.
Jane M. Talesnick
85 A study of legislative tax history indicates that Congress has frequently
reacted to tax loopholes by enacting stricter statutory taxing provisions.
As noted in note 9 supra, the predecessor to section 2036 was passed
into law as a response to the Supreme Court decision in May v. Heiner,
281 U.S. 238 (1930).
Justice Cardozo once astutely stated that continually revised tax
legislation is essential "to keep pace with the fertility of invention
whereby taxpayers [contrive] to keep the larger benefits of ownership




CRIMINAL PROCEDURE -STOP AND FRISK: WARRANTLESS
CAR SEARcHEs - Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
N the predawn hours of October 30, 1966, a police officer on
car patrol in a "high-crime area"' of Bridgeport, Connecticut,
was approached by an "informant" who had supplied him in-
formation in the past.2 This informant reported to the officer
that an individual (later identified as Williams) sitting in a
vehicle nearby was carrying narcotics and had a gun at his
waist.3 With no further verification or corroboration, after
making a radio call for assistance, the officer approached the
vehicle. When Williams rolled down the window in response
to the officer's request to open the door, the officer reached
in and removed a loaded pistol from Williams' waistband.
4
Upon seizing the pistol the officer arrested Williams for un-
lawful possession of a handgun. Later, after other officers had
arrived, a more thorough search was conducted of Williams'
person and the car. This search turned up not only substantial
quantities of heroin on his person and in his car, but also
another pistol and a machete in the car.
Williams was subsequently charged and convicted of both
the illegal possession of a handgun and of heroin, and, in 1968,
on appeal to the Supreme Court of Connecticut, the conviction
was affirmed.5 Two years later, on petition for federal habeas
corpus relief which had been denied in federal district court,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
denied Williams' petition and affirmed the conviction.6 On
1 Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144 (1972). This particularly graphic
bit of imagery represents what was undoubtedly an important factor
in the Court's consideration of the factual circumstances relevant to
the case, especially as it relates to the Court's justification of the police
officer's actions under the rationale of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
See p. 244 infra.
2 407 U.S. at 146.
3 Id. at 144-45. There is evidence of some discrepancy in this version of
how the police officer became aware of Williams' activities. In dissent,
Circuit Judge Friendly noted that in the first hearing on a motion to
suppress in the trial court, the officer indicated that he approached
Williams in response to a police signal telling him to go to Williams'
car; in a second hearing on the motion, however, the officer's testimony
recounted the unnamed informant version here outlined by the Court.
Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d 30, 39 n.9 (2d Cir. 1970) (dissent).
4 It is acknowledged that the pistol was not visible to the officer from
outside the car. 407 U.S. at 145.
5 Connecticut v. Williams, 157 Conn. 114, 249 A.2d 245 (1968).
"Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1970).
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rehearing, however, the circuit court reversed itself and set the
conviction aside.7 In June of 1972, on certiorari to the court
of appeals, the United States Supreme Court reversed the grant
of habeas corpus relief and affirmed Williams' conviction.
INTRODUCTION
In affirming Williams' conviction, the Supreme Court, in
an opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Rehnquist, justified its
disposition of the case by ruling on two separate and distinct
issues of law: First, it validated the search for and seizure of
the pistol and Williams' subsequent arrest for illegal possession
thereof under the rationale set forth in Terry v. Ohio;" second,
it upheld the validity of the later search of Williams' person
and of the car (after the arrest) and the seizure of items
thereby found, reasoning that it was a "proper" search and
seizure incident to a lawful arrest, citing Brinegar v. United
States9 and Carroll v. United States as authority. 10
In order to treat these two distinct issues of the Adams
decision, this comment is divided into two separate parts. The
first part will set forth in some detail the reasoning and author-
ity employed by the Court in its opinion; the second part will
analyze the significance and possible ramifications of the
Court's holdings.
I. THE Adams DECISION
A. Stop and Frisk
It is the first of the two above-mentioned issues with which
the Court actually concerned itself and to which it dedicated
all but the last few lines of its opinion. In dealing with the
legality of the seizure of the pistol from Williams' waistband,
the Court held that the doctrine enunciated in Terry was ap-
plicable to the facts of this case and that the initial search
and seizure of the pistol, though based on less than probable
cause for arrest, fell within the narrow limitations prescribed
by Terry for a "limited intrusion" which is "reasonable" under
the fourth amendment.
1'
The ruling in Terry announced the principle that certain
limited invasions of an individual's fourth amendment right
to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures are not
7 Williams v. Adams, 441 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1971).
8 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
9 338 U.S. 160 (1949), cited in 407 U.S. at 149.
1I 267 U.S. 132 (1925), cited in 407 U.S. at 149.
11 407 U.S. at 148.
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per se unreasonable nor unconstitutional when, depending on
the circumstances at the time, 12 they are based upon an articu-
lable suspicion of criminal activity (though less than probable
cause) which affords a police officer the reasonable belief that
a crime is being or is about to be committed and that the per-
son with whom the officer is dealing is presently armed and
dangerous.13 Under such circumstances a police officer has
the right to stop and frisk the subject- to detain the person
temporarily and conduct a limited "pat down" search for
weapons- in order to investigate the activity of which he is
suspicious.
It was the contention of the respondent in Adams, and of
dissenting Justices Brennan, Marshall, and, to a limited extent,
Douglas,14 that even under the standards of Terry the initial
seizure of Williams' pistol was unreasonable under the fourth
amendment; that an uncorroborated tip from an unnamed in-
formant is not sufficient in itself, absent other grounds for sus-
picion, to justify the police officer's actions.' 5
The majority of the Court, however, clearly disagreed with
this contention and found that such information, under the cir-
cumstances, was sufficient grounds upon which the officer
could lawfully seize the gun"' and that the gun was therefore
properly admissible as evidence. 17 Having so concluded, the
Court then reasoned that since the gun was found where the
informant had indicated it would be, this tended to act as cor-
roboration for the rest of the informant's tip and clearly af-
forded the officer the probable cause sufficient to arrest
Williams lawfully for illegal possession of the gun.'8
B. Warrantless Car Search
The second major issue resolved by the Adams Court in
12 392 U.S. at 29. Accord, Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S 40, 59 (1968),
wherein the Court reaffirmed this aspect of the Terry ruling, holding
that "[tlhe constitutional validity of a warrantless search is pre-eminently
the sort of question which can only be decided in the concrete factual
context of the individual case."
13 392 U.S. at 26-27.
14 Mr. Justice Douglas based his dissent primarily on second amendment
grounds. 407 U.S. at 149-51.
15 The dissents of Justices Brennan and Marshall clearly expostulate the
view that such a tip from an unnamed informant under these circum-
stances lacked the credibility and reliability necessary to justify the
reasonableness cf the officer's action in seizing the pistol. 407 U.S. at
153-61.
16 "Since we conclude that the policeman's actions here conformed to the
standards this Court laid down in Terry v. Ohio .... " 407 U.S. at 144.
17 Id. at 148.
18 Id. The Court based this finding on the definition of probable cause
to arrest set out in Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).
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affirming Williams' conviction involved the validity of the sub-
sequent search for and seizure of items found on Williams' per-
son and in his car after the arrest. In ruling that these actions
were valid as being incident to a lawful arrest, the Court, in
contrast to its detailed consideration of the first issue, paid
almost no attention to this element of the decision. No argu-
ment was set forth in its behalf; nowhere in any of the dis-
senting opinions is the issue or its merits discussed. Clearly
preoccupied with the question of Terry's application to the case
at hand, the Court summarily disposed of the car search issue
with the following language which is to be found in the last
paragraph of the majority opinion and which represents the sum
total of the Court's reported consideration of the matter:
Under the circumstances surrounding Williams' possession of
the gun seized by Sgt. Connolly, the arrest on the weapons
charge was supported by probable cause, and the search of his
person and of the car incident to that arrest was lawful....
The fruits of the search were therefore properly admitted at
Williams' trial, and the Court of Appeals erred in reaching a
contrary conclusion.1 9
II. TH Adams DEcIsION ANALYZED
The reasoning of the Court outlined above appears relatively
straightforward; however, further analysis of specific aspects
of the two major issues reveals developments in the law not
apparent on the face of the Adams opinion. With respect to the
issue of the initial stop and frisk, it will be shown in Section
A how Adams has expanded or "put flesh to the bones"
20 of
Terry (1) as it applies to uncorroborated informants' tips
and (2) as it reflects Mr. Justice Harlan's argument in Terry
that the doctrine authorizes forcible stops and that the con-
comitant right to frisk for weapons follows automatically
thereafter, without any requirement that the officer first make
reasonable inquiries.
Dealing with the second issue-the subsequent car search
-Section B is likewise divided into two subsections. The first
subsection will analyze the general area of warrantless car
searches and demonstrate how the Court has developed two
distinct and dissimilar rationales for constitutionally justifying
such searches. The second subsection will point out not only
how the Adams Court has apparently disregarded this distinc-
tion by citing the precedent for one rationale while couching
its holding in the language of the other, but will also speculate
as to the possible ramifications of this incongruity.
19 407 U.S. at 149.
2" Id. at 153 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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A. The Adams Expansion of the Terry Doctrine
1. The Role of the Informer's Tip
It is made clear in Adams that the strict requirements of
the rule established in Aguilar v. Texas,21 and later clarified in
Spinelli v. United States, 22 for determining the reliance officers
may lawfully place on information from informants, is not
applicable in Adams-type stop and frisk cases under the ration-
ale of Terry. In exploring the rationale behind this new ap-
proach, it is to be noted, first, that both Aguilar and Spinelli
dealt with the sufficiency of affidavits in support of a find-
ing of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant and
an arrest warrant respectively, and hence were dealing with
probable cause requirements specifically and not the "narrowly
drawn authority to permit a reasonable search" 23 under certain
circumstances as was outlined in Terry.
24
Specifically, the Aguilar-Spinelli "two-pronged test" 25 does
not require that a finding of probable cause be based on direct
personal observation of the affiant; it may be based upon hear-
say information. 26 When such is the case, as with informants'
tips, the affiant must reveal sufficient "underlying circum-
stances" from which a magistrate could conclude that there are
reasonable grounds for (1) the affiant's belief that the inform-
ant himself is reliable or credible and (2) the informant's con-
clusion that what he said is true; i.e., that there is some basis
upon which the informant founded his information.
27
Even though the Court in Adams recognized that Aguilar
and Spinelli established the general rule to be applied in in-
formant-probable cause situations,28 the Adams decision indi-
cates that such requirements are not relevant to cases which
are founded, under Terry, upon an "articulable suspicion less
than probable cause.' '29 The crucial point would seem to be
that since stop and frisk intrusions themselves need not meet
exacting probable cause standards to be "reasonable," there is
no reason why such standards should be applied just because
the officer happens to be acting on the basis of an informant's
21 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
22 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
23 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
24 Id. at 25-27.
25 Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 413 (1969).
2 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964), citing as authority for this
proposition Jcnes v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
27 Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416 (1969).
28 407 U.S. at 147.
2,, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 31 (1968) (emphasis added).
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tip rather than on his own personal observation. The Court in
Adams quite specifically adopted this position when it held that
"[w]e reject respondent's argument that reasonable cause for
a stop and frisk can only be based on the officer's personal
observation, rather than on information supplied by another
person."30
In refusing to apply the Aguilar-Spinelli: criteria to stop
and frisk cases, the Court has now adopted the view, in appar-
ent disregard of earlier lower court decisions on the matter, "
that such tips and information merely have about them
"enough indicia of reliability" to justify the particular intru-
sion.32 Though the Court announced no clear objective criteria
as to what shall constitute "enough indicia" (indicating that
such determination must depend on the circumstances of a
given case), it did indicate that some "tips" would not warrant
the intrusion.33 For the purpose of deciding the issue in Adams,
however, it simply noted that the informant was known to the
officer personally, had supplied him information in the pastF4
had come forward personally to give the information, and the
tip was immediately verifiable at the scene. These circum-
stances were sufficient to meet this "indicia of reliability"
test.35
It is quite apparent, moreover, that the Court in Adams
has rejected any notion that Terry requires any direct police
observation of the supposed unusual and suspicious conduct.
Adams specifically stands for the proposition that tips from un-
named informants will suffice at least where the officer is in
a position to verify the tip at the scene. Any language of the
majority opinion in Terry to the contrary3" would seem now
to be only so much surplusage.
30 407 U.S. at 147.
31 See, e.g., Ballou v. Massachusetts, 403 F.2d 982 (1st Cir. 1968). The court
there held that an anonymous phone tip to the police, when combined
with specific facts known to the officers at the time and visual corrobo-
ration at the scene, afforded the police the reasonable suspicion suf-
ficient to justify their actions under Terry. The Ballou court went on,
however, to warn that (1) "such a trip must be linked to other facts
known by the police," and (2) "the critical question is the accuracy
of the tip, to be assured both by its specificity and capability cf being
substantially corroborated by observation." Id. at 986.
32 407 U.S. at 147.
33 Id.
34 Mr. Justice Marshall's dissent attacked this aspect of the decision by
pointing out that the past information supplied by this informant was
hardly of the type to clearly establish his reliability as a credible
source of information and that even under Terry an officer cannot jus-
tify "an invasion of liberty" on the basis of "unreliable, unsubstanti-
ated, conclusory hearsay." Id. at 156-59.
35 Id. at 146.
36 See Terry excerpt, p. 249 infra.
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2. The Harlan View Prevails
The application of Terry in Adams is also noteworthy in
that it gives a rather clear indication that it is the Harlan con-
figuration of the Terry rule which will prevail, rather than that
of Mr. Chief Justice Warren who wrote the majority opinion.
The specific ruling of the majority in Terry was expressed as
follows:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes un-
usual ccnduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light
of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that
the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and pres-
ently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this be-
havior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reason-
able inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the en-
counter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or
others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and
others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the
outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover
weapons which might be used to assault him.37
Mr. Justice Harlan, however, in his concurring opinion,
argued that this language left some crucial areas of the theory
underlying Terry in doubt and that "a few gaps" needed to be
filled in.38 It was his contention that two things were left out
of the majority opinion which are essential to the rule. He
argued first that it is vital that the "articulable suspicion less
than probable cause" which will justify a limited protective
search carries with it, of necessity, the right "to make a forci-
ble stop."'30 Second, the right to search for weapons in such
situations "follows automatically" and immediately upon the
stop, 40 and there is no reason why the officer should be re-
q'uired to "ask one question and take the risk that the answer
might be a bullet."'4 1 Apparently, it was his concern that any
requirement holding that officers must first make inquiries
before frisking was one which posed a serious threat to such
police activities.
It is apparent from Adams that Mr. Justice Harlan's views
have prevailed on these two points. Not only did the Adams
Court use the term "forcible stop" specifically and repeatedly
in describing the police conduct in question,42 but the descrip-
tion of the factual situation in the case in no way reveals any
37 392 U.S. at 30 (emphasis added).
38 Id. at 31.
30 Id. at 31-32.
40 Id. at 34.
41 Id. at 33.
42 407 U.S. at 146-47.
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
inquiries or questioning of Williams by the police officer (other
than the "request" that he open the car door). The Court, more-
over, did not even discuss the issue in the opinion and made no
effort to deal with the absence of such interrogative endeavors
by the officer. Only Mr. Justice Marshall brought up the ques-
tion of such a requirement.43 However, since his was one of
the three dissenting opinions, it may be surmised that al-
though the issue was perhaps in deliberation, it was felt by the
majority of the Court to be of little consequence, or at least
not a controlling consideration under Terry.
From these initial, rather cursory observations on the more
obvious effects of the Adams decision upon the Terry doctrine,
it is clear that this case will exert a telling influence on stop
and frisk case law.44 By extending Terry (at least apparently)
to certain types of possessory offenses and by allowing unsub-
stantiated informants' tips to suffice as the basis upon which
an officer may initiate, without further inquiry, a forcible stop
and frisk, a significant expansion of Terry has been recog-
nized.45 Leaving this aspect of Adams aside, however, this
comment now turns to a much subtler and perhaps more in-
triguing element of the decision - that dealing with a warrant-
less car search.
B. Two Distinct Rationales for Warrantless Car Searches: Has
Adams Disregarded the Distinction?
1. Car Search Case Law- The Development of Search In-
cident and Probable Cause Rationales
Over the years, case law dealing with warrantless car
searches has developed at least two different and distinct
theories upon which such searches may be justified: searches
incident to a lawful arrest, and searches which are based upon
probable cause. Through a process of evolution and sophistica-
tion these two approaches have come to stand upon entirely
separate grounds, each having certain limitations and qualifica-
tions not found in the other. This inquiry will turn first to the
development of the "search incident" rationale.
43 Id. at 157-61.
44 For more lengthy and expilict analyses of the impact of Adams upon
Terry, see Note, The Predicates of Suspicion: Stop and Frisk on an
Informant's Tip - Extending Terry to Possessory Offenses, 49 N.D.L.
REv. 127 (1972); Comment, The Informant's Tip and Terry's "Reason-
able Conclusion" - A Modified Standard, 4 TEXAS TECH. L. REv. 167
(1972).
45 See generally LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry,
Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 Micu. L. REv. 40 (1968); Note, Stop and
Frik: The Issue Unresolved, 49 J. URBAN L. 733 (1972).
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a. Search Incident to a Lawful Arrest
In Chimel v. California,4' the recent landmark decision
which dealt with the "permissible scope under the Fourth
Amendment of a search incident to a lawful arrest, '47 the Su-
preme Court, in charting the grounds for its decision, supplied
an enlightening retrospection of the development of the judicial
treatment of warrantless searches incident to lawful arrests.
The Court in Chimel noted, first, that the concept of the
legitimacy of warrantless searches incident to arrest started as
dictum in the 1914 decision of Weeks v. United States48 where
the arresting officer was said to have a right to search the
person of an arrestee.4" The notion of such a lawful right was
then expanded by an "embellishment of the Weeks state-
ment"50 in Carroll v. United States5 1 in 1925. In dictum, the
Carroll Court extended the scope of such a search beyond the
person to the "places" which were "in his control. '52 The
Chimel Court, more than 40 years later, noted, however, that
Carroll's expansion of the doctrine "was far from a claim that
the 'place' where one is arrested may be searched so long as
the arrest is valid.
5 3
In the same year as Carroll, in Agnello v. United States,
54
the Carroll language regarding the "places" which could be law-
fully searched as incident to arrest was expanded to encom-
pass the idea that such searches could extend to the place
where the arrest was made "in order to find and seize things
connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which
it was committed, as well as weapons and other things to effect
an escape from custody."5 5 Agnello went on to hold that such
a right, however, does not extend to other places "remote"
from the scene of the arrest, and such searches could not be
properly justified as "incident" to arrest.
56
Following Agnello came a line of cases which further de-
veloped the idea that the real problem and limitation under
search incident justification is the lawful scope of such searches.
46 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
47 Id. at 753.
48 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
41 Id., as interpreted in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755 (1969).
5,) Id.
5' 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
3- Id. at 158, as construed in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755 (1914).
53 395 U.S. at 756.
54 269U.S. 20 (1925).
, Id. at 30.
56 Id. at 31.
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In 1927, Marron v. United States57 upheld the seizure of
items not enumerated in a search warrant because, since the
search was made after the arrest of the petitioner (and there-
fore could be justified as a search incident to that arrest), the
proper scope of such a search could then extend to the whole
situs of the arrest and to anything which could be connected
to the criminal enterprise for which the arrest was made.
Some years later, in Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United
States,58 and also in United States v. Lefkowitz, 59 the thrust
of the Marron decision was blunted by the limitation that
searches of the whole situs of the arrest could not involve a
"general search or rummaging of the place," but must be
restricted to items "visible and accessible and in the offender's
immediate custody."60
According to the Court in Chimel, this limitation was
"thrown to the winds"'6 1 with the ruling in Harris v. United
States62 which authorized the search of an entire four-room
apartment as a proper search incident to an arrest. On the
heels of Harris, however, came Trupiano v. United States
6 3
which. severely limited the application of a search incident
justification of the scope allowed in Harris to only those situa-
tions where the obtaining of a search warrant is impracticable.
Specifically, the Trupiano decision held that something more
"in the way of necessity" 64 than merely the existence of a law-
ful arrest was required to uphold such warrantless searches;
if it was practicable to obtain a search warrant first, then even
a search "incident" to an arrest could not proceed without it.
Trupiano, however, was short-lived, being overruled in
1950 by United States v. Rabinowit. 65 In Rabinowitz the Court
authorized a search incident to arrest much like that in Harris.
In doing so, the Court held that it is the "reasonableness" of
such searches, not the practicability of obtaining a warrant,
which is the test.66 Looking back to Weeks and Carroll, the
Court founded this position on the idea that the right to search
the person or places in his "immediate control"6 7 is dependent
57 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
58 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
,9 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
GO 282 U.S. at 358.
61 395 U.S. at 757.
62 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
63 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
64 Id. at 708.
,r 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
"" Id. at 66.
6 Id. at 63.
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merely upon the validity of the arrest itself, not upon the im-
practicability of getting a warrant; given a lawful arrest, the
only question remaining is the reasonableness of the scope of
the search. In Rabinowitz, the fact that the search was
"limited," in that it was confined to those areas within the re-
spondent's "immediate control," made it both reasonable and
valid.'8
Finally in 1969, after having reviewed all of these cases,
Chimel recognized that the real issue in warrantless searches
incident to arrest is not their initial justification -which, as
was carefully pointed out in Rabinowitz, is dependent only on
the validity and lawfulness of the arrest - but their "permis-
sible scope under the Fourth Amendment."6 9 The Chimel Court
then went on to overrule Rabinowitz to the extent that searches
justified as incident to lawful arrest may be conducted of the
person and of the area within his immediate control, construing
that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.
70
This severe limitation on the scope of such searches was
based, according to the Chimel Court, on the underlying ration-
ale for justifying any warrantless search as "incident" to arrest;
i.e., that it is necessary to prevent escape, a weapons-assault
on the arresting officer, or the destruction of criminal evidence.
This rationale, the Court noted, has been enunciated in other
cases as well 7' and was present in the decision rendered in the
case of Preston v. United States.7 2 In Preston, the search inci-
dent rationale would have validated a contemporaneous auto-
mobile search had it not been, vis-A-vis Agnello, too "remote"
in time and place.7 3 Although perhaps not significant as new
precedent in the general development of the search incident
approach, Preston is a pivotal case, however, in that the Chimel
Court by indirection (in citing Preston with approval) has
placed warrantless car searches within the confining grasp of
the now-controlling rule of Chimel.
4
68 Id.
69 395 U.S. at 753.
7) Id. at 764.
7 Id. The Ccurt noted that this rationale was clearly set out in Sibron v.
New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), where a search incident to arrest was
upheld "only because" its scope had been "reasonably limited" by the"need to seize weapons" or "prevent the destruction of evidence."
72 376 U.S. 364 (1964), cited in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 764
(1964).
73 376 U.S. at 368.
74 See Comment, Chirnel v. California: A Potential Roadblock to Vehicle
Searches, 17 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 626 (1970).
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b. Probable Cause Searches
Having explored the development of case law dealing with
the "search incident" rationale used to justify warrantless
searches, and noting that Chimel has now clearly established
that the problem to be overcome in legitimating such a ration-
ale is the proper scope of the search, this inquiry now turns to
an investigation of the alternative rationale of "probable cause"
searches.
As mentioned earlier, the Chimel Court spoke of the fact
that a search incident approach in Preston would have suc-
ceeded had the search not been too remote from the arrest.
The decision in the case, however, did not turn on this ruling.
As an alternative to the search incident rationale, with its con-
comitant scope problem, the Preston Court based its holding
upon the validation of the search as being one within the para-
meters of a "probable cause" rationale. Viewing the Preston
decision with approval, the Chimel Court observed that this
alternative rationale, first enunciated in Carroll, is not at all
inconsistent with the search incident approach.
75
Turning to Carroll, the correctness of the Chimel Court's
observation is evident. As was noted earlier, Carroll dictum
dealt with the scope of warrantless searches incident to arrest.
The holding in the case, however, was based upon an entirely
new and different rationale. Carroll was in fact not a case
dealing with a search conducted after an arrest. It was con-
cerned with a warrantless search conducted before there were
grounds to arrest, and for that reason the petitioner had argued
that since there was no lawful arrest there could then be no
valid search "incident" thereto. 6 The Court, however, justified
this search by constructing a detailed schema based upon the
"necessary difference" between the search of houses and other
structures and the search of mobile vehicles like cars. 7  This
difference, according to the Carroll Court, lay in the fact that
cars "can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
in which [a] warrant must be sought," and in light of this
reality, it is often simply "not practicable" to secure a warrant.78
The Carroll Court then went on to hold that-as dis-
tinguished from the justification of a search as incident to a
lawful arrest - an automobile search, under circumstances mak-
75 395 U.S. at 764 n.9.
711267 U.S. at 158.




ing it impracticable to obtain a warrant, could be conducted
without a warrant upon a showing of "probable cause for
believing that [the vehicle was] carrying contraband or illegal
merchandise.'1 7" The Carroll approach, then, based the validity
of such searches upon probable cause grounds, and not upon
any search incident rationale. Moreover, in further holding
that "[i]n cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably
practicable, it must be used," and "[i]n cases where seizure is
impossible except without a warrant, the seizing officer acts
unlawfully" except upon a showing of such probable cause,80
the Carroll Court made it clear that a showing of circumstances
rendering the obtaining of a warrant impracticable was at least
as important as was a showing of probable cause.
In later cases the Carroll doctrine was clarified and the
distinction between probable cause searches and searches inci-
dent to arrest was given solidity and substance.
In Brinegar v. United States,8 ' the Court found the material
facts to be virtually "indistinguishable" from those found in
Carroll 25 years earlier8 2 and affirmed the applicability of that
approach.
As was discussed earlier, Preston distinguished the probable
cause and search incident rationales and noted specifically that
the police have the right to search a car contemporaneously at
the scene of an arrest "either because the arrest [is] valid or
because [they] had probable cause." 83
In 1970, after the Chimel ruling, the Court handed down a
a decision in Chambers v. Maroney8 4 which was clearly an ap-
plication of the Carroll probable cause rationale and which
strengthened the Carroll requirement that a showing of exigent
circumstances making the obtaining of a warrant impracticable
is as important as a showing of probable cause. After finding
that a car search could not be justified as incident to arrest, 5
the Court held that "alternative grounds" based on Carroll could
be found to justify the search.8 6 The Court reasoned that "the
search of an auto on probable cause proceeds on a theory wholly
different from that justifying the search incident to an arrest.
8 7
79 Id. at 154.
80 Id. at 156.
81 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
82 Id. at 171.
83 376 U.S. at 367-68 (emphasis added).
N4 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
85 Id. at 47.
S6 Id.
87 Id. at 49 (emphasis added).
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The Chambers Court then reasserted the Carroll requirement
that such probable cause searches are always dependent upon
"exigent circumstances," making it impracticable for the police
to obtain a warrant, and that without a clear showing of such
exigencies even probable cause to conduct the search falls
short."'
Chambers, however, departed significantly from the impli-
cations of prior holdings when it dealt specifically with the
temporal aspects of the probable cause-exigent circumstances
relationship. Having established that probable cause existed to
justify the seizure of an auto, and that exigent circumstances
then also existed to fully validate such seizure under Carroll,
the Chambers Court then went on to hold that a later search
of the car at the police station was thereby justified. This rather
confusing position (somehow having avoided the question of
exigent circumstances at the time of the search as opposed to
the time of the seizure) was based on the reasoning that once
an initial seizure was justifiable under Carroll there could be
no logical difference between holding the car to obtain a war-
rant and searching later without one. 9
As late as June 1971, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,"'
the Court had continued to maintain that a showing of exigent
circumstances is critical to the justification of a warrantless car
search on probable cause grounds. There is evidence, however,
that the Coolidge ruling, insofar as it apparently limited the
Chambers approach (in dealing with the issue of exigent cir-
cumstances) to cases where a moving vehicle was actually
stopped by the police, is now being very strictly construed by
lower courts in favor of a Chambers-oriented analysis.9 1
c. Probable Cause and Search Incident Rationales:
A Brief Summation
In view of the foregoing it would seem clear that, at least
prior to Adams, the Supreme Court had established that auto-
88 Id. at 51, where the Court held that "[o]nly in exigent circumstances will
the judgment of the police as to probable cause serve as a sufficient
authorization for a search."
81) Id. at 52.
" 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
911 See, e.g., United States v. Bozada, 473 F.2d 389 (8th Cir 1973) (no war-
rant required for search of parked truck following stakeout); United
States V. Cohn, 472 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1973) (permitting warrantless
seizure 19 hours after warrantless search disclosed contraband). These
cases might be regarded as examples of how Chambers may be used to
counter the limitations imposed by Coolidge, under the implication that
initial exigent circumstances somehow do not disappear even after a
substantial passage of time. Such reasoning, it is here argued, is a clear
distortion of the logic of Carroll.
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mobile searches without warrants may be justified on at least
two separate and distinct grounds, each having its own set of
unique requirements and limitations.
The first of these grounds is that of "search incident to a
lawful arrest." Under this rationale, the special difficulty which
must be overcome is the permissible scope of the search. As
to this requirement, pre-Adams cases would seem to be gov-
erned by the holding in Chimel which limits such a search
to the person of the arrestee and the places within his "im-
mediate control." Specifically, such "places" are limited to those
areas into which the arrestee might reach to obtain weapons
or to conceal or destroy evidence. Moreover, Chimel applies
this limitation to car searches, at least to the extent that it
interpreted Preston in this manner.
The second ground for justifying a warrantless car search
is based on the rationale of Carroll, which, as a distinctly dif-
ferent theory, validates such a search on the basis of a find-
ing of probable cause. This approach is limited, however, by
the fact that probable cause must always be accompanied
by a showing of "exigent circumstances" which render the
obtaining of a warrant impracticable under the circumstances.
It is important to remember that Carroll founded its exi-
gent circumstances requirement upon the unique dissimilarity
between houses, which do not move, and automobiles, which
do. In this regard, it is crucial to realize that such "mobility,"
in Carroll, was due not so much to any intrinsic qualities of
the automobile as to the simple fact that at the time the search
was conducted there was no way for the police to prevent its
mobility. The police had no probable cause upon which to
arrest the subjects and hence no way to validate any real
detention of the car by way of an argument attempting to
justify it as a search or seizure "incident" to an arrest.
2. Does Adams Fit In?
The Adams Court declares the search of a car lawful as
being "incident to [a lawful] arrest," citing Carroll and Brine-
gar as authorities. But, as has been shown, Carroll did not
uphold a search incident to arrest. Rather, it is the landmark
case for upholding warrantless car searches based upon probable
cause grounds only. Therefore, why the reliance of the Adams
Court on Carroll when upholding the lawfulness of a search as
being one incident to arrest? Certainly the mere fact that a
car search is in issue does not make it automatically fall within
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Carroll, especially in view of subsequent case law on the sub-
ject. More importantly, if the Court were attempting to make
this a true "probable cause" case, as would seem to be indi-
cated by its reliance upon Carroll and Brinegar, why are the
"exigency" requirements not discussed? There is no considera-
tion at all of this second but equally essential element of the
Carroll rationale.
If, on the other hand, the Adams Court were actually up-
holding this search as one incident to a lawful arrest, as would
seem to be indicated by the language used by the Court, where
then is the appropriate precedent? Carroll's treatment of the
search incident rationale was mere dictum, and its discussion
of the "places" which could be searched under that theory has
been mooted by subsequent rulings. Why is there no reference
to or consideration of Chimel, Preston, or even Rabinowitz? 92
In short, the Adams Court has not only failed to cite proper
authority, it in no way resolved the correlative search incident
question of the proper scope of the search.
It may always be argued, of course, that these considerations
were simply never put in issue before the Court or, even if
they were, they were rendered moot by the fact that the search
of Williams' person had already turned up both the gun and
narcotics. Thus, the subsequent car search may have had little
real bearing on the case. But, in an area so rapidly changing as
that of search and seizure law, such valid contentions as may
exist in the Court's favor must always be suspect, especially
where there is no supportive argument in evidence at all.
Admitting that speculation may be precarious when based
on no more than the fact that the Court has neglected to speak
to a potentially important issue, it is possible that Adams may
be one of those cases. which marks the beginning of a new or
at least different approach to a controversial area of law.
9 3
It is apparent, for example, that the Court is not yet pre-
pared to rule specifically upon whether or not the arrest of
92 See Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646 (1971), in which Chimel was
held to be prospective only. Since the search of the defendant in Adams
occurred before the decision in Chimel was handed down, Rabinowitz
would have been controlling precedent for the Adams case as to search
incident law.
93 That Adams may have a substantial impact in the area of car searches
is amply illustrated by United States v. Ragsdale, 470 F.2d 24 (5th Cir.
1972). In this case, after developing an intriguing justification for "im-
puting" the knowledge of one police officer to another, the court appar-
ently reasoned that in Carroll-type situations, with exigent circum-
stances but absent full probable cause, Adams may be used to apply
Terry to car searches, allowing such searches on the basis of reasonable
suspicion rather than probable cause.
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a person (1) who is in or with a car on the public streets, (2)
who is handcuffed or at least placed in custody out of reach
of that car, and (3) who is so detained until the arrival of other
police officers who then search the car, has so "immobilized"
that automobile, absent other circumstances, as to remove the
situation from the realm of "exigent circumstances" required
for probable cause car searches.
It is possible that the Court, though it undoubtedly could
have articulated the probable cause necessary for a Carroll
rationale, even under a Chambers analysis, has considered in-
stead that the unique problems of car searches exempt them
from any "exigency" test at all where they are otherwise
"reasonable," especially when they are in fact contemporaneous
to a lawful arrest. If such is the case, it is incumbent on the
Court to articulate its reasoning.
It is also possible that the Court may be paving the first
steps in an effort to exempt contemporaneous car searches
totally from the strict limitations imposed upon search inci-
dent justifications by Chimel.
Finally, isn't it entirely possible that the Supreme Court
has simply disposed of these issues in a careless and confusing
manner?
However speculative the nature of the above observations,
the Court's treatment (or non-treatment) of the car search in
Adams has afforded its observers a unique opportunity to con-
sider the past development and present status of such case
material in our Supreme Court.
Frederick D. Lewis, Jr.

COMMENT
UCC § 9-503 - REPOSSESSION - STATE ACTION - DOES
REPOSSESSION BY A SECURED CREDrIOR PURSUANT TO STATUTORY AND
CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS CONSTITUTE STATE ACTION?
INTRODUCTION
U NIFORM Commercial Code (UCC) section 9-503 authorizes
the use of repossession, a self-help remedy, by secured
creditors in instances of default on the part of the debtor.' In
states where section 9-503 has been enacted into law, a number
of suits have been brought in federal district courts attacking
the constitutionality of the creditor's right to repossess without
prior notice and an opportunity for a hearing.2 The suits allege
that such a procedure violates fourteenth amendment due
process guarantees.
The purpose of this comment is to examine the arguments
concerning the constitutionality of repossession pursuant to
section 9-503. As will be seen, the central issue in the reposses-
sion cases is whether this "private" taking, when executed by
a secured creditor pursuant to statutory and contractual pro-
visions, can be said to be state action or action taken "under
color of" state law. If so, courts can proceed to measure the
taking against the fourteenth amendment guarantee of due
process of law. Following an examination of the meaning of
due process and a review of conflicting lower court decisions
in repossession cases, two theories which support a finding of
state action will be presented: One relies upon the "public
function" doctrine, and the other derives from the concept
of state sanction. Finally, the relationship between the statu-
tory and contractual repossession provisions will be examined.
I. BACKGROUND: CHALLENGING UCC SECTION 9-503
A. The Due Process Claim
Since the Supreme Court announced its decision in Snia-
I UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE [hereinafter cited as UCC] § 9-503 provides:
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the
right to take possession of the collateral. In taking possession a
secured party may proceed without judicial process if this can
be done without breach of peace or may proceed by action ....
In Colorado, UCC § 9-503 has been codified as COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
155-9-503 (Supp. 1965).
.2 Kirksey v. Theilig, 351 F. Supp. 727 (D. Colo. 1972); Greene v. First
Nat'l Exch. Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va. 1972); Oller v. Bank of
America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp.
614 (S.D. Cal. 1972); McCormick v. First Nat'l Bank, 322 F. Supp. 604
(S.D. Fla. 1971).
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dach v. Family Finance Corp.,3 summary prejudgment reme-
dies have been increasingly subjected to constitutional chal-
lenge.4 The most recent major case in this area is Fuentes v.
Shevin,5 in which petitioners challenged the constitutionality
of various state prejudgment replevin procedures under the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The challenged
statutory proceedings permitted a private party, upon the
posting of a bond, to obtain a prejudgment writ of replevin
through an ex parte application to the court clerk without a
hearing or prior notice to the other party. The sheriff would
then execute the writ by seizing the property.6 In broad lan-
guage, the Court held that procedural due process requires
notice and an opportunity for a hearing before the state may
legitimately authorize its agents to seize property in the pos-
session of one person upon the application of another.
The decision in Fuentes contained three strikingly expan-
sive interpretations of the due process clause and represented
a consolidation of the trend toward applying due process safe-
guards to any significant property interest. First, the Court
held that even a temporary, nonfinal taking was nonetheless a
deprivation within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment.
As noted by the Court, a wrong cannot be permitted to be
done simply because it can later be undone. 7 Second, even
though lacking full legal title, the purchaser under a condi-
tional sales contract has a sufficient property interest to trigger
procedural due process protections. The Court declared that
the fourteenth amendment has never been construed so nar-
rowly as to shield only undisputed ownership; rather, the pro-
tection extends to "any significant property interest." Third,
3 395 U.S. 337 (1969). In Sniadach, the Court held that Wisconsin's pre-
judgment garnishment of wages violated the fundamentals of pro-
cedural due process insofar as the garnishment procedure allowed a
taking of property without notice and prior hearing. See The Supreme
Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 113-18 (1969). For comments on
the ramifications of Sniadach, see Note, Some Implications of Sniadach,
70 COLUM. L. REV. 942 (1970).
4 E.g., Wheeler v. Adams Co., 322 F. Supp. 645 (D. Md. 1971) (unsuc-
cessful challenge to state replevin procedures); Santiago v. McElroy,
319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (distress sales under distraint pro-
cedures of state statute held unconstitutional); Laprease v. Raymours
Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970) (successful challenge
to state replevin procedure); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal.
1970) (Innkeeper's Lien Law invalidated); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d
258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971) (sustained challenge to state
claim and delivery law).
5 407 U.S. 67 (1972), noted in The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV.
L. REv. 1, 85 (1972).
6 See Fuentes v. Shevin, 47 U.S. 67, 73-78 (1972), and replevin statutes
cited therein.
7 Id. at 82.
8 Id. at 86.
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the Court made clear that the application of procedural due
process safeguards does not hinge upon value judgments with
respect to the "importance" or "necessity" of the goods to the
person from whom they are taken. Thus, the seized items in-
volved in Fuentes, which included a stereo, bed, and table, came
within the ambit of constitutional protection despite their ar-
guably nonessential nature. In sum, a partial interest in non-
essential property is protected against even temporary depriva-
tion.
Since the property replevied was subject to fourteenth
amendment guarantees, the requirements of the Constitution
were clear: "'Parties whose rights are to be affected are en-
titled to be heard; and that in order that they may enjoy
that right, they must be notified.' '" Moreover, the right to
notice and an opportunity to be heard must be given at a
meaningful time, in a meaningful manner. An opportunity for
a hearing after the seizure does not come at a meaningful
time. Thus, state replevin statutes which failed to provide
notice and an opportunity for a hearing to the debtor prior to
the issuance of the writ were held to be constitutionally de-
fective.
B. Repossession and the Repossession Cases
As a practical matter, the replevin statutes at issue in
Fuentes and repossession under UCC section 9-50310 are func-
tionally identical. Both authorize prejudgment seizure of prop-
erty, and in each instance, the taking is effected by virtue of
the unilateral decision of the creditor. The person from whom
the goods are taken is afforded no opportunity to justify his
possession. In short, both statutory replevin and repossession
sanction seizure of property before final judgment without even
a gesture of notice and hearing.
As the Court pointed out in Fuentes, the statutory replevin
devices involved in the case bore slight resemblance to their
common law ancestor.1" At common law, replevin was a remedy
by which to secure the return of a thing allegedly wrongfully
taken from the replevisor.1'2 The replevin statutes, however,
extended the reach of the remedy to allow action under it to
secure the return of goods allegedly wrongfully detained by
the debtor.
1 3
9 Id. at 80.
l0 For text thereof, see note 1 supra.





Similarly, UCC section 9-503 is used to effect the return
of a thing allegedly wrongfully detained by the debtor. In-
deed, the takings disputed in Fuentes were founded upon con-
'ditional sales contracts, a transaction within the purview of
Article 9 of the UCC. In view of the close affinity between
the two remedies, it appears that the statutory authorization
to repossess under section 9-503 is for all practical purposes a
duplicate of the replevin statutes held unconstitutional in
Fuentes. Given the Fuentes decision, and assuming arguendo
that the due process standards enumerated therein apply to
repossession, it is difficult to imagine how the Court could
avoid holding section 9-503 unconstitutional when the question
reaches it.
14
Of course, to maintain a claim under the fourteenth amend-
ment, some significant state involvement must be found.' 5
The fourteenth amendment erects no shield against private
wrongful conduct. 6 This need to find state action in order
to invoke the guarantee of due process provides the central
area of dispute regarding the constitutionality of repossession
pursuant to UCC section 9-503.
As mentioned earlier, statutory enactment of section 9-503
authorizes a secured creditor to repossess collateral upon default
on the part of the debtor.1 7 The crucial difference between re-
plevin (Fuentes) and repossession (UCC section 9-503) lies in
the actor who seizes the items. In the case of replevin, the
creditor, through the use of a writ, invokes the machinery of
the state, and it is an officer of the state, commonly the sheriff,
who seizes the property.' In these circumstances, there can
be no doubt as to the direct involvement of the state, and
the application of the fourteenth amendment follows auto-
matically. Repossession, on the other hand, does not directly
involve any state official. When a creditor repossesses on this
self-help basis, it is ostensibly a "private" taking effected by
the creditor or his agent-not a state officer."'
The Court. had no difficulty finding the requisite state
14 This is not to say that Fuentes will be held to control. Fuentes was a
4-3 decision, and it is entirely possible that the two Nixon appointees
who did not participate in that decision, Justices Pcwell and Rehnquist,
will join the dissenters in a subsequent case, restrict Fuentes to its facts,
and form a 5-4 majority against the debtor's position.
15 Civil Rights Cases, '109 U.S. 3 (1883).
16 Shelley v. Kraemer, 344 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
17 See note 1 supra.
18 See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 73-78 (1972).
19 Oller v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21, 23 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Mc-
Cormick v. First Nat'l Bank, 322 F. Supp. 604, 606 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
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action in Fuentes since the challenged statutes authorized a
state actor, the sheriff, to do the seizing. But repossession under
the UCC presents a more complex situation. The essential
question is whether this ostensibly "private" taking constitutes
state action sufficient to invoke due process safeguards. If
state action is found, Fuentes would seem to dictate invalida-
tion of UCC section 9-503.2
0
Lower court cases have split on the question of whether
state action can be found in repossessions made pursuant to
UCC section 9-503. Illustrative of this conflict are two California
federal district court cases decided prior to Fuentes: Adams v.
Egley2- and Oller v. Bank of America.
22
In Adams, the plaintiff received a bank loan in return for
which he executed a promissory note and security agreement
in favor of the bank. When he fell behind in his payments,
the defendant, acting on behalf of the bank, repossessed two
of the vehicles pledged as security under the agreement. The
court held that the California statutory enactment of UCC
section 9-503 and its impact on the security agreement (which
explicitly incorporated the statute) constituted sufficient state
involvement in the "private" taking to bring the due process
clause into play. In arriving at that conclusion, the court relied
heavily on the notion that a statute, as a form of state authori-
zation and encouragement (discussed more fully infra23) con-
stituted sufficient state involvement to bring acts taken under
the statute within the ambit of the fourteenth amendment.
Moreover, the Adams court refused to regard the security agree-
ment as creating an independent contractual right to repossess
but rather viewed the agreement as a mere embodiment of
state policy. As such, repossession was action taken "under
color of" state law. Once state action2 4 was found, the court
concluded that under Sniadach the taking violated the guaran-
tee of due process of law.
Oller v. Bank of America never reached the due process
question. The case involved an automobile repossession pur-
2 0 See note 14 supra.
21 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
22 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
23 See text pp. 271-74 infra.
24 The Supreme Court has held action "under color of" state law to be the
equivalent of state action. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7
(1966). In this note, the phrases will be used interchangeably. For
a good discussion of the possible differences in the meaning of these
phrases, see Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 211-12 (1970)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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suant to the terms of a conditional sale contract and UCC sec-
tion 9-503. The court dismissed the case on jurisdictional
grounds, holding no action "under color of" state law could
be found, and thus the court had no jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. section 1343(3)25 and 42 U.S.C. section 1983.26 The re-
possession was viewed as a purely private act done by a
private party to protect its contractual security interest. The
court rejected Adams' reliance on the notion of state authoriza-
tion and encouragement, reasoning that since this concept of
state action was derived from cases involving claims of racial
discrimination -claims which seem to enjoy special status-
it should be restricted to that type of case. The Oiler court
also alluded briefly to the difficulty of finding state action
where the actor is not a state official or one acting in conjunc-
tion with a state official, or where state action did not compel
the result, or where the power exercised was not of statutory
origin.
2 T
In Oller and subsequent decisions,2 courts have been hesi-
tant to regard the concept of state action as encompassing
secured creditors' acts of repossession. However, existing prece-
dents and theories supplementing those raised in Adams and
historical facts regarding the origin of the right to repossess
by private means shape a strong argument for the finding of
state action in this area.
2528 U.S.C. § 1343(3) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of a civil
action authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any right,
privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United
States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of
citizens or all persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States.
26 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regu-
lation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Consti-
tution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
27 342 F. Supp. at 23.
28 Kirksey v. Theilig, 351 F. Supp. 727 (D. Colo. 1972); Greene v. First
Nat'l Exch. Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va. 1972).
In Kirksey, Judge Arraj held that the Colorado enactment of UCC
§ 9-503 did not constitute sufficient state involvement with the acts of
the defendants (who repossessed plaintiffs' automobiles) to bring their
actions "under color of" state law. The opinion examined numerous in-
stances in which courts have found state action and held defendants'




The precise meaning of state action or action taken "under
color of" state law is indeed elusive. In examining the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, Mr. Justice
Clark noted that the Court has found fashioning a "precise
formula" for recognition of state responsibility to be an "im-
possible task," and each case must be decided by "sifting facts
and weighing circumstances. '21 Two key theories of state action,
the "public function" doctrine and the state sanction doctrine,
provide the basis for finding state action in the repossession
cases.
A. The "Public Function" Doctrine
Despite indications that it is very difficult to find state
action or action "under color of" state law where the actor
is not a state official, 3" courts have often found that "actions
of a private citizen can and in some [instances] do, become the
actions of the state for both the purposes of § 1983 and
the due process clause. '31 One of the instances in which a
so-called private act is transformed into an official one is
explained by the "public function" doctrine. Should the private
individual be performing a function traditionally performed by
the state3 2 or acting as an agent of the state, 33 the action taken
by the individual may be said to be that of the state, and hence
the individual is acting "under color of" state law.
3 4
In Hall v. Garson,35 for example, the court was faced with
a challenge to the constitutionality of the Texas Landlord Lien
statute. The court noted that while the alleged wrongful con-
duct was perpetrated by a person who was not a state officer
or state agency official,
the entry into another's home and seizure of another's property,
was an act that possesses many, if not all, of the characteristics
of an act of the State. The execution of a lien, whether a tradi-
tional security interest or a quasi writ of attachment or judg-
ment lien has in Texas traditionally been the function of the
Sheriff or constable. Thus Article 5238a vests in the landlord or
2. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
30 E.g., Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951); Jobson v. Henne, 355
F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1966); Warren v. Cummings, 303 F. Supp. 803 (D.
Colo. 1969).
31 Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430, 439 (5th Cir. 1970) and citations therein.
:2 Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308
(1968); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). But see Lloyd Corp. v.
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) as an indication that the Court is reluctant
to apply the public function doctrine.
33 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
34 Id.
35 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970).
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his agents authority that is normally exercised by the state and
historically has been a state function.3 6
Thus, in the instant case, even though the seizure of a
tenant's television set was made by her landlady and not a state
official, the court found the state action required to invoke the
protection of the fourteenth amendment.
This use of the "public function" doctrine is dealt with in
Magro v. Lentini Brothers Moving & Storage Co.,37 in which
the court noted in dicta that in the past three decades another
theory of state action had emerged whereby "private persons,
when performing traditionally public functions, [have] become
liable under section 1983 .... Under this approach, state action
can be found in defendant's execution of its own [Ware-
houseman's] lien."38
The quotations from Hall and Magro demonstrate that in
order to raise the "public function" doctrine in repossession
cases, it is necessary to examine the historical origins of re-
possession. If the right to repossession by private self-help and
without the invocation of state machinery did not exist at
common law, then the public function argument is applicable
since the creditor has assumed a function traditionally per-
formed by the state.
It is not clear that the right of secured creditors to re-
possess without judicial proceedings existed at common law.
39
36 Id. at 439.
37338 F. Supp. 464 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 460 F.2d 1964 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 406 US. 961 (1972). In Magro, the court refused to rule on
whether or not state action existed in defendant's execution of its own
Warehouseman's Lien, and rested its decision on the ground that the
procedure did not violate due process.
38 Id. at 466 n.7.
3 9 See 1 & 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY (1965)
[hereinafter cited as GILMORE]. But see Annot., 36 A.L.R. 853 (1925).
A crucial point made explicitly in Greene v. First Nat'l Exch. Bank,
348 F. Supp. 672, 675 (W.D. Va. 1972) and implicitly in Kirksey v. Theilig,
351 F. Supp 727, 730 (D. Colo. 1972) and Oller v Bank of America,
342 F. Supp. 21, 23 (N.D. Cal. 1972) is that the right to repossess with-
out recourse to the courts existed at common law. For support, they
refer to Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S, 67, 79 n.10 (1972), which cites the
common law recognition of self-help as a permissible remedy. See 2 F.
POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 572-75 (1st ed.
1895) [hereinafter cited as POLLACK & MAITLAND], and 3 W. HOLDSWORTH,
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 278-87 (3d ed. 1923) [hereinafter cited as
HOLDSWORTH]. But to derive from these treatises that a creditor had the
right to self-help repossession may well be a misleading overgeneraliza-
tion. Just as the Fuentes decision noted that replevin at common law
was a far cry from the contemporary meaning of replevin, the same
may be said of the nature and use of self-help at early common law, as
discussed by Holdsworth and Pollack and Maitland. These authors
emphasize at the outset that the very idea of self-help is antithetical
to that of the rule of law (see 3 HoLDswoRTH at 278), and any self-help
then recognized appears to be only in the cases of a wrongful taking
(see 3 HOLwSwoRTn at 278-80), analogous to the situation of early




The right of a secured party to take possession of the collateral
on default without judicial proceedings did not come to be
recognized until the 19th century:
40
Until early in the nineteenth century the only security devices
which were known in our legal system were the mortgage of
real property and the pledge of chattels. Security interests in
personal property which remained in the borrower's possession
during the loan period were unknown.
41
A number of security interest devices developed in response
to growing commercial needs; they included the pledge, the
chattel mortgage, the trust receipt, and the conditional sale.
42
As will be seen, these devices which vested the secured creditor
with a right to self-help were largely legislative creations.
Therefore it was through state action in the form of legislation,
and not common law development, that creditors were permit-
ted to use self-help, thereby performing what formerly had
been a public function.
At common law, the pledgee-creditor could exercise the
power of sale which had been coupled with the bailment and
apply the proceeds to the debt without enlisting the aid of
a court.43 Since any agreement by which the debtor was ac-
corded the right to possession of the collateral until default
could not be a pledge,44 pledge law has no application to the
repossession cases.
The chattel mortgage, first recognized in England during
the early 19th century, 45 was an exclusively statutory device in
Both authorities note that the oldest formal form of self-help is the
process of distraint; the two surviving forms of common law distraint
that Holdsworth treats are distraint damage feasant (the person who
finds beasts on his land doing damage may keep them until their
owner pays for any consequential damage) and the landlord's right to
distrain for rent (which stemmed from the peculiar nature of the land-
lord/tenant relationship). The latter was so highly regulated that Holds-
worth regarded it as "a peculiar form in which legal proceedings may
be initiated." See 3 HoLuSWOarH, at 283. In any case, these common
law forms of self-help are ostensibly devoid of a commercial setting and
seemingly have little bearing on a creditor's right to self-help in cases
of a debtor's default. Since neither of these authorities may be said to
directly deal with self-help in a commercial setting (which would be
more germane to the question of a common law right of creditors to
repossess), later treatises will be turned to in an effort to ascertain more
specifically the commercial creditor's right to self-help at common law.
4" 2 GILMORE § 44.1, at 1212.
41 1 GILMORE § 2.1, at 24 (emphasis added).
42 Id. §§ 1.1 to 4.12. UCC § 9-105 now lumps these various devices together
as "security agreements."
43 2 GILMORE § 43.2, at 1187.
44 1 GILMORE § 1.1, at 5.
45 Id. § 2.1, at 24-25.
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this country.46 Indeed, the chattel mortgage is commonly thought
to be inconceivable in the absence of statutory provision.
47
Statutes validating chattel mortgages were first enacted about
1820.48 As such, the American chattel mortgage and the rights
it conveys are not a function of common law development but
a creation of the legislature.
Similarly, the trust receipt was inaugurated during the
last quarter of the 19th century in response to perceived com-
mercial needs.49 But it did not receive widespread judicial
recognition, and it was not until the proposal of the Uniform
Trust Receipts Act and its adoption by the states (starting in
the 1930's) that the use of a trust receipt as a security interest
device was made possible.50
The final security interest device, the conditional sale,
was historically not favored by law,5 1 and in some states it
was initialy held void for vaguely articulated reasons of public
policy.
5 2
The modern conditional sale derived in part from the law
of sales at common law and reflects this heritage.53 In the case
of default on the part of the debtor, the creditor could either
repossess and retain payments already made or sue for the
balance due; he could not do both at common law.54 The reme-
dies of repossession or action on the debt were viewed as in-
consistent and hence mutually exclusive by the courts. 55 Any
agreement which permitted both remedies was treated as a
chattel mortgage.5 6
This election of remedies requirement worked harshly
upon creditors because of the strong possibility of a deficiency
upon resale of the repossessed items, and it was not until the
late 19th century that the conditional sale assumed any com-
mercial significance. 57 At this juncture, most jurisdictions re-
46 See 2 G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 495 (rev.
ed. 1940).
47 Glenn, The Chattel Mortgage as a Statutory Security, 25 VA. L. REV. 316,
339 (1939).
48 1 GILMORE § 2.2, at 26. See also 1 L. JONES, CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND
CONDITIONAL SALES §§ 190-235 (R. Bowers ed. 1933).
4) 1 GILMORE § 4.1, at 86.
,0Id. §§ 4.2, 4.3, at 94-99.
51 3 L. JONES, supra note 48, § 905, at 7-9, § 938, at 43-46.
52 E.g., Turnbull v. Cole, 70 Colo. 364, 201 P. 887 (1921). 3 L. JONES, supra
note 48, § 938, at 43 n.18, contains an extensive list of such cases.
- 1 GILMORE § 4.1, at 86.
54 Id. § 3.2, at 66; 3 L. JONES, supra note 48, §§ 1308-10, at 379-86.
55 See Note, 17 MINN. L. REV. 66 (1932).
• E.g., In re Berghoff Printing Co., 62 F.2d 493, 494 (6th Cir. 1932). See
also 2 G. GLENN, supra note 46, § 513.
57 1 GILMORE § 3.2, at 67-68.
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acted by passing filing statutes which eliminated the doctrine
of election of remedies and made the debtor liable for any
deficiency after repossession while giving him the right to any
surplus.
58
This history reveals not only that "[t]he modern security
device which we call conditional sale bore little resemblance to
its common law ancestor,"' but also that the conditional sale,
as we know it, was shaped through pre-Code or Code legisla-
tion. What had made the common law conditional sale unde-
sirable for use - its requirement of election of remedies -
was eliminated largely through legislative action which con-
ferred a practicable right to "private" self-help.
Thus, far from being a clearly established right at com-
mon law, the right to retake by self-help arose essentially
through legislative action. It was largely through legislation
that secured creditors were vested with a practicable right
of self-help; by authorizing repossession without invocation of
state machinery, the legislation turned over to these creditors
a function traditionally performed by the state. As such, action
under such legislation can be said to be state action in the
context of the "public function" doctrine.
B. State Sanction
In addition to the "public function" theory, a second ra-
tionale exists under which repossession pursuant to UCC sec-
tion 9-503 can be found to be state action. It is not only true
that if the state through legislative action vests a right to
private action which did not exist at common law (in this
case the use of private self-help to effect repossession of a
defaulting debtor's goods),6" then conduct taken pursuant to
the statute is action "under color of" state law. 61 But, more-
over, when the state authorizes and encourages (i.e., sanctions)
private action, then the private acts resulting from such au-
thorization or encouragement constitute state action.
62
State laws which compel a particular result clearly bring
the actor's conduct "under color of" law. 3 Although when one
moves away from compulsion, the law becomes less clear, the
58 Id. § 3.2, at 68. It should be noted that in some states the early doctrine
of election of remedies was eliminated through case law; see Gilmore &
Axelrod, Chattel Security, 57 YALE L.J. 517, 543 (1948).
oll 1 GiLMvoE § 3.2, at 63.
61 See Section A supra.
6i Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970); DeCarlo v. Joseph
Horne & Co., 251 F. Supp. 935 (W.D. Pa. 1966).
62 Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
63 Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
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Supreme Court's decision in Reitman v. Mulkey04 significantly
illuminates this gray area.
The Reitman case involved litigation between private par-
ties regarding a constitutional amendment passed by California
voters which, in effect, repealed fair housing laws and gave
private individuals absolute discretion in transferring property.
5
The Court affirmed the California Supreme Court's decision
that such an amendment violated the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment.6 The state court based its re-
sult on its determination that where the intent is to authorize
private racial discrimination and to create a constitutional right
to discriminate, "the section would encourage and significantly
involve the State in private racial discrimination contrary to
the Fourteenth Amendment.
'67
Thus, to find action taken under color of law, it is not
necessary for state laws to compel the result. Rather, state
action may be found in cases where state policy, as expressed
in laws, merely "encourages" or "authorizes" private persons
to violate fourteenth amendment guarantees.
Moreover, the state's role need not be active in the al-
leged wrongdoings; a passive stance which in effect sanctions
wrongful results may lead to a finding of state action. Burton
v. Wilmington Parking Authority"8 was an action for declara-
tory and injunctive relief involving the Eagle Coffee Shop, a
lessee of the Parking Authority which in turn was an agency
of the state. In finding sufficient state action to apply four-
teenth amendment claims to the coffee shop's refusal to serve
Negroes, the Court stated:
By its inaction, the Authority, and through it the State, has not
only made itself a party to the refusal of service, but has elected
to place its power, property and prestige behind the admitted
discrimination.
6 9
In Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 70 Mr. Justice Brennan rec-
ognized and cogently articulated the broad scope of state action:
Our prior decisions leave no doubt that the mere existence of
efforts by the State, through legislation or otherwise, to author-
ize, encourage, or otherwise support racial discrimination in a
particular facet of life constituiesiiigal state involvement in
those pertinent private acts of discrimination that subsequently
"4387 U.S. 369 (1967).
65 Id.
Of Id.
7 Id. at 376 (emphasis added).
08 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
"9 Id. at 725 (emphasis added).
71398 U.S. 144 (1970).
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occur. . . . This is so, as we noted in Reitman v. Mulkey ...
whether or not the private discriminator was actually influ-
enced in the commission of his act by the policy of the State.
Thus, when private action conforms with state policy, it becomes
a manifestation of that policy and is thereby within the ambit
of state action.
71
The authorization and encouragement rationale of these
cases, all of which involved racial discrimination, has been ex-
tended by some lower courts to include situations where racially
motivated acts were not a factor. In Klim v. Jones, 72 the plain-
tiff sought to have California's Innkeepers Lien Law declared
unconstitutional, alleging that it permitted a taking of property
without due process of law. In this case, the plaintiff, who had
allegedly fallen behind in payments for his hotel room, was
padlocked out of the room, his personal belongings remaining
inside. In holding the imposition of the lien without any sort
of hearing violated due process, the court relied on Reitman to
find the requisite state action. After noting that it was only
by virtue of the statute that the defendant had the right to
impose the lien (since no such right existed at common law),73
the court added: "This is not just action against an amorphous
background of state policy, but instead is action encouraged,
indeed only made possible, by explicit state authorization.
'74
In holding the prejudgment repossession procedures com-
plained of were executed "under color of" state law, the court
in Adams v. Egley75 also relied heavily on the rationale under-
lying Reitman. The UCC sections under scrutiny (9-503 and
9-504) "set forth a state policy, and the security agreements
upon which the instant actions rest . . . are merely an embodi-
ment of that policy.176 Thus, it was apparent to the court that
the acts of repossession were made "under color of" state
law.
77
When viewed against the backdrop of UCC Article 9 in its
entirety, the state sanction approach gains additional potency.
Part 5 of Article 9, which deals with default,7 8 is arguably not
71 Id. at 202-03 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
72 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
73 Id. at 114.
74 Id.
75 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
76 Id. at 618.
77 On the "imprimatur" of UCC § 9-503 coupled with the use of the court
system "to grind out deficiency judgments" as constituting state action,
see Clark, Default, Repossession, Foreclosure, and Deficiency: A
Journey to the Underworld and a Proposed Salvation, 51 ORE. L. REv. 302,
329 (1972).
78 UCC §§ 9-501 to -507.
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neutral, and when enacted, establishes a state policy more
favorable to the secured creditor than the debtor.79 Moreover,
Part 5 represents more than a recodification of existing law;
rather, it provides "the first truly integrated system for realiza-
tion by secured parties," by eliminating the technical dif-
ferences among various forms of security agreements.80 And
through the establishment of an elaborate state mechanism for
the filing of security interests (as provided for in the UCCS1),
the state becomes actively involved in aiding the secured
creditor. In this sense, the state is more than an idle bystander
in UCC transactions.
The involvement of the state through extensive legislation
in this field, gives rise to another argument for the finding of
action "under color of" state law. The argument is essentially
an outgrowth of the notion of the security agreement as an
embodiment of state policy, and involves the relationship be-
tween the statute and contract right.
III. EFFECT OF THE EXISTENCE OF BOTH
CONTRACTUAL AND STATUTORY RIGHTS
The interaction between the statutory right to repossess
(given by legislative enactment of UCC section 9-503) and the
privately made contractual right to repossess upon default, a
clause frequently found in standard form conditional sales
contracts, 2 poses an interesting question regarding the extent
of independence of the contractual right. May the secured
creditor argue that he repossessed pursuant to the contract
and not the statute and thus avoid the strictures of due process?
In Santiago v. McElroy,8 3 a case dealing with that issue,
the plaintiff alleged that the Pennsylvania statutory distress
proceedings8 4 were unconstitutional as violative of fourteenth
amendment rights. The court narrowed the issue to distress
sales, and held that such sales are executed "under color of"
law and that they violated due process guarantees. 85 In so
holding, the court had to deal with defendant landlord's conten-
tion that the taking and the sale were accomplished by a
private party pursuant to a pfovision in a lease agreement be-
7 See Clark, supra note 77, at 306.
80 See Hogan, The Sec-ured Party and Default Proceedings Under the UCC,
47 MINN. L. REV. 205, 253 (1962).
8 See UCC §§ 9-401 to -407.
82 E.g., Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
83 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
84 Distress proceedings enable the landlord to seize the property of a
tenant in arrears and sell the distrained goods. Id. at 286-87.
85 Santia g v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
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tween private parties.8  Hence, argued defendants, the taking
was private and not made pursuant to the distress statute, and
thus there was no state action to measure against the four-
teenth amendment." The court did not agree:
The lease provision permitting levies and sales does not purport
to create an independent right in the landlord to distrain; rather,
the tenant agrees only that the landlord has the right to act pur-
suant to [the relevant statute] .... 8s
In effect, the contract right was subsumed by the statutory
right.
A similar result was reached in Adams v. Egley. 89 After
noting that the security agreement in question was merely an
embodiment of state policy, the California court, while hesi-
tant to go as far as did the court in Santiago, concluded:
Even if an independent right to repossess is created by the signed
security agreement, that right is created under authority of state
law, and consequently does not defeat the jurisdiction of this
court.
9 0
A finding that the contract right does not stand independ-
ently of the statutory right is particularly appropriate in cases
of security agreements made pursuant to the UCC. As shown
in Section II A, supra, the right contracted for (to repossess by
self-help) was initially vested by statutory enactment, and thus
the right is more of a function of the statute than an ordinary
contractual provision. Moreover, the extensive legislation in
this area governing the /terms and effect of the security agree-
ment also remove the security agreement from the realm of the
traditional common law contract. Since it is the state filing
mechanism which makes the system operative (in terms of
effectiveness), security agreements made pursuant to the UCC
rely heavily on state involvement in that field.
To carry this argument to an extreme and assert no con-
tract right exists independent of the law because ultimately
the right to contract is given by law and all contracts ulti-
mately rely on the protection of the law for enforcement, would
be to do the theory an injustice. What is suggested herein is
that the special relationship that the statute as the creator and
vestor of the right to repossess, and the reliance on the state
filing system as a means of perfection of rights, bear on the
contract right in an unusually heavy way. The contract right
86 Id. at 294.
87 Id.
88 Id.
'41 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
90 Id. at 618.
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in this instance derives from the statute, depending upon its
creating and sustaining force.
CONCLUSION
A compelling case can be made that where a secured
creditor repossesses pursuant to contractual provision sanc-
tioned by legislative enactment of UCC section 9-503, such
action is taken "under color of" state law. The contractual
right is subsumed by the statutory provisions, and the former
does not stand as an independent ground for justification of
the creditor's conduct. Since the secured creditor's right to
private self-help did not exist at common law, it was only by
virtue of statutory enactment that such right was vested and
institutionalized. Because the state vested the secured creditor
with the right to private self-help in lieu of the traditional
remedies involving invocation of the machinery of the state,
and because the state authorizes and encourages these private
takings, the repossessing creditor's conduct falls within the
ambit of action taken "under color of" state law. Once action
"under color of" state law, and hence state action, is found,
the due process clause will not tolerate takings without notice




HANDLING CONSUMER CREDIT CASES
By BARKLEY CLARK,
JOHN R. FONSECA
Rochester, New York: The Lawyers Co-Operative Publishing
Company; San Francisco, California: Bancroft-Whitney Com-
pany, 1972. Pp. xi, 738. $35.00.
A literate well-organized book, Handling Consumer Credit
Cases, by Professors Clark and Fonseca, is indeed a signifi-
cant, fresh offering in the area of consumer credit law.
I heartily agree with the authors' prefatory comment that
"consumer credit has now fully emerged as an independent
area of the law." Their pioneer effort to delineate the scope
of this new legal area is admirable. Earlier authors such as
Homer Kripke in Consumer Credit, Text-Cases-Materials (West
1970), and William F. Young, Jr. in Consumer Credit, Cases
and Materials (West 1969), seemed unsure of whether they
were defining a new body of law or merely exploring a sub-
area of the law of sales. Professors Clark and Fonseca cor-
rectly identify consumer credit as an independent, emerging
body of law.
Instinctively knowing that the scope of "consumer credit
law" is not narrow, the authors have incorporated deceptive
trade practices, warranties, and right to privacy, inter alia,
as part of the area. Logically, they could have swept even
more broadly by including other current lively matters such
as sex discrimination in credit, or anti-trust concerns in con-
sumer credit.
Throughout the book, but with special focus in Chapters
XII and XIII, the authors display their experience in the new
area by insisting that consumer credit law must finally be
reduced to a question of the effectiveness of the relief that
complements the emerging substantive law.
Unfortunately, there are several troublesome features of
Handling Consumer Credit Cases. The authors' intentions are
puzzling. Their "Research References," which appear at the
end of each section, suggest an intention to introduce con-
sumer credit law to the unacquainted practitioner. If that is
their aim, the mark is significantly missed. The practitioner
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will find the chapters a lively overview, but not a research
tool. Indeed, the authors' conundrum is their apparent assump-
tion that the reader is already conversant with credit law en-
actments and jargon. They offer no real practical aid for credit
counselling, such as checklists of problem areas, forms, sample
complaints, or other tools of a true research piece. Without
proper preguidance, I believe that the unfamiliar practitioner
will be simply puzzled rather than instructed.
As a classroom tool for students, if that is intended, the
book is again not in focus. It offers no case readings, queries,
or problems, and without extensive editorial comments by an
instructor, it is too sophisticated. Furthermore, its retail price
is prohibitive for students.
I am particularly saddened that this book is not adaptable
for classroom use, for I had so anticipated. The authors surely
adapt these materials in some form for their own students, and
I thus suggest that they publish their own course material in
some usable textbook form for those of us who teach in this
area.
Although the authors prefatorily state their hope that the
book will be useful to banks, retailers, legislators, and so forth,
for reasons suggested above that hope is ephemeral. Indeed,
it seems the book is written for the authors themselves and
for those of us who reflect on the materials to which the
book refers as preparation for teaching the area in a more
mundane way. A particularly obvious key to this seemingly
overriding purpose is the emphasis on the National Consumer
Act.1 Comparing the Uniform Consumer Credit Code with the
National Consumer Act is enjoyable as an academic exercise,
but it can be no more than that - the credit industry will fight
the National Consumer Act to its death. At the most, the Na-
tional Consumer Act has inspired revisions of selected amend-
ments to the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, as is now evident
in Working Redraft No. 4 of the Code and its earlier Working
Redrafts, or in a unique enactment such as the Wisconsin Con-
sumer Act, passed in early 1972.2
If the National Consumer Act is relevant, then why have
the authors omitted Senator Proxmire's proposed Fair Credit
Billing Act;3 or the proposed federal Consumer Protection Agen-
1 NATIONAL CONsUMER LAW CENTER, NATIONAL CONSUMER ACT (FIRST
FINAL DRAFT 1969).
2WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 421-27 (1972).
3 S. 652, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
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cy;4 or the numerous bills 5 which would expand the juris-
diction of the Federal Trade Commission under section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act 6 and permit private remedial
relief, even class actions thereunder; or the studies and hear-
ings of the National Commission on Consumer Finance; or the
class action studies of the National Institute for Consumer
Justice or the American College of Trial Lawyers?
Of course, any book in this swiftly changing field can
only be of fleeting moment. Many suggestions in the book
indicate the authors' awareness of its transient value. The
Uniform Consumer Credit Code is under substantial revision
after only six amended passages in relatively minor states since
its promulgation in 1968.1 Although the National Consumer Act
seems dead, Congress probably will not wait for the states
to enact legislation to match rising consumer and consumer-
advocate expectations. And every enacted statute seems to be
undergoing proposed revision and constant (and often con-
flicting) judicial and administrative interpretations. All we can
do is capture an overview sense of the present and be ana-
lytically prepared for the future. Professors Clark and Fonseca
have made a contribution in that regard.
L. Richard Freese, Jr.*
4S. 1160, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 564, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973); II.R. 5389, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
See, e.g., S. 986, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972), which sets up rather elabo-
rate provisions and particular language to be used for designation of
warranties in consumer sales; and S. 1222, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972),
which would expand the availability of class actions.
15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
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